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Abstract  
 
Since before the Neolithic Revolution, when human civilisation first emerged, 
humans and canines have lived, and died, together.  This Scottish study is 
conducted in the field of animal-human interaction and, using qualitative 
methods, applies established insights from the sociology of health (born of 
human-to-human interaction) to a human-animal relationship.  Specifically, this 
thesis explores death and dying in relations between the companion canines, 
and the human members, of ten families.   
 
Nonhuman illness narratives are found in profusion in this study, and it was also 
found to be possible to apply biographical disruption to nonhumans, when 
conceptualised as biographical disruption-by-proxy. Unexpectedly, there 
emerged from the data support for a four-fold model of canine selfhood, as 
forged within the family.  This is, as far as I am aware, the first modelling of a 
specific nonhuman consciousness, within the discipline.   
 
Suffering was found to exist in both physical and non-physical forms for the 
companions, and a mutual vulnerability to loneliness, and desire for 
companionship, appears to be a powerful point of connection between the 
humans and the canines.  Being together emerged as both a practice, and as 
an ideal, that moulded the human-canine relations, and it was regarded as 
unfitting for a canine to die alone.   
 
Companion canine dying comes forth as a negotiated process, shaped by a 
divide between gradual and sudden death. This work encountered developed 
narratives of departure, that seem to structure the experience of losing a 
companion.  In particular the role of the expert is a privileged voice in the 
negotiations of dying, and the biomedical view is treated as being definitive.  
The role of the expert is not simply submitted to however, but a range of 
stances to veterinary authority are displayed, being; acquiescence, resistance 
and invalidation of the veterinary voice.  Ultimately, whilst interplays of wellbeing 
are present, they are less biophysically grounded, than they are rooted in the 
everyday routines of life, in the rituals of eating, sleeping, walking, and playing 
together, that compose the shared world of the human and companion canine.   
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Chapter 1  ~  Introduction  
 
1.1 On the Question of Dogs  
The first question that leaps to mind is why dogs?  What can a study of dogs 
possibly tell us about society and social processes?  Is the study of canines not 
incidental to a science which explores and seeks to understand society?  The 
short answer to these questions is that the study of human canine relations is 
not incidental to a science of society, and companion canines are profoundly 
implicated in social processes.  One of the deepest tenets of Sociology is that 
the powerful, the significant things, can be hidden in the everyday (Scott, 2009).  
What could be more everyday than watching someone walking their dog, canis 
lupus familiaris, along the streets of Scotland.  Yet this taken for granted, 
everyday sight, speaks to a depth and breadth of relations across the social 
web.   
 
In the 10,000 years since the Neolithic Revolution, that turning point of our 
species when humans first transformed from hunter gathers into settled 
agrarian societies, human beings have lived in the company of wolves and their 
descendents (Gopher, Abbo and Lev-Yadun, 2001). Indeed, archaeological 
evidence supports the domestication and training of the first wolf pups by Stone 
Age Peoples beginning at least 12,000 years ago (Guisepi, 2009).  Moreover, 
the human-canine relation constitutes the first human-nonhuman alliance.  
Canines were domesticated a full two to three thousand years before humans 
domesticated sheep or goats (Davis, 1987).  Sheep being the first animals that 
we know were domesticated for food, at around 9,000 BC in the Middle East 
(Davis, 1987).  In terms of funerary rites, there are early canine burials found in 
Sweden dating from around 5250-3700 BC, with joint human-canine burials 
found in Germany from even earlier (Hirst, 2009).   
 
For the entire history of our society we have lived, worked and died with 
canines.  Indeed that bond between human and nonhuman appears to pre-date 
civilisation itself, and embrace the deep Paleolithic pre-history (dating from 
35,000 to 10,000 BC) when wolves, who were thought to be scavenging the 
camps of our most remote hunter gather ancestors, began to ally with humans 
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(Gopher, Abbo and Lev-Yadun, 2001).  It is a primal, possibly even a proto-
social relation, for a human and canine to live and die as companions.   
 
1.2 Research Questions  
This study applies insights from human-human relations surrounding death and 
dying, to human-animal relations.  The original intention was to do this by 
extending the established wisdom of sociological thought outward, and 
connecting these theories across the human/animal divide at four key areas:  
 
I. Serious Illness - To explore the experience of serious illness in companion 
canines, for their owners1 and those in the animal’s immediate society.  
This will be carried out with particular attention to the work of Charmaz 
(1983) on identifying subtle forms of suffering, and Michael Bury’s (1982; 
2001) work on biographical disruption.   
 
II. Practices surrounding Death and Dying - To highlight the everyday 
activities, rituals and practices associated with the death and dying of 
companion animals.  This will be conducted with attention to the seminal 
work of Glaser and Strauss (1965).  This aspect of the study will explore 
the rituals in place and seek out any patterning of everyday activities, 
regular visiting of graves and keeping of jars for disposal etc. 
 
III. Dying and Meaning - To reveal the meanings surrounding the death and 
dying of a companion canine to their owner, and those in the animal’s 
immediate society. Taking previous work, particularly Fulton’s on death 
and identity (1976), and exploring to what extent an understanding born of 
studying human death is reflected in the meaning(s) given to canine death.   
 
IV. Wellbeing - To consider any disruptions to wellbeing and the impacts upon 
the welfare of the owner, and those in the companion canine’s immediate 
society, of their illness and death.  To explore possible influences upon 
                                                 
1 The term owner has recently been challenged as potentially reinforcing an exploitative relation 
towards animals, however, I agree with Sanders (1999) that it remains a useful term, describing 
the social situation of certain animals.   
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wellbeing by building upon the work of Mort et al. (2007) regarding the 
2001 foot and mouth outbreak;  particularly their findings that interplays of 
human/animal wellbeing are embedded deep in the social web, beyond 
the access of the bio-medical frame alone. 
 
Once data collection was underway, in the second year of the thesis, it became 
clear that objective 2, which focused on everyday practices connected with 
death, such as the visiting of graves and regular remembrances, was not 
emerging as a concern within the raw data.  This question had been developed 
following my study ‘On Meaning and Companion Animals’ (Desougi, 2008), 
which explored the lives of three families with multi-species companion animals.  
One of these families had regular, and developed, practices connected with the 
death of the companions, and coming from this I had considered that it may be 
a fruitful area for future enquiry.  However, it now appears that this case may 
have been a stand-alone instance, of a particular focus on ritualistic 
remembrance, and practice, of that family, and this emphasis is not reflected in 
the data of the subsequent two studies conducted and the experience of the 
other 16 families I have encountered.  Also, within this study there emerged a 
rich stream of data focused around the phenomena of various everyday 
practices, concerned, not with death rituals, but with the rituals of everyday 
living, in essence wellbeing.  Therefore in the second year of the PhD, the 
decision was taken to amend the original objectives of the thesis to respond to 
this new emphasis.  There are now three core questions in the study, which are;  
 
I. Serious Illness, Self and Suffering – Can established sociological insight 
based on the study of humans, be applied to nonhuman illness and 
suffering, and are there possibilities for a nonhuman selfhood?  (The 
original research question was expanded, to include the experience of a 
self, which is implicated in the understanding of suffering.) 
 
II. Dying and Meaning – To reveal the meanings surrounding the death and 
dying of a companion canine to their owner, and those in the animal’s 
immediate society.  
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III. Everyday Practices and Wellbeing – original questions 2 and 4, being 
practices surrounding death and welfare respectively, have been conflated 
into a single objective. The focus of this third objective is: to explore the 
everyday practices of living with a companion canine, with particular 
attention to times of illness and loss, and to consider any interplays of 
wellbeing between human and nonhuman that may be present.     
 
1.3 Symbolic Interaction and the Possibility of Animal Agency  
This research is conducted within the discipline of Sociology, specifically the 
fields of animal-human interaction and the Sociology of Health and Illness.  The 
field of animal-human interaction was recognised by the British Sociological 
Association in 2006, when the minimum 12 people were gathered, myself being 
one of them, to form the Animal-Human Studies Group (AHSG).  Even in this 
short space of time the field in Britain is flourishing, and an increasing number 
of studies are being researched and reported (AHSG, 2013).   
 
Animal-human interaction is part of the interpretivist stream of the discipline and 
in particular is influenced by the symbolic interactionist and the ethnographic 
traditions.  Until recently it was not possible to embrace nonhumans within 
symbolic interactionism.  This was because interactionism is founded upon 
concerns with meaning and mindfulness, and in orthodox symbolic 
interactionism animals could not be embraced in this understanding, due to their 
perceived lack of capacity to endow their own behaviour with meaning and a 
presumed absence of consciousness.   
 
The animal has no mind, no thought, and hence there is no meaning 
here in the significant or self-conscious sense. 
 (Mead1964:168, cited in Sanders 1999) 
 
At the birth of symbolic interactionism society itself was conceived of by Mead 
as a web of meaningful interactions (O’Donnell, 2001).  However, “Mead drew a 
very hard line between humans and animals by asserting that the latter were 
not capable of symbolic interaction” (Alger, 1997:65), rendering the world of 
nonhumans outwith the reach of our discipline.   
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The rigidity of this understanding has consequences for the way in which the 
social web is conceived and understood.  It also has far reaching consequences 
for how nonhuman life is regarded and related to.  That which does not have a 
self, does not have to be regarded as a subject, and can more easily be 
identified and used, or even abused, as an object (Vertlesen, 2005).  It was 
encouraging to see these issues raised in an issue of Sociology, by Kay Peggs.  
Though Peggs (2009) does not specifically address the thought of Mead, she 
does analyse and critique the ways in which organic differences, which exist 
between all creatures, are transformed into an ‘us and them’ divide between 
human and nonhuman. With this divide between human and nonhuman then 
being utilised as a source of human identity.   
 
Human primacy discourses are fundamental to human primacy identity 
politics, since such discourses influence perception of the relationship 
between human and nonhuman animals and reflect and reinforce any 
notions we might have of our own superiority.  (Peggs, 2009:86) 
 
Peggs (2009) goes so far as to contend that human primacy discourses 
represent, correctly I would argue, a form of human worship, where animals are 
“anthropolatrically approved resources for actions that result in human gains, 
and such actions are based in power relations between human and nonhuman 
animals” (Peggs, 2009:88).  By declaring humans superior to animals, other 
forms of life and sentience then become secondary, even servile, beings, which 
can justifiably be exploited or destroyed (Peggs, 2009); in human primacy 
discourse animals are deemed to exist as part of the ‘natural’ world, as 
resources for human use, rather than as beings in their own right.  By living 
outwith the realm of society, and the subject, nonhumans have less status, and 
do not receive the basic protections, as a part of society.   
 
In interactionist terms, being without meaning and consciousness, animals 
cannot be regarded as part of the social world, as they cannot manifest agency 
(Mead, 1964).  The work of Goffman, particularly Frame Analysis (1974), 
constitutes one point at which this restriction is breached, at the theoretical 
level.  Goffman presents a way of conceiving the invisible structures that 
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underlie experience and action.  Particularly pertinent to this study is Goffman’s 
identification of a “cosmological divide” (1974:30) separating human and animal.   
A cosmological divide is the most fundamental divide in the framing of 
experience, and as such it is difficult to question, given its deep social 
embedding and taken for granted nature, but it remains a social construction 
born of social processes nonetheless (Goffman, 1974), and is therefore open to 
sociological inquiry.  In this case a divide is socially constructed that separates 
human and animal, in a distinctly ‘us and them’ sense, with that which is human 
being seen as peculiar, indeed frequently superior to, as Peggs (2009) alludes, 
that which is animal.   
 
In light of this understanding Goffman proposes that it is possible for animals to 
be social agents, particularly with regard to their capacity to frame play as a 
non-threatening act and to communicate this meaning of their actions to 
another, his example being the play of otters (1974).  Being able to frame action 
and respond to social cues is indicative of both meaningful action and 
mindfulness.  Goffman thus opens the way for a new wave of ethnographic and 
interactionist research, which embraces nonhumans and takes our 
understanding of social process across “the great divide” (Nimmo, 2012:177).   
 
However, though I would argue that nonhumans, particularly canines as they 
are the interest here, may possess and demonstrate agency, I am not 
convinced that it is the substantial agency which a free adult citizen, without 
disability and living in contemporary Scotland, would possess.  The agency of 
companion canines is limited.  They do not choose when or what they eat, 
where they go for walks, with whom and in what conditions they live, they are 
generally not free to leave their humans companions, apart from the extreme 
action of running away, which risks starvation, disease and death.  There are 
powerful controls on the expression of both bodily processes and emotional 
displays.  Even their urination and defecation has been disciplined, and is 
subject to human control regarding time and place. Whilst the canine 
companions in this study may be regarded as possessed of agency, it is best 
understood, to borrow a term from Klocker’s work on child domestic workers, as 
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‘thin’ agency (Klocker, 2007).  The agency of the canines is ‘thin’ as it is 
embodied in “everyday actions that are carried out within highly restrictive 
contexts, characterized by few viable alternatives” (Klocker, 2007:1). The world 
of possibilities and opportunities of the companion canine is circumscribed by 
the world and will of their human keepers.   
 
1.4 Multi-species Society  
Whilst a particular animal, within a species, may be positioned as an object or 
as a subject, and this distinction is explored in the following chapter on the self, 
the cosmological divide renders all members of a species, indeed all who are 
not human, Other, as less than a full human subject.   
 
The work of Sanders, particularly Understanding Dogs: Living and Working with 
Canine Companions (1999), directly addresses the subjectification, of at least 
some members, of a species of animal.  Using an ethnographically informed 
approach Sanders (1999) explored animal-human interaction, researching the 
areas of guide dog training, veterinary care and everyday dog ownership.  He 
found that in these areas the humans regarded the animals as subjects, 
endowed with personality, feelings and individuality (Sanders, 1999).  Sanders 
argues passionately for an understanding of dogs as minded social actors, that 
are not only attributed with personhood, but also actively involved in the 
routines and rituals of the family (Sanders, 1999).   
 
Alongside this the Algers, using an ethnographic method, explored not only 
animal-human interaction, but also applied sociological method and theory to 
begin to chart animal-animal interaction, in this case by exploring the nonhuman 
society of cats (Alger and Alger, 1999).  They found a subtle and complex social 
organisation, with normative structures framing ways of welcoming strangers, 
arranging sleeping places and companions, and a hierarchical order affecting 
access to privileged places within the cat colony (Alger and Alger, 1999).   
Sociological method can, as in this case, open up an understanding far 
removed from the biological reductionism of the veterinary and zoological fields.  
That is not to suggest that insight into phenomenon such as mating practices 
and influences of hormones on behaviour is not fascinating and useful, but 
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rather that to conceive of animals only in this narrow reductive view, closes 
down vast avenues of thought and exploration.  Above all it overlooks, if not 
outright contradicts a crucial principal, that of ‘social primacy’ (Goffman, 1974).  
Human society is not played out against a backdrop of the natural world, as if a 
curtain of nature frames a stage upon which only people act and have 
significance.  Animals, in their understanding and being, are moulded by 
society, even as we are.   
 
Alger and Alger (1997) advocate a move away from language as the backbone 
of interactionism, to a greater embrace of interaction rituals as the basis for 
understanding inter-species relations, which, though to my knowledge they do 
not cite him, is a move firmly in the direction of Goffman (1974).  Goffman was 
born in the ethnographic tradition and based his earlier work, particularly his 
PhD, upon ethnographic methods.  Alger and Alger’s Cat Culture, Human 
Culture: An Ethnographic Study of a Cat Shelter (1999) is an innovatory piece 
of work.  Alger and Alger apply the ethnographic method to focus on both 
animal-human interaction and animal-animal interaction to explore the 
nonhuman society of cats.  Far removed from an understanding born of a 
biologically inspired view of aggression and territorial behaviour, they chart the 
“highly complex social structure” shaping a small artificially created colony of 
cats (Alger and Alger, 1999: unlisted pages).   There is a sense upon reading 
this work of standing at the edges of the tiny shore of our understanding as the 
Algers begin to chart the norms of a whole new society.  In the spirit of 
Sociology it appears that the deepest mysteries may have been sleeping quietly 
beside us, beneath a blanket of our taken for granted assumptions, all along.     
 
This raises the question, do nonhumans have to manifest their own society in 
order for them to be appropriate subjects of sociological study?  Whilst work has 
been done to substantiate the existence of communities amongst cats (Alger 
and Alger 1999) and estuary crabs (Lee 1997), which is valid in its own right, 
such justification is unnecessary.  We do not require nonhumans to form 
societies to prove themselves worthy of sociological analysis, the focus of 
societal construction need not be moved out with the realm of humanity for 
them to be embraced in our understanding. 
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In a constructivist approach human agents are the constructors of social reality 
(Gergen, 1999) and nonhumans can be understood as entities which carry the 
weight of human originated meaning.  It is through their contact with humanity, 
rather than any society that they may or may not have of themselves, that 
nonhumans are constituted; they are the bearers of our meaning.  From the 
beauty perceived in the curve of a swan’s neck to the courage in the eyes of the 
lion; these are projections of meaning.  The swan and the lion need be neither 
beautiful nor courageous in themselves, they simply are; it is through their 
interaction with us that they become the carriers of our meaning, the very mirror 
of our society.     
 
At the point of contact between human and nonhuman society, nonhumans 
cease to be pure entities of undifferentiated existence and become ‘sentient 
commodities’. The term sentient commodities is drawn from Wilkie’s exploration 
of the paradoxical relationship between domesticated livestock and their 
keepers (2005): however, this term could be extended to encompass not only 
nonhumans being kept and killed for food, but any nonhuman constituted by 
virtue of its contact with humanity.  From the moment of our first awareness and 
interaction with them nonhumans cease to be beings unto themselves and 
become objects of veneration or utilisation for consumption or pleasure in 
human society; they become commodified.  Moreover, the rules which govern 
the form and extent of an animal’s commodification do not necessarily originate 
from an animal’s innate attributes, the presumed loveability of the Chihuahua or 
repellence of the rat are meaningful constructions that originate within human 
society.   
 
A feature of Wilkie’s (2005) work is the attention given to ambiguity in our 
interactions with sentient commodities; the tensions of conflicting discourses 
becoming apparent.  In short where a sentient is utilised for food (which can be 
interpreted as a functionalist approach to their commodification) emotive 
distance is maintained least an affectional connection be formed with the 
sentient commodity.  Affectional connections being born of the discourse which 
perceives humans as carers, rather than utilisers of nonhumans, creating 
irresolvable tensions expressed as ambiguity (Wilkie, 2005). This can be seen 
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in the disparity between the required indifference to nonhuman death of the 
slaughter house employee and the abject grief of the hobby farmer on the death 
of a pig.  These tensions are frequently embodied in the same human being. In 
an act reminiscent of Goffman’s2 observation regarding staff in his Asylums, 
who “fall prey to the danger that an inmate may appear to be human” 
(1968a:79), a livestock worker may develop an attachment to an animal, which 
is problematic for their professional persona.    
 
Any animal, however, that deviates from the routine process of 
production can stand out from the herd, become individually recognised, 
have more meaning to the worker, and thus become more than ‘just an 
animal’.   (Wilkie, 2005:213)   
 
Understanding nonhumans as sentient commodities, whilst useful, does have 
limitations, it seems unsatisfactory as an explanation for the deep mythological 
and symbolic framing of animals which can be seen in diverse areas from art 
and religion to the toys of childhood (Kalof, 2007) and there is another very 
serious limitation.  In that whilst this concept is helpful in providing a way to 
examine and consider our relationship to nonhumans, it lacks an appreciation 
for the potential agency of the nonhuman in our relationship with them.  By 
limiting the awareness of their agency, we risk becoming blinded to evidence of 
it.  This is also a limitation with regard to my own contention that we do not need 
to prove nonhumans have they own society, in order for them to be worthy of 
sociological analysis.  Again, this focus, so strongly weighted towards the 
human perception, risks creating a conceptual view which will have difficultly 
recognising possible agency in the Other.   
 
Recent archaeological debate has challenged the established idea that early 
humans domesticated canines in a single event at a single site (Lobell and 
Powell, 2010).  It is being suggested that it may not be so clear cut, humans 
may not have simply gone forth and domesticated canines, the canines may 
have approached us. It is now suspected that domestication occurred at 
                                                 
2 It is also interesting to note that Goffman included nonhumans, in this case dogs, in his all 
embracing dynamics of impression management in The Presentation of the Self in Everyday 
Life (1959) 
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multiple sites around the globe, at multiple times, and that, “dogs descend from 
wolves that gathered near the camps of semi-sedentary hunter-gatherers, as 
well as around the first true settlements, to eat scraps. The process was 
probably driven by the animals themselves” (Lobell and Powell, 2010:pages 
unlisted).  It may be that the first impulse, the original agency, that birthed the 
very first human-nonhuman alliance, was not initiated by our species at all, but 
came from the Other.   
 
As Midgley points out, in the last few years the previously taken-for-granted 
behaviouristic scepticism towards animal agency has been steadily losing 
ground, in multiple fields, because simply “it is barren” (Midgley, 1998:136), and 
does not provide good explanations for animal motivation, intention or 
communication.  Though not a social scientific conference, I attended the 2013 
Scottish Conference on Animal Behaviour at Glasgow University, out of 
curiosity to see what some natural scientists were thinking.  I was intrigued to 
hear of multiple studies, at the cutting edge of animal behaviour, that were now 
operating with an understanding of nonhumans as being capable of agency and 
of some form of sentience.  It seems as if a flood gate has been breached and a 
new understanding of animal agency is being searched for, across diverse 
areas of study, which includes human and animal study itself emerging and 
becoming a new and growing field (Shapiro, 2008).  With regard to my 
discipline, though the numbers are still modest, several sociologists have turned 
their attention to human and animal relations, including: Alger and Alger (1997), 
Arluke and Sanders (1996), Arluke and Solot (1997),  Arluke (2006), Bryant 
(1979), Charles and Davies (2008), Convery et al. (2008),  Flynn (2000), 
Franklin (1999), Irvine (2004), Peggs (2012), Sanders (1999), and Wilkie 
(2010).  In the words of Wilkie, “contemporary sociology has clearly responded 
to the 'animal turn'” (Wilkie, 2013:pages unlisted).   
 
To be human is not to be a discrete entity, dwelling in isolation, a being that only 
thinks itself into existence in a lonely Cartesian sense. Even our bodies are not 
discrete, but are covered and filled with microscopic life.  The human genome, 
that grail of our science, is powerless to save us from our profound interweaving 
with other living things.  Human genomes can only be found in around 10% of 
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the cells of a human body, the rest belongs to the genomes of the bacteria and 
fungi (Harraway, 2008).  If to be human is to be set apart from other forms of 
life, and crowned as the only beings possessing sentience, then, in the words of 
Haraway, “we have never been human” (2008:1). To regard ourselves as 
separate, is to indulge in “the primary narcissism of the self-centred human 
subject, who tries to hold panic at bay by the fantasy of human exceptionalism” 
(Haraway, 2008:11).   
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Chapter 2  ~  Serious Illness, Self and Suffering  
 
If to be human is to be a living and sentient being and part of multi-species 
society, what are the implications of this for an orientation towards nonhumans, 
are they to be understood as objects of human action or subjects within the social 
web? This question stands at the frontier of Sociology.  In order to progress 
towards answering it, the first research question of this thesis will ask whether 
sociological insights concerning serious illness and suffering, which are 
experiences of a self, can be applied to nonhumans.  To begin, one of the 
significant sociological insights regarding human illness, is that it can be 
conceived of as form of biographical disruption.   
  
2.1. Biographical Disruption  
The term biographical disruption is born of the interpretivist tradition of Sociology.  
Specifically, it emerges in the field of medical sociology and appears to have first 
been utilised as a conceptual tool by Michael Bury (1982), who credits its origins 
as being from both the Parsonian and interactionist traditions.  However, I would 
argue that the focus on the agent and the lack of assumed legitimacy of the wider 
pre-existent power structures found in the Parsonian view, weights the concept 
as being more profoundly influenced by interactionist thought, even though Bury 
(1982) himself lists this influence second.  The concept of biographical disruption 
is situated in an ontology that is opposed to the objectivism of the bio-medical 
model, born as it is of the reductionism of the clinical gaze (Foucault, 1973), 
expressing a constructivist, possibly even a subjectivist, understanding of the 
nature of reality and an interpretivist epistemology.  It conceives that illness 
“especially chronic illness, is precisely that kind of experience where the 
structures of everyday life and the forms of knowledge which underpin them are 
disrupted” (Bury, 1982:169).   
 
This re-conceptualisation of illness has immediate and profound implications, not 
least in enabling a “welcome shift from the outsider perspective epitomised in the 
Parsonian concept …to an understanding of lay experiences” (Lawton, 2003:23).  
Biographical disruption also provides a conceptual basis for an extended 
appreciation of the suffering involved in chronic illness, in at least two ways.  First 
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understanding illness as biographical disruption enables an appreciation of 
suffering in terms of that experienced in the inner world of the agent, as the 
“organisation of attributes that has become consistent over time” (Charmaz, 
1983:170) is threatened with negative identification and isolation, in essence 
subjection to stigma in its overt form (Goffman, 1968b). Second by locating 
illness as a disruption in the social fabric, suffering by others in the immediate 
social network is embraced in this concept, such the difficulties experienced by 
parents caring for mentally ill young people (Harden, 2005), who found that the 
“invisibility of the condition was a double-edged sword” (Harden, 2005:363), in 
essence the problem of the covert management of stigma (Goffman, 1968b), 
particularly that of association (Harden, 2005).  The world of the chronically ill is 
peppered with suffering, experienced both by the agent and, if the illness is 
declared, by those around them, as all must adapt to this new and limited 
existence, hostile to many of the previously taken for granted assumptions (Bury, 
1982; Charmaz, 1983; Harden, 2005). I would argue that this evidences a deeply 
humane conceptualisation of the experience, far removed from the mechanistic 
reasoning that reduces the experience of the vital agents in their vast and 
intricate webs of meaningful interactions, to dysfunctioning of pieces of flesh.   
 
In biographical disruption, rather than chronic illness being understood as the 
malfunctioning of bodily organs, it is appropriately situated as a disturbance in the 
social frame, calling into question the underpinning narratives on which the agent 
is constructed.  This makes chronic illness a rich site for sociological enquiry, as it 
is at the point of contestation that underpinning structural forces, otherwise so 
taken for granted, may be more readily evident.  As Goffman (1974) highlights, 
the point at which frames break, is a place where the normative expectations that 
shape meaning can be seen.  Goffman also specifically pays attention to the 
body, in his words, “now it is apparent that the human body is one of those things 
that can disrupt the organisation of activity and break the frame, as when an 
individual appears in clothes that are unbuttoned or unsuitable” (Goffman, 
1974:347, emphasis added).  The body itself is a potential disrupter, perhaps 
particularly the leaking body, on the borders of human and animal (Haraway, 
1991), or the malfunctioning body, where medicine and other disciplines carve 
out their power (Foucault, 1973).   
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 Yet this potential to break the frame is not necessarily limited to the human body 
alone.  The canine body, with its moulting, urinating, vomiting, flatulence and 
sexual mounting, can also disrupt normative expectations in a social encounter, 
particularly those norms associated with acceptable levels of cleanliness and 
propriety. If this should occur whilst the dog is in the charge of a human 
caretaker, and whilst in the presence of other humans, in the home or public 
space, the disruption is likely to result in remedial action being taken by the 
caretaking human:  
 
Since the dog’s misbehaviour disrupts the normal flow of public interaction 
and potentially diminishes the identity of the owner, people with dogs 
commonly take certain steps to get public interaction back ‘on track.  
 (Sanders, 1999:3)  
 
However, whilst established sociological thought supports the idea that the 
experience of serious illness is a wider phenomenon than a physical wound, and 
that disruptions to the social framework, relations with others, and normative 
expectations of the self and lifecourse are implicated, there is a critical difficulty in 
applying this understanding beyond the human to the nonhuman.   In that to 
experience such suffering, beyond the raw physicality of wounded flesh, to know 
the suffering of loneliness or loss of hope requires a self.  Without a self, who is 
there to suffer?  But whether canines have a self, and if they do what form it may 
take, is a highly contested question, to which this thesis must now address itself 
directly.   
 
2.2. Animals as Objects  
The interpretive tradition of which symbolic interactionism is born, can trace its 
genesis to Dilthey’s observation that the social sciences require a different 
methodology to the natural sciences, and through Simmel’s epistemology of 
Sociology (which is opposed to Durkheimian thought). It also flows through 
Weber’s emphasis on the meaningful constructions of value-orientation, and 
touches the influence of Freud (Delanty and Strydom, 2003), which Elias “fused” 
so elegantly “with comprehensive historical research”, to illuminate how the 
expression of self arises from the ambiguities of societal pressures (Bauman, 
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1990:24).  Ultimately this interpretative tradition birthed symbolic interactionism in 
the work of George Herbert Mead.   
 
For Mead, who we are, our ‘selves’, is not an attribute that we are born with, 
but one acquired over time through interaction with others.   
 (Bauman, 1990:24) 
 
Like Vygotsky’s children (1986) this prismatic self colours to the light of the world 
around it, in a prism of the idiographic ‘I’, the socialised ‘Me’ and the generalised 
‘Other’. Here can be seen the strength of symbolic interactionism in its 
observation that ourselves; even to the deepest, darkest most hidden private 
recess of our inner being, that platform from which we observe and interact with 
the world; is formed and moulded by social forces.  However, Mead denied the 
possibility of selfhood, and subjectivity, to nonhumans, a position which both 
Irvine (2004a and 2004b) and Sanders (1999) have observed and challenged.   
 
Whether animals are in essence subjects with emotions and personality, or 
objects, is a contentious issue.  Not least because the category to which animals 
are assigned affects how they may legitimately be treated by humans, whether 
that is as valued companions or as objects of consumption.  Biologist Mike 
Bekoff, gives a good example of the difficulties inherent in this debate in his 
essay Animal Emotions and Animal Sentience and Why They Matter: Blending 
‘Science Sense’ with Common Sense, Compassion and Heart (2006).  Bekoff 
(2006) argues passionately for a consideration of animal emotion to be brought 
into his discipline, which tends to view animals as objects.  Arguably due to a 
need to understand them this way, given their use as experimental matter within 
that discipline.  However, the debate appears to have a flaw in its foundation, on 
both the side of those who attribute innate subjectivity to animals and those who 
do not.  With regard to the stance of viewing animals as objects, Arluke and Solot 
(1997) observed, in their study of novice practitioners in biological and physical 
science communities, that how to be with and understand animals for dissection 
is a role.  It is a role that is learnt in a social context, with its own expectations, 
rewards for appropriate behaviour, penalties for deviance, and rites of passage 
(Arluke and Solot, 1997).   
 
~ 16 ~ 
 
To return to Goffman (1968b), if it is recalled that subjectivity is a social 
accomplishment, born of social processes, the argument as to whether animals 
do, or do not, inherently possess subjectivity is null and void.  No being does, for 
all beings, indeed in an animist society even the rocks and stones, are either 
subjects or objects dependent, not upon inherent nature, but the values that the 
specific society ascribes to them.  Even in the extreme objectification of animals 
as experimental ‘subjects’, or rather experimental matter, things are not as clear 
cut, and objective, as they may appear to be (Arluke and Sanders, 1996).   
 
Wilkie’s (2005) work provides a particularly helpful analysis of the nature of 
animal-human relations in the productive process.  In her words “for millennia 
domesticated animals have been, and continue to be, an unparalleled human 
resource.  They have been the foundation upon which personal, national and 
global institutional livelihoods have been built” (Wilkie, 2005:213).  She points 
out, that how people relate to animals “cannot be isolated from the cultural and 
socio-economic contexts in which they encounter them” (Wilkie, 2005:213).  So, 
for example, to the Nuer, the cattle on whose lives their society depends, are 
noble spiritual beings born of ancestral cattle spirits, to whom they sing songs 
and write poetry (Evans-Pritchard, 1940).  Whereas in the capitalistic society of 
contemporary Britain, livestock can be conceptualised quite differently.   
 
Livestock in the capitalist production process are understood as creatures without 
subjectivity, Wilkie proposes that the animal in this productive process can be 
understood as a “sentient commodity” (2005:213).  Further, Wilkie (2005) 
highlights that the subjectification of the sentient commodity, that is the animal, is 
resisted in this form of productive process, it being problematic for the keepers 
and abattoir workers to relate to the commodified animal as a subject.  In the 
extreme of objectification we can see the use of live animals in certain forms of 
scientific experimentation, where they are regarded as full blown objects.   
 
In this case the animal is understood, not as a sentient commodity, but as 
experimental matter, without subjectivity, lacking personality, emotion and 
sentience (Arluke, 2006).  The crucial issue here is that animals are designed in 
their very being, not according to any innate nature, but rather according to the 
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specific set of social relations between humans and animals in the culture and 
the sub-cultures in which they are embedded. This objectification may be 
particularly acute in areas where science can now design high numbers of 
identical creatures, such as zebra fish, specifically for experimentation.  If a 
creature is engineered in its biology to be genetically identical to a thousand of its 
fellows, where are the “cracks” that Goffman (1968a:280) talks about, those small 
areas of differentiation and ambiguity wherein identity dwells?   
 
2.3. Animals as Subjects  
The subjectivity of animals, or lack thereof, is not dependent upon their innate 
nature, but rather relies upon the set of social relations in which they are 
embedded.  Humans are endowed with thought, and are defined as thinking 
beings, whilst animals are regulated to the other side of the cosmological divide, 
and are assumed to lack the highly valued traits of consciousness and self-
concept.   
 
It is only in human society – only within the peculiarly complex context of 
social relations and interactions which the human central nervous system 
makes physiologically possible – that minds arise or can arise, and thus 
also human beings are evidently the only biological organisms which are 
or can be self-conscious or possessed of selves              (Mead, 1934:235) 
 
In short, according to Mead (1934), only humans possess agency, and therefore 
animals cannot in this understanding, be regarded as actors within the social 
web.  With regard to dogs specifically, Mead (1934) is explicit that they have no 
personality, and that humans falsely attribute it to them.  There seems to be a 
tension in Mead’s thought here, given his insistence that human selfhood is not 
pre-existent, but rather arises from interaction, “the self is not something that 
exists first and then enters into relationship with others, but it is, so to speak, an 
eddy in the social current and so is still part of the current” (Mead, 1934:182).  If a 
human selfhood can arise from interaction, is it so unthinkable that a nonhuman 
self could?   
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The agent is a nexus of meaning, a locus of transformation even, of the potent 
structuring forces abroad in the world.  The identity of the agent is the result of a 
form of categorisation of persons, rather than the expression of any attribute that 
may or may not be essential to the person.  In Goffman’s words;  
 
Society establishes the means of categorising persons and the 
complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of 
each of these categories.  (Goffman, 1968b:11) 
 
Our identity is bestowed upon us by the society around us and by the person’s 
with whom we interact.  Selfhood and sentience, rather than being innate, can be 
understood as something that is ‘done’, as  Sanders suggests: 
 
I would propose an expanded view of mind that, like personhood, we can 
best understand as arising out of social interaction.  In essence, I maintain 
that people ‘do mind’ as a cooperative interpretive process that does not 
depend on the ability of all parties to express their thoughts linguistically. 
  (Sanders, 2003:407) 
 
 
If selfhood is an emergent phenomenon, and an activity, that occurs within a 
social context, then this leaves the question that if selfhood can emerge for a 
nonhuman what form might it take, and what would be the possibilities for a 
nonhuman self?   
 
2.4. Possibilities for a Nonhuman Self  
Currently there appears to be only one working model of the prerequisites for 
animal selfhood within the discipline.  This model is theoretical and, according to 
correspondence with its designer Irvine (Autumn, 2009), its first application to an 
empirical study subsequent to its development, was during the course of my 
Masters Ageing in Companion Animal Ownership.  To develop this model, Irvine 
(2004a) had to overcome Mead’s (1934) insistence on language as a condition of 
selfhood.  "For Mead, having a self requires the ability to talk about having one" 
(Irvine 2003:46).  Building on the work of Sanders (1999), and on the work of the 
Algers (1997 and 1999), Irvine’s (2004a) empirical study of an animal shelter 
takes things a stage further, by outlining a model of the aspects required for 
animal selfhood, without reliance on language.   
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 Once we understand, as Mead (1934) identifies, that the self emerges from 
interaction, and, going beyond Mead, that the self is only partly dependent on 
language (Alger and Alger, 1997; Goffman 1959), it is possible to theorise an 
emergent nonhuman self.  Subjectivity is a prerequisite for selfhood, in that to 
relate to the Other, there needs to be an assumption of subjectivity, for there to 
be another ‘I’ to relate to.  There needs to be a reflection in the Other against 
which we can mirror our feelings and beliefs, as in Lacan’s (1989) imaginary 
order and Kristeva’s (1989) semiotic.  In Irvine’s (2004a:8) words “interaction 
must seem to have a source, and we must see the Other as having a mind, 
beliefs, and desires, just as we do”. Irvine (2004a; 2004b) has adapted William 
James’ (1890) model of selfhood and proposes that, theoretically, a self consists 
of four features: agency, coherence, affectivity and self-history.  Crucially Irvine 
locates emergent selfhood, as Kristeva (1989) does, at a preverbal stage.  
Therefore whilst Mead (1934) requires language for there to be a self, Irvine’s 
(2004a; 2004b) selfhood is emergent before language, with the acquisition of 
language then being a way through which a self is elaborated and presented.  
Animal and human thus share the machinery of selfhood, which is then 
developed and expressed in different ways.  The four features of a possible 
nonhuman selfhood are: 
 
1. Agency – “meaning that you are the author of your actions and 
movements and not the author of the actions and movements of others” 
(Irvine, 2004a:9).  This is more than instinct, it is not just having a desire, 
but also being aware that the desire is your own, and then expressing this 
awareness of subjectivity in action, or the lack of action.  Behaviour 
intended to impact the action of others, such as the pet cat manipulating or 
tricking their owner into getting a treat (Desougi, 2008), would be an 
everyday example of agency.   
 
2. Coherence – “provides the boundaries of the self” (Irvine, 2004a:11).  To 
function in the world effectively it is necessary to be a coherent self, which 
is a discrete limited self, rather than a diffuse one.  Coherence gives the 
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self “a place to live” (Irvine, 2004b:133).  A companion animal responding 
to their name is a simple, but effective, display of coherence.   
 
3. Affectivity – the capacity for emotion.  In an evolutionary framework the 
ability to signal and interpret emotional cues enhances an animal’s 
survival, by helping them avoid anger or hunt out pain (Irvine, 2004a; 
2004b).  In an everyday context this can be seen in a dog’s guilty slinking 
off the forbidden couch, to avoid the wrath of their owner (Desougi, 2009). 
Irvine would also include more complex emotion and emotional states, 
such as grief, and “ways of feeling” (2004a:13).  Examples of ways of 
feeling would be the mellow dog or the hyper cat, and describes more 
complex emotional patterning, which relates to character traits.     
 
4. Self-history – the continuity that “makes interactions into relationships” 
(Irvine, 2004a:14).  In self-history events, objects and others are given 
meaning and related to on the basis of those meanings.  To have self-
history it is necessary for there to be recall, a dog needs to remember the 
painful injection at the vet, for them to dislike going there next time, without 
the memory and meaning there would be no resistance.  This “memory 
required for self-history is preverbal, and several aspects of it appear in 
animals” (Irvine, 2004a:14).   
 
This is a useful theoretical model, and it gives purchase when wrestling with the 
thorny issue of the possibilities for nonhuman personhood.  However, there is a 
taken for granted premise operating in Irvine’s (2004) work, and for that matter in 
the work of Sanders (1999), that is they both assume that to be accorded 
selfhood is a good thing.  This is an assumption that seems to be widespread in 
their work, and it is one that needs to be questioned.   
 
2.5. Consequences of Having a Self: Accountability and Anguish   
On 2 December 2013 a lawsuit was filed in the New York State courts asking 
them to grant personhood to a 26 year old chimpanzee (Gorman, 2013).  A 
section of animal advocacy voices are increasingly calling for personhood status 
to be granted to nonhumans.  The Nonhumans Rights Project, which brought the 
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American action, claim that they are “the only organization working toward actual 
LEGAL rights for members of species other than our own” (Nonhuman Rights 
Project, 2014;unlisted pages, emphasis in the original).  This is not actually the 
case, there are several animal advocacy and animal welfare organizations 
working to improve the rights of nonhumans under the laws of their country, 
which are not seeking the legal status of personhood for nonhumans.  For 
example the Dutch Party for The Animals, that has had two ministers elected to 
their House of Representatives, and which petition for improved animal welfare 
under Dutch Law.  Also the Animal Justice Party in Australia, which advocates 
that nonhumans should be granted improved rights, and not seen as just property 
under the law, but have their sentience acknowledged by way of a new form of 
legal status, that is yet to be established.   
 
In the voices calling for nonhumans to be recognized as persons, the ascription, 
or recognition, of selfhood, appears to be unquestionably regarded as a good 
thing.  This appears a naive position, nonhumans have their own being and 
needs according to their specific form of life and living; what is good for us, may 
not necessarily be good for them, and to operate on the assumption that their 
needs are the same as ours, could itself lead to forms of harm.  As Peggs points 
out, “the attribution of sentience depends on human definitions and 
conceptualizations, which makes the dependence on sentience human-centered 
and problematic” (Peggs, 2012:137).   
 
Moreover, to be regarded as a self is not a purely positive condition, there are 
problematic implications to being a person, whose consideration seems to be 
absent from the advocates’ view.  It appears to have been overlooked that, at 
least in Britain and areas of Europe, animals have previously been understood, 
and accorded, as having a rudimentary personhood.  A recent documentary on 
BBC2, ‘Inside the Animal Mind’, claims that animals are only now, for the first 
time, being understood as minded (Inside the Animal Mind, 2014).  This is simply 
not the case, as attested by the detailed works of Victorians such as William 
Lauder Lindsay, who proposed that animals were not only minded, by subject to 
the same mental illnesses as humans (Lauder Lindsay, 1880).   
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Animals have previously been understood as persons, and with personhood can 
come accountability for your conduct, and the potential for social and moral 
deviance.  As Lauder Lindsay observes, “certain animals commit crimes or 
criminal acts, offences against man’s [sic] laws or their own, and these crimes are 
of the same nature as those committed by man [sic] and occur under the same 
kind of circumstances, as the result of the same sort of motives” (Lauder Lindsay, 
1880:149, emphasis in the original). To have a self is to be accountable for your 
actions and potentially the consequences of them.   
 
 
In medieval Europe animals were placed on trial for crimes, with the same legal 
procedures as humans, including defence, and the same range of punishments, 
from execution to excommunication (Kalof, 2007).  As in the case of the pig who 
was burned in 1266 for eating a child (Mason, 1988), or the grasshoppers who 
were banned from southern Tyrol, after trial by jury (Dinzelbacher, 2002).  From 
the thirteenth to the twentieth century, animal trials where held across Europe, 
and as Dinzelbacher points out, “these were serious proceedings, carried out by 
professional lawyers – not by archaic-minded and superstitious peasants – 
sanctioned by bishops, and often discussed by university professors” 
(Dinzelbacher, 2002:406).  In cases of bestiality, the animal, having its own 
being, may be regarded as consenting, and may be put to death with the human 
sexual partner, as in 1546 in Paris, when a man and a cow were hanged, and 
then burned by order of Parliament.  Alternatively the nonhuman may be 
regarded as not consenting, as in the case of the female donkey in 1750, who, 
whilst the human sexual partner was convicted of bestiality and put to death, was 
acquitted on the grounds of having been raped (Mason, 1988).  To be possessed 
of selfhood is a double edged sword.  If you have a self and sentience you may 
be held accountable for your actions or even responsible under the law.   
 
There is another consequence of having a self, that is that if you have selfhood, 
not only can you be held as accountable for your actions, but you may also 
understand anguish and pain, beyond that that an object or a machine can know.  
The legacy of Descartes has haunted our understanding of animals, as “bounded 
by creationist dogma and entranced by the recent development of reliable clock 
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mechanisms, he regarded animals as mindless machines” (Sanders, 1999:114), 
encouraging his own students to kick dogs, in order to hear the workings of the 
machine (Sanders, 1999).  Yet the world is not filled with clockwork cats and 
dogs, over which humans are exalted as the sole subjects capable of suffering.  
Rather, as Darwin’s evolutionary continuity reminds us, we dwell with other forms 
of life and sentience, each straining towards life, and away from death and pain.  
The shadow of Descartes also fell over the thought of Mead (1934), who explicitly 
broke with Darwin, arguing against the continuity of both emotion and 
consciousness between humanity and other forms of animal life.  Mead 
challenged Darwin’s assumption that the gestures of animals are expressive of 
inner emotional states, to Mead “this is a false approach, it is quite impossible to 
assume that animals do undertake to express their emotions” (1934:16).   
 
The Algers, in sympathy with Sanders (1999), concluded that in this regard Mead 
“is labouring under the Cartesian model that has been largely discredited by more 
recent research into animal behaviour” (Alger and Alger 1997:66). They highlight 
that the undermining of the Cartesian model has come on two fronts, that of the 
“tradition of sentimental anthropomorphism” (Jasper and Nelkin, 1992, as cited by 
Alger and Alger 1997:66) and shifts in animal behaviourist research, I would 
suggest particularly the debates around animal emotion and sentience.  To the 
biologist Bekoff (2006) the existence of animal pain, be it different or similar to 
human pain, challenges the assumptions of anthropocentric science, which can 
construct animals as objects, “data or supplies” (Arluke and Solot, 1997:29) to be 
used, Bekoff (2006:31) challenges science to: 
 
Dare to look into the sunken eyes of animals who are afraid or feeling 
other sorts of pain, and then try to deny to yourself and to others that 
these individuals aren’t feeling anything. 
 
 
I would suggest that part of the difficultly with animal pain is that, as the Scottish 
medical doctor and pain researcher, Dr Alexander Mennie1 observed:  
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… pain is an entirely subjective experience which has never been 
satisfactorily defined.  It is what the patient says ‘hurts’ or is ‘sore’.  One 
thing is certain however, our perception of pain depends on the intactness 
of our nervous system.  (1974:49, emphasis in the original) 
 
In this observation Mennie (1974) identifies three key aspects of pain: its 
subjectivity, a communicative imperative associated with pain, and its embodied 
nature. Two of these three aspects of pain are problematised in the case of 
companion canines.  First, being a subjective experience, to know pain requires 
that a being has a subjectivity in order to appreciate it, this is contested in the 
case of canines, whose selfhood is open to question.  Second, there is an 
important signalling, or communicative imperative entangled with pain.  “Both in 
order to understand the pain and to do something about it, it becomes necessary 
intentionally to communicate pain” (Hydén and Peolsson, 2002:326). This 
communicative imperative is particularly pertinent today, given the widespread 
influence of the biomedical model, which regards pain as a negative 
phenomenon, and seeks to understand a pain, in order to diagnose and treat it. 
Whereas alternative models, such as a religious one, may regard pain differently 
(Bendelow and Williams, 1995), in a religious framework pain can be either a 
private misfortune to be endured or a beneficial gift bestowed for the training of 
character (Lewis, 1940). This communicative imperative to pain is also 
problematised in the case of canines, who, whilst they may yelp, moan or growl, 
cannot describe their pain to the veterinarian or owner in human language.   
 
Pain has a complex relationship to language, in terms of human pain, the “pain 
experience both shatters and resists ordinary language: the words we use in 
everyday circumstances do not allow for the communication of the pain 
experience” (Hydén and Peolsson, 2002:326).  Hydén and Peolsson (2002) 
argue, therefore, that bodily gestures and non-linguistic forms of communication 
take on a special significance in the context of pain, and they analyse the 
pointing, iconic and symbolic functions of gesture in pain communication.  It may 
be worth considering whether a companion canine’s inability to express pain in 
human language could, rather than estrange us further from an understanding of 
canine pain, be a context in which human and canine may share a language of 
gestures, as we both point to the area of discomfort and shelter the sore hand or 
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paw. Beyond this, given that Irvine (2004) and Kristeva (1989) theorise that 
consciousness has its roots before language develops, could it be possible that 
“the pain experience, which in a certain sense is a pre-linguistic cry or shriek” 
(Scarry, 1985 cited in, Hydén and Peolsson, 2002:326), is evidence of a pre-
linguistic phenomenon that humans and canines share.   
 
Research by Bendelow (1993) found that physical pain tends to be the first form 
of pain considered when the issue is initially queried.  As Bendelow points outs, 
the narrowing of the understanding of pain, this time not just to a single species, 
but also to a singular form, that is the physical, is also a legacy of Descartes and:  
 
There is a need to broaden out the definition of pain from the Cartesian 
proposition which inevitably acts to divorce mental from physical states 
and tends to attribute single symptoms to single causes.  The notion of 
pain having a substantial emotional component, literally the obverse of 
pleasure, is in fact a much older conceptualisation than that of pain being 
a physiological sensation.   (Bendelow, 1993:275) 
 
Bendelow (1993), as well as Wolpert (1999), found that non-physical forms of 
pain tend to be the ones given the status of a person’s greatest anguish, when 
the issue of suffering is further explored.  There are forms of suffering beyond the 
physical, and they are not necessarily the less painful for being so.  Loneliness 
can represent a profound form of suffering (Elias, 1985), particularly for a social 
species, and loss of self, and isolation can also be painful to those who are ill or 
dying (Charmz, 1983).  
 
Loss of self and a disruption of biography during chronic illness are understood 
within Sociology to be forms of human suffering (Charmaz, 1983; Bury 1982).  
These forms of suffering are problematised in the case of nonhumans, whose 
selfhood is questioned. There are possibilities for theorising a nonhuman 
selfhood within Sociology, but they are in their infancy and lack empirical support.   
Combined with this to have selfhood is not a purely positive position, there are 
potentially difficult consequences to promoting the selfhood of nonhumans.  The 
second research question of this thesis takes the concern with self and suffering 
a stage further, by investigating the meanings surrounding death and dying.   
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Chapter 3  ~  Dying and Meaning  
 
3.1. Death  
The second research question seeks to reveal some of the meanings 
surrounding death and dying.  At its heart death is a mystery.  In a world where 
“the most elementary and obvious form of success is to remain alive” (Bauman, 
1992:33), all are destined for failure.  Being a mysterious phenomenon death is 
shrouded with many myths, of particular interest here is the illusion that we know 
death and the myth that it is the great equaliser.   
 
A powerful aspect of sociological wisdom is its insistence that ‘all is not as it 
seems’, and this is particularly the case with regard to the knowledge of death.  It 
can be a taken for granted assumption in everyday life in Scotland that we know 
what death is, that death is an obvious cessation of biological life.  But matters 
are not so straightforward.  In the current knowledge hegemony, science, and in 
particular medical knowledge, occupies a dominant position (Foucault, 1973).  
Medical experts are in a position of authority to declare a state of death, and 
determine its authenticity.  Yet the definitions of death, upon which this medical 
expertise is founded, “are shifting and mutable definitions”, that are not purely 
clinical (Haddow, 2005: 95). The category of brain stem death for example, a 
diagnosis of which will permit a human’s organs to be harvested for the use of 
others, is a socially constructed definition that “did not produce a more ‘accurate’ 
description of death so much as mark new delineations between the living and 
the dead” (Giacomini, 1997:1478).  The ‘living’ appearance of the dead, in brain 
stem death, can be particularly problematic for the families of the bereaved 
(Haddow, 2005).  Their loved one breathes, is warm to the touch and has the 
appearance of merely sleeping.  Brain stem death appears to constitute a state of 
death, a cessation of thought and personhood, whilst the living processes of 
embodiment, such heartbeat, breathing, consuming and excreting, remain.   
 
More extremely, and controversially, serious illness in which a human 
personhood is considered to be annihilated, can also be regarded as a form of 
death, the loss of identity being treated as a kind of death in life.  Those whose 
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thinking is impaired, as in the case of dementia, have been suggested to be 
‘socially dead’, that it categorised and related to “as good as dead” (Sweeting and 
Gilhooly, 1997:93).  Sweeting and Gilhooly (1997) conducted a study whose aim 
was to determine, according to percentage how socially dead or alive dementia 
suffers were.  Sweeting and Gilhooly’s application of the concept of ‘social death’ 
is evocative, however, I have a disquiet.  The idea of ‘social death’ was originally 
proposed by Goffman (1968a), when investigating people in an institutional 
setting whose subjectivity is denied, but Goffman (1968a) maintained an 
emphasis on the presence and effect of agency, though under pressure and 
limited.  Sweeting and Gilhooly are very quick to deny the possibility of 
personhood in nonhumans:  
 
It is personhood which makes human life more valuable than that of 
animals, fish or plants (Harris, 1985) …, self and other awareness is 
bound up with language: there are certain human significances (e.g. 
shame, indignation) which can only be held by an animal with language.  
  (Sweeting and Gilhooly, 1997:97).   
 
It is arguable that just as they have been so quick to limit nonhuman personhood, 
Sweeting and Gilhooly are also too quick to assume that sufferers of dementia 
are socially dead to the extent that they claim. Sweeting and Gilhooly’s (1997) 
expansion of the idea of being socially dead, runs contrary to the spirit of 
Goffman’s original argument, and it seems unbefitting to base an understanding 
which radically limits agency, upon the insights of a theorist who championed it.   
 
As Bauman and May (1990) so powerfully point out, even in cases of the most 
extreme limitations of agency, such as the numb, zombie like existence of slaves 
in a concentration camp, agency, however minimal, remains.  This is potent gem 
of sociological wisdom, and it seems that in emphasising their idea of social 
death, Sweeting and Gilhooly (1997) may have strayed too far from a perspective 
which gives a place to agency.  In being too quick to deny agency, they are at 
risk of being unable to perceive the subtle, perhaps non-linguistic, forms of 
agency expressed in the lives of dementia sufferers.  It is perhaps interesting to 
note that the psychiatrist, Scott Peck, speaks of this very danger in his popular 
work, The Road Less Travelled and Beyond (1997).  In that he found himself, 
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when working in a home for older people, at first too quick to assume a lack of 
agency and awareness, due to what he refers to, on his part, as simplistic 
thinking.  Later he began, slowly, to become aware of pervasive and subtle forms 
of interaction among his patients, but this only became evident with time, 
attention, and a mediation of his approach (Peck, 1997).   
 
This is reminiscent of the transformation of our understanding of agency in the 
African grey parrot.  Until the late 1970s, early 1980s, it was largely assumed that 
African Grey parrots had limited agency and could only mimic.  However, when 
Dr Pepperberg spent two decades studying a particular individual, Alex, a wealth 
of subtle, and meaningful, agency gradually became clear (Pepperberg, 1998).  
This included the acquisition, and apparent understanding, of aspects of human 
language, and the ability to count (Pepperberg, 1998).  Rapid assumptions 
concerning, and especially the dismissal of, agency are intellectually dangerous, 
as they can render the observer blind to subtle, or perhaps unexpected, 
expressions of agency. It is far safer, as Collins (1992) suggests, to hold that 
agency is likely to be present, even if it is under adverse conditions, and with little 
or limited expression.  Finally, in a matter of taste, it seems crude to categorise, 
or assume that you can, a living being as 60% socially dead, as Sweeting and 
Gilhooy (1997) attempt to do.  What about the reclusive and despondent, are 
they 40% socially dead?  If someone has a headache and does not want to 
interact with their colleagues are they then 10% socially dead?  In this 
misapplication the helpful concept of social death rapidly becomes farcical, and is 
diluted to the point of uselessness.   
 
3.2. The ‘Good Death’  
In terms of a medicalised understanding, and increasingly a related lay view, an 
understanding of death is shaped by the concept of the ‘good death’, particularly 
Kubler-Ross’s (1989) five stage model of dying.  Indeed these concepts are 
becoming so dominant that when Borgstrom, Barclay and Cohn, investigated how 
contemporary medical students framed their experience of dying patients, they 
found that the students “invariably draw on the notion of the ‘good 
death’”(Borgstrom, Barclay and Cohn, 2013:391, emphasis given).  The ‘good 
death’ is the aware and openly acknowledged death.  Bhatnagar and Joshi 
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(2012), in the American Journal of Hospice and Palliative Medicine, give a telling 
record of a ‘good death’, in an effort to persuade their fellow medics to adopt their 
approach to patient care.  In this case a female patient, who had previously 
suffered three months of anguish, becomes peaceful, and her family are calmed, 
by the “honest, compassionate information sharing” (Bhatnagar and Joshi, 
2012:626), of the doctors with the family.  The open approach apparently leads 
the patient to a state in which she never cried, and where her family were 
prepared for death and “extremely grateful and peaceful” (Bhatnagar and Joshi, 
2012:627).  The doctors are the heroes of this ‘good death’, in the words of the 
dying woman “Doctors, I have not seen angels but you are my angels,  …by your 
honest information, I understand that I have few days remaining but I am not 
afraid” (Bhatnagar and Joshi, 2012:626).  It is worth noting the doctors’ comment 
that the acceptance by, perhaps even docility of, the patient and family meant 
that the “relatives were prepared for death, so this bereavement visit was not 
difficult for us” (Bhatnagar and Joshi, 2012:627).  This seems reminiscent of the 
‘good patient’, who does not inconvenience the medical staff.   
 
To reach this state of aware acceptance that Kubler-Ross advocates (1970), it is 
considered necessary for a person to go through, and experience, various 
psychological stages, or responses, to the knowledge that they are dying.  
According to Kubler-Ross’s model of the five stages of dying, these stages are:  
denial and isolation, anger, bargaining, depression and finally acceptance 
(Kubler-Ross, 1970). There is a psychological, rather than a sociological, 
emphasis with this model, and it seems to be influenced by a powerful cultural 
trend extoling the virtues of the psych disciplines and the therapeutic model of 
counselling, which exalts openness and vulnerability, over stoicism and dealing 
with matters within a private personal space (Furedi, 2004).  I have a disquiet 
with Kubler-Ross’ model for four reasons, being:   
 
i. a privileging of awareness, 
ii. the pathologising of deviant experience,  
iii. an overshadowing of other, possibly more useful, models, 
iv. and a bizarre and intellectually alienating element in her writings.  With 
regard to her mystical experiences of meeting deceased people, having 
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conversations with them and being instructed by them to continue her 
work (Kubler-Ross, 1991).   
 
There is process emphasis in Kubler-Ross’s classic work, On Death and Dying 
(1970); one that it is considered that a dying person must go through, “a natural 
progress, a process indeed” (Kubler-Ross, 1970;103), in order for them to arrive 
at the optimal state for experiencing death, that is acceptance (Kubler-Ross, 
1970).  This is the acceptance that death “is not such a frightening, horrible thing” 
(Kubler-Ross, 1970;101), in short not something to be resisted.  Those who resist 
the process of dying according to the model are problematised, “there are a few 
patients who fight to the end, who struggle and keep a hope that makes it almost 
impossible to reach this stage of acceptance” (Kubler-Ross, 1970:101).  
Acceptance and openness, rather than resistance or keeping the experience 
private, is held up as the noble and courageous condition.   
 
There is an assumption that dialogue and open awareness between the dying, 
their loved ones, and medical carers is the ideal, and this can lead to a ‘moral 
imperative’ to manifest a heroically aware death (Seale, 1995b:606).  This 
imperative to be aware, expose and debate the feelings, vulnerabilities, and 
experience, may be linked to a wider cultural trend of extolling the therapeutic 
virtues of confession, the necessity of cleaning the emotions, which are 
increasing being regarded as damaging, especially if strong and held in (Furedi, 
2004).  A form of “emotional determinism” (Furedi, 2002:25) seems to be at work, 
feeding into the culture from the discourse of the psych disciplines, which 
promote a diminished human self, dependent on professional support to 
negotiate everyday life, or in this case death.   
 
Further, there is a prescriptive element to Kubler-Ross’s model, as “despite its 
inherent ambiguity, the concept swiftly provides normative expectations by which 
patient’s behaviour could be understood” (Borgstrom, Barclay and Cohn, 
2013:395).  There is a danger with Kubler-Ross’s five-stage model, that there 
may be a pathologisation of alternative experience. Those who do not wish to 
enter death with awareness, and are unable, or refuse, to progress through the 
stages as set out, can be rendered failed, deviant.  Borgstrom, Barclay and Cohn  
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(2013) found that those patients who did not embrace the process and reach 
acceptance, where regarded by medical students as being in denial, and that “in 
this context denial is referred to as a disease-like object that the students feel 
they can, and should, diagnose and treat.” (Borgstrom, Barclay and Cohn, 
2013:391).   
 
Kubler-Ross does stress the importance of not assuming an absence of agency 
on the part of the dying, in particular she presents an instance where the family 
and nursing staff assumed a lack of agency in a dying patient, only to be amazed 
when Kubler-Ross stimulated responses (1989).  While she can, quite justifiably, 
be criticised as casting herself and her students as the heroes in this, and other, 
narratives, the point remains that it is perilous to deny agency, and that to do so 
may blind one to its subtle manifestations. As “there is no clear-cut 
biological/social and death/existence division” (Haddow, 2005:109), it is better to 
err on the side of the indomitable nature of social action and reaction, and keep 
looking for agency, even within the most limited and restrictive of circumstances.     
 
Death and dying are profoundly ambiguous phenomena.  On the one hand a 
state of death can be declared, and personhood denied, whilst the body remains 
biologically alive.  Yet at the other extreme the destruction, or total absence of a 
body, does not necessarily lead to a cessation of interactions or the end of 
personhood, “death does not mean the termination of the relationship with the 
previous embodied self” (Haddow, 2005:109).  People maintain relationships with 
the dead, pray for them, leave offerings and encounter and interact with their 
ghosts (Hepworth, 2000).  Death is not a purely biological event, but also a 
culturally constructed phenomenon (Timmermans, 2005), co-existing with 
physical changes to the body, a phenomenon whose boundaries shift and mutate 
with the tides of social process.   
 
Paradoxically the socially constructed nature of death seems to be particularly 
evident in the case of ‘natural death’ within intensive care units.  A natural death 
is one regarded as not being executed at the hands of medical staff, but rather 
resulting from natural biological decline, rather than the abrupt removal of 
technological life support.  Yet this death is anything but ‘natural’, intensive care 
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staff actively use drugs and technologies to mimic the gradual decline of a 
‘natural’ death (Harvey, 1997), in order to “obliterate the impression that that staff 
‘killed’ the patient” (Timmermans, 2005:998).  Natural death is intensively socially 
constructed and constitutes a managed performance. Yet it remains a 
performance enacted by way of a physical body localised in space, a body 
though which life and liveliness is expressed in the world.   
 
3.3. Creatureliness  
Humans share with their canine companions a common creatureliness.  Humans 
and canines have, at least in part, a shared experience of embodiment, of 
physicality, and of living and being in a world of air, water and mud (Haraway, 
2008).  We are, both of us, animals; formed of fur and flesh which moves, 
breathes, eats, excretes, pulses with life and then perishes, on earth.  Becker 
describes humans as "a hyper-anxious animal", anxious, indeed terrified, 
because "reality and fear go together naturally" (1973:17).  The reality of which 
he speaks is the imposing and terrible power of the natural order, and our 
nakedness before it. Becker (1973) emphasises that there is 
an irreconcilable tension between the terrifying nature of the natural world and 
our helplessness as a creature within it, which leads to fear.  To be aware of this 
reality is to fear, and it is this awareness, leading to terror, which is closed off by 
the development of character and ameliorated by the structures of culture 
(Becker, 1973).  
 
The world needs to be made manageable and by the time childhood is left we 
have "repressed our vision of the primary miraculousness of creation", and have 
closed off "raw experience" (Becker, 1973:50).  Without this closing off of raw 
experience, and filtering by character and culture, we would be unable to 
function.  
 
The great boon of repression is that it makes it possible to live decisively in 
an overwhelmingly miraculous and incomprehensible world, a world so full 
of beauty, majesty, and terror that if animals perceived it all they would be 
paralysed to act.  (Becker, 1973:50).  
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In this sense some mental illness is a failure to sufficiently repress reality, 
causing levels of anxiety that inhibit normal functioning.  For the human to 
perceive the world, or lack sufficient character filters against it, is to be insane, 
naked before reality, to be schizophrenic.  Where all the world falls into you.  "In 
the face of the terror of the world, the miracle of creation, the crushing power of 
reality, not even the tiger has secure and limitless power, much less the child" 
(Becker, 1973:54).  Becker argues that animals do not feel this fear: 
 
the knowledge of death is reflective and conceptual, and animals are 
spared it.  They live and they disappear with the same thoughtlessness: a 
few minutes of fear, a few seconds of anguish, and it is over.  
 (Becker, 1973:27).   
 
This is a deeply anthropocentric comment, and I do not find it persuasive.  On 11 
March 2011 I saw an interpretive dance entitled Humanimalia, choreographed, by 
Janis Claxton, of Edinburgh College of Art.  It was a remarkable piece of work, 
she had studied the movement of primates and choreographed a dance in which 
the humans mimicked the way of moving of the nonhumans. One of the 
impressions that repeatedly struck me, was the fear, the hesitation, the checking 
of the environment and profound wariness expressed in the motion (Janis 
Claxton, 2011).  This anxious guardedness I have witnessed myself when I have 
encountered wild foxes, deer, or other creatures.  If, as Becker suggests (1973), 
wild animals do not fear except in the most superficial biological sense, why this 
profound wariness of the wild creature, especially the adults?  They do not move 
fearlessly, with the confidence of a slumbering awareness, rather they tend to be 
acutely aware and alert for danger.  
 
There is a risk with this idea of Becker’s (1973), and for that matter Elias’ (1985) 
and Mead’s (1934), that only humans fear death, that it may feed into an egostic 
understanding of humanity.  It risks feeding into a form of human exeptionalism, 
or worship (Peggs, 2009), where humans are seen as automatically superior to 
other forms of life and sentience, rather than different in sense and way of being.  
Moreover, if animals do not understand death, how can they mourn?  Barbara 
King, in her article in Scientific American, suggests that, “mounting evidence from 
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species as diverse as cats and dolphins indicates that humans are not the only 
species that grieves over the loss of loved ones” (King, 2013).   
 
3.4. Embodiment  
Death is a socially constructed event, or more accurately series of events, but it is 
a socially constructed event, which emerges in relation to profound physiological 
changes occurring to an embodied organism.  There is an interplay between the 
meanings held by the actors (including the one who is dying), and changes 
occurring to the flesh of the dying actor.  Becker, drawing on Norman Brown 
(1968), argued that "death is a complex symbol" (1973:19).  That is the case, but 
it is a complex symbol that is lived out, performed, and experienced, by an 
embodied organism steeped in physicality.  There is no death, where the body is 
not implicated, even in the case of ‘brain death’ where the body is presumed 
largely intact, and the ethereal, allegedly mental self, presumed gone (Haddow, 
2005).  It is the body’s capacity to express and make vivid the intentions and 
responses of the agent that are compromised.  On the other hand there is no 
death without meaningful agency, a rotting carrot cannot die, it simply succumbs 
to processes of decay.  You cannot loose agency if you have never had it.  Death 
is neither the cessation of the bodily processes of life, nor the loss of meaningful 
agency, but both, together.  As Shilling argues, the body is a “multi-dimentional 
medium for the constitution of society” (Shilling, 2012:250), but is one given to us 
by evolution and is a living vehicle through, upon and within which societal 
phenomena are mediated.   
 
In a naturalistic understanding the body is part of the natural world apart from the 
social, and those beings, such as women and animals, who are regarded as 
closer to the body, are seen as being moulded more by emotional and instinctual 
drives, than by reason and the civilising impulse, “women are often positioned as 
unable to transcend corporeality” (Harrington, 2005:235). From a patriarchal view 
“woman incarnates nature” (Beauvoir, 1949:265).  Under a patriarchal gaze, 
there is a tendency to sentimentalise woman and animals as both base and 
closer to the earth and earthiness (Peggs,2012), and to see women as being 
more instinctual than reasoning, and as being shaped by the maternal urges and 
menstrual cycles of their bodies.  The naturalistic body itself, is pure, untainted by 
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social forces and pre-social.  Yet, there is no purely naturalistic body which 
exists, “as a pre-social, biological basis on which rest the superstructures of self-
identity and society” (Shilling, 2013:45).  Bodies do not live and breathe in 
isolation, separate and apart, in some hermetically sealed realm of organic, plant 
and animalian, existence removed from society.  All life, at least as far as humans 
are capable of knowing it, exists within an overarching, and pervasive, social 
matrix (Gergen, 1999).  While it may be tempting to think of a ‘natural’ order as 
being separate from a ‘social’ order, this clear division does not exist.  There is no 
savannah where antelopes roam free and untainted by the vagaries of the social.  
Even the landmass is not beyond the influence of human society, whether directly 
by hunting and herding, or remotely, in terms of the effects of mass human 
occupation and resources management on weather patterns, pollution levels, and 
the varying degrees of human transit and disturbance.    
 
Combined with this, from the vantage point of being human, the profound 
implications and effects on understanding of our own species being cannot be 
avoided.   Since no human is capable of existing apart from the social, there is no 
human view untainted by it. Even the singular shipwrecked island dweller, was 
conceived, born and grew up within human society, and the long range sailor, if 
they go too far, and spend too long, outside the company of others, will face 
“soul-destroying loneliness”, psychological failure and death (Associated Global 
Transport Services, 2013:unlisted pages).  We simply cannot survive as an 
organism without both a physical body and the body of society, and prolonged 
solitude or solitary confinement is incompatible with maintaining a sane, and 
coherent connection to reality (Guenther, 2011). 
 
As a social creature it is possible for us to bond with other social animals, and 
relations with companion animals in particular can be emotionally intense 
(Walker, 1999), and profound intersubjective bonding may be involved.  In light of 
this, the decision to terminate the life of a companion can be deeply disturbing, as 
usually a loving bond requires that we care for and preserve the life of the loved.  
Therefore it may be acutely difficult to maintain an image of being a good and 
loving person, both inter and intra psychically, whilst arranging the death of the 
loved.  Painful contradictions may be involved in the decision to euthanize an 
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elderly or ailing canine companion, and complex justifications may come into 
play, in a telling phrase Sanders refers to this as ‘killing with kindness’ (1999:73). 
Of course painful contradictions are not necessarily felt by all companion animal 
owners, sometimes decisions to euthanize a companion are less complex, even 
arbitrary.  For example, the decision to dispose of the family dog as he or she 
does not match the new furniture, or euthanizing the dog before a holiday, and 
then acquiring a new one on return, as this is more economical than paying for 
boarding fees (Sanders, 1999).  In such cases the dilemmas and paradoxes may 
be felt more acutely by the veterinary staff, than the owners themselves 
(Sanders, 1999). All deaths, and the justification thereof, are not necessarily 
equal.   
  
As Haddow points out, “the real scandal of being embodied, one which arguably 
is a governing feature of all our lives, is that our embodiment comes to an end” 
(Haddow, 2005:92); and in a common sense view death may be regarded as the 
great leveller.  Yet, all deaths are not equal, and neither is the speed, or the 
manner, in which different embodied beings approach, or are taken to them.  
Though overall human mortality rates for all social groups in Britain have declined 
since the 1950s, the difference in mortality rates between geographical areas has 
increased (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1997).  Those living in areas with the 
deepest poverty have the highest mortality rates, with more people living in areas 
of high relative mortality rates than at any time since the 1950s (Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, 1997).  One in twelve citizens live in an area where deaths 
occur at 15% above the expected level (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1997).   
 
While macro structural forces of poverty and exclusion make dying an unequal 
experience, the myth of equality in death does not endure at the micro 
sociological level either.  David Sudnow’s chilling work Dead on Arrival, 
powerfully demonstrated a rationing of medical care for bodies assumed to be 
dead on arrival at hospital, based upon the perceived social usefulness of the 
person.  In his words “there seems to be a rather strong relationship between the 
age, social background, and the perceived moral character of patients and the 
amount of effort that is made to attempt revival” (Sudnow, 1976:15).  In light of 
changes in the law and medical process, which attempted to address such 
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inequalities by having compulsory procedures for medical staff to follow, 
Timmermans revisited Sudnow’s findings and conducted a fresh study.  His 
results were also unequivocal, the inequality had only not vanished, but had 
increased under the new measures, as “under the guise of lifesaving attempts, 
the staff perpetuated an insidious kind of social inequality” (Timmermans, 
1998:454).  Where young people or those known to the staff are given extensive 
and aggressive resuscitation, whilst those perceived as less worthy, with very old 
bodies or ones perceived as tainted by drug addiction, receive token 
ministrations, in a sinister form of moral stratification (Timmermans, 1998).   
 
Death is a mysterious phenomenon, one that we are only beginning to know and 
understand.  It is not a clear and fixed biological state, but a mutable category of 
being, whose boundaries shift and change with the tide of social action and 
reaction.  Though it comes to all living things, death does not do so equally, with 
the wealthy being able to evade its clutches for longer, and the despised being 
ushered more speedily into its embrace.  Death is not an event removed or 
immune from social processes, rather it is the place of their final and unequivocal 
inscription upon a living embodied being.  Having explored death and dying, 
attention now turns to the issues of life and wellbeing, which form the third and 
final question of this thesis.   
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Chapter 4  ~  Wellbeing   
 
4.1 A Biomedical View 
In a biomedical understanding, which informs both the veterinary and, to a 
considerable extent, the psychological frameworks for understanding the loss 
and serious illness of a companion canine, the disruption and suffering 
associated with illness and loss have their foundation in the biochemical 
domain. In a biomedical understanding, anxiety and grief are associated with 
stress, which is understood to have a chemical foundation, and is considered to 
be amenable to measurement and quantification, by various methods, such as 
by the measurement of the levels of the hormone cortisol in the blood or saliva 
(Handlin, et al., 2012), or by the quantification of intrapsychic states, along a 
numerical scale (Wesley et al., 2009).  In short in this view the impact on 
wellbeing is localised as an intrapsychic event, related to biochemical and 
physiological changes.  In a biomedically informed framework, companion 
canine illness and death is seen as a psychological stressor which leads to 
physiological symptoms.  It is the individual’s internal response to the external 
event which is pivotal in this understanding. This response is subject to powerful 
discourses which shape the culturally acceptable level, duration and 
manifestation of human grief, and these discourses are highly medicalised.  
Deviation from these ‘appropriate’ levels and durations of grief, can be regarded 
as evidence of psychological abnormality and the failure of a normative grief 
process (Borgstrom, Barclay, and Cohn, 2013).   I would suggest that the most 
influential of these normative maps of grief is Kubler-Ross’ model (1970).     
 
In 1989 Garrity et al. conducted one of the early quantitative statistical 
investigations into the relationship between companion animal ownership and 
human wellbeing from a biomedical perspective. They researched companion 
animal ownership and attachment as supportive factors in the health of 1,232 
elderly Americans (Garrity et al., 1989).  They concluded that:  
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In terms of the current knowledge regarding pet ownership and health, it 
appears that the elderly who are attached to their pets are likely to 
experience better morale than do those pet owners who are not 
attached. There is some evidence that ownership, regardless of 
attachment, is linked to enhanced emotional status. Evidence of 
beneficial effects on physical health for owners or attached owners is 
limited in the literature and not apparent in this study. Based on these 
data, we believe that pet factors may have only a physical health-
protective role under special circumstances, such as in the absence of 
human confidants.  (Garrity et al., 1989:41) 
 
Garrity et al. (1989) are reserved in the claims they make regarding an 
association between biophysical factors and human and companion animal 
relations. Garrity et al. (1989) emphasise that the relationship between 
companion animals and human wellbeing is complicated, which, as Miltiades 
and Shearer (2011) point out, is far from an understatement, and was as much 
the case decades later, as it was in 1989.   
 
In terms of the body, biomedically informed research suggests that people living 
with companion animals are less likely to develop heart disease (Anderson, 
Reid and Jennings, 1992), and in terms of psychosocial development, children 
who grow up in homes with animals tend to be more confident and sociable 
(Guttmann et al., 1985).  Yet this does not mean that having a companion 
animal is always beneficial, or that all kinds of companion animal effect human 
wellbeing in the same way.  If a person is recovering from a heart attack they 
may get better, and get better faster, if they have a companion animal, but it 
makes a difference what kind of animal it is.  Friedmann and Thomas’ (1995) 
research suggests that owners may be nearly nine times more likely to be alive 
the first year after a heart attack if they have a companion canine, but not if they 
have a companion feline.  Holding and stoking a companion animal may reduce 
heart rate (Baun et al., 1984), and it may lower the levels of the stress hormone, 
cortisol, in the blood (Beetz et al., 2012).  In some studies companion canine 
ownership has also been associated with lower blood pressure, which is 
regarded as beneficial for cardiovascular health (Anderson, Reid and Jennings, 
1992; Friedmann, Locker and Lockwood, 1993; Jennings et al., 1998). 
However, living with a companion animal may also aggravate an asthma attack 
or provoke allergies (Huang et al., 2013).   
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In a biomedical view companion animals may be regarded as contributing to 
human wellbeing by reducing heart rate and blood pressure, and buffering the 
physiological systems against the negative effects of environmental stress, as 
Friedmann, Locker and Lockwood observe, “the presence of animals has been 
associated with decreased physiological responses to stressors” (Friedmann, 
Locker and Lockwood, 1993:115). Such an understanding presents an 
important contribution to how we understand the human animal nexus.  
However, there is a risk that the subtle and complex web of interactions that 
form human and companion canine relations may be reduced to a limited and 
narrow understanding based predominately upon the biochemical domain.  In 
short there is a risk that complex social processes may be falsely attributed to, 
rather than being seen as co-existent with, biochemical reactions.   
 
An example of biological reductionism in seeking to understanding the human 
and companion canine bond, can be found in Handlin et al.’s (2012) recent 
research exploring correlations between the relationship of companion canines 
to their owners, and oxytocin and coristol levels, measured in both the canines 
and the humans.  Handlin et al. (2012) measured the oxytocin and cortisol 
levels in the humans and canines at a testing facility, by inserting a cannula into 
both participants and then permitting them three minutes of interaction.  They 
also had the owner complete a Monash Dog Owner Relationship Scale survey, 
which numerically rates the owner and canine across 28 items scaled 1 to 5. All 
the owners were female aged 35-70 and all the canines were Labrador 
Retrievers. Handlin et al. (2012) concluded that interacting with the dog was 
related to oxytocin release in humans, the more hugging and kissing of the dog 
the more oxytocin in the canines and the humans, also there was less cortisol 
(which is lowered by oxytocin in any case). They found some correlation 
between human and canine in oxytocin levels, but could not find a significant 
correlation for cortisol (Handlin et al., 2012). Findings such as these are 
interesting, particularly from a physiological stance, but it is far too simplistic to 
assume that the complexities of a human and nonhuman relationship can be 
understood from so narrow a physiological view. Handlin et al. begin their 
discussion of their statistical findings with the statement that: 
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Given that oxytocin levels have been demonstrated to correlate with 
some maternal physiological and behavioural variables, including the 
level of maternal interaction and sensitivity to the infant’s cures, this 
study explored whether the scores obtained on the MDORS correlated 
with oxytocin and cortisol levels in dogs and their owners. 
  (Handlin et al., 2012:224) 
 
The implication being that the quality of the human and canine relationship may 
be assessed by these means.  The humans and canines in this study were in a 
highly artificial situation, there was very limited opportunity for the researchers 
to observe the participants together and beyond this; it is unlikely that an 
understanding of human and canine relations, that is coherent and realistic, can 
be built up from such a foundation. A microscopic biochemical basis for 
understanding human and canine behaviour is far too crude a mechanism to be 
able to build a clear picture of such a complex phenomenon, manifest at a 
macro level. The biomedical institution is a principal force in meaning 
construction, and it privileges a positivistic paradigm (Chapela, 2013), this leads 
to a tendency to go “looking for biological answers and ‘hard’ evidence to 
embodied social problems” (Chapela, 2013:504), and multifaceted embodied 
social phenomena, such as interplays of animal and human wellbeing.   
 
Whilst the biomedically informed view of the psychological and veterinary 
studies can be informative, it represents, what may be the dominant, but still 
remains only a particular view of companion canine and human interaction.  The 
biomedical view, and those studies informed by this paradigm, function on the 
basis of a series of assumptions which give pre-eminence to the internal 
psychological and physiological functions of the human organism.   They map 
the world according to a medicalised model which affects both what they see 
and how they see it (Foucault, 1973).  Sociology sees the world with different 
eyes than the medical model, and can move beyond the limitations of 
psychological and biomedical conceptualisations of life and wellbeing, enabling 
the perception of suffering, and the perception of effects of trauma, which lie 
outwith the vision of the medical model (Charmaz, 1983; Mort et al., 2007).   
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4.2 Beyond a Biomedical Understanding  
Whilst the majority of studies addressing animals and wellbeing appear to be 
based in the medical and veterinary disciplines, (and to a lesser extent 
psychology), and attempt to understand the dynamics involved from the 
perspective of a bio-medical model, overall the results of these multiple studies 
are contradictory (McNicholas  et al., 2005).  McNicholas et al. undertook a 
review of the biomedical evidence regarding whether companion animal 
ownership is beneficial for human health that was reported in the British Medical 
Journal.  With attention to multiple voices from within the biomedical domain, 
the review was conducted by a psychologist, a general practitioner, a veterinary 
surgeon and a professor of palliative medicine, they concluded that, whilst:  
 
Research dating from the 1980s popularised the view that pet ownership 
could have positive benefits on human health … Although the research 
did much to raise awareness of the importance that people attach to their 
pets, recent studies have failed to replicate the benefits … recent 
research has failed to support earlier findings that pet ownership is 
associated with a reduced risk of cardiovascular disease, a reduced use 
of general practitioner services, or any psychological or physical benefits 
on health for community dwelling older people. Research has, however, 
pointed to significantly less absenteeism from school through sickness 
among children who live with pets.  (McNicholas, 2005:1252) 
 
Studies claiming to find a positive correlation between companion animal 
ownership and human health cannot be easily replicated, and results are 
conflicting.  To take just the issue of the perceived positive effect of companion 
animal ownership on cardiovascular health, Friedmann, Locker and Lockwood 
(1993), found that companion animal ownership was beneficial for human 
health and that it resulted in lower blood pressure in the humans.  Yet when 
Parslow and Jorm conducted their study Pet Ownership and Risk Factors for 
Cardiovascular Disease: Another Look ten years later, they found that not only 
did companion animal ownership not convey positive benefits on cardiovascular 
health, but that it was associated with higher blood pressure (Parslow and Jorm, 
2003).   
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The picture emerging from the biomedical field is unclear and filled with 
contradictions, as McNicholas et al., (2005) point out there is no direct causal 
relationship between companion animal ownership and human health, rather:  
 
The main issue may not be whether pet ownership per se confers 
measurable physical benefits but the role that pets have in individual 
people's lives—namely, the contributions of the pet to quality of life or the 
costs to wellbeing through a pet's death. This issue embraces a broader 
definition of health that encompasses the dimensions of wellbeing 
(physical and mental) and a sense of social integration.  
 (McNicholas, 2005:1252) 
 
There is a need to search beyond a biomedical view.  I would suggest that part 
of the reason for the confusing and contradictory picture that is emerging from 
the biomedical field, is that the studies are coming from a limited frame and are 
seeking to address interplays of wellbeing in purely bio-physical (and discrete 
psychological), rather than sociological, terms.  One exception to this trend are 
the related works of Mort et al. (2007) and Convery et al. (2008).  As they vividly 
illustrate in their studies of the 2001 UK foot and mouth disease outbreak, it is 
necessary to extend our understanding of wellbeing beyond the confines of the 
bio-medical model; for interplays of wellbeing run far deeper than becoming ill 
and going to hospital.  Mort et al. (2007) identified profound suffering that was 
not predominantly physical and was not necessarily limited to those humans in 
immediate contact with the culled livestock.  Shop owners in villages near the 
farms experienced negative effects on their businesses and emotional and 
psychological dissonance during the culls (Convery et al., 2008).  Adults and 
children driving past the piles of burning animals found the experience 
disturbing (Mort et al., 2007).  There was deep suffering and loss for the human 
farming community, not only loss of economic resources, but also emotional, 
professional and the loss generational investment (herds may be build up over 
generations, with animals from relatives farms passing to newlywed families 
(Convery et al., 2008), such legacies of livestock were irretrievable lost during 
the culls.  
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These forms of suffering transcend the biomedical, they are embedded in the 
lived experience of the community, and are not necessarily picked up by the 
NHS helplines: Mort et al. (2007) argue that interplays of animal and human 
wellbeing are so deeply socially embedded that awareness of them is difficult to 
access.  
 
Dasgupta suggests a wider interpretation of wellbeing than a biomedical one, in 
which human wellbeing is based on the need “for food and care and shelter, for 
friendship and love and a communal life, and for freedom to develop” 
(Dasgupta, 1993: 8).  Animal and human interplays can intersect at every point 
of this definition.  Human and animal interplays of wellbeing are multifaceted 
phenomena, that can encompass sociological, physiological, emotional, spiritual 
and psychological aspects.  Place can also form part of the human and animal 
interactional landscape.  The physical environment in which human and animal 
interact is also implicated in the interplays of wellbeing.  Places can have 
meaning and purpose, and if these meanings are disrupted, there can be 
negative effects on the social actors (Convery et al., 2008). The empty fields 
and silent barns, lead to deep melancholia for some of the farmers and livestock 
workers caught up in the Cumbrian foot and mouth disease outbreak of 2001, 
as they were forced to inhabit, what Convery et al. termed, “emotional 
geographies of changed landscapes” (2008:56), in the aftermath of the cull of 
approximately 10 million of their animals.   
 
Wellbeing is a complex issue, in his ethonographic study of the Nuer in Sudan, 
Evans-Pritchard found a profound interplay between human and animal 
wellbeing (1940). In particular he highlights the complex relationship of the Nuer 
with their cattle, which embraces a understanding of wellbeing as composed of 
multiple factors.  There is physiological interdependence, in terms of foodstuff, 
physicality and care of the bodies, in his words “they probably could not live 
without them, any more than the cattle could live without the care and protection 
of their owners” (Evans-Pritchard, 1940:248).  Yet there is also a depth of 
interweaving of the mental, emotional and the spiritual life of the people with the 
animals on which they depend (Evans-Pritchard, 1940; 1956).  
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This would be compatible with Dasgupta’s understanding of wellbeing as 
representing, not a fixed quality, but one that is cyclic in nature (1993). 
Wellbeing is more helpfully understood in terms of an interplay of factors, rather 
than as an isolated quality inherent to an individual.  Moreover in the 
emotionally intense (Walker, 1999), and involved relationship between human 
owner and companion canine, with its   “centrality of emotional connectedness” 
(Sanders, 1999:22) the subject of the animal can become linked to the subject 
of the human, and interplays of wellbeing beyond the physiological, implicating 
the social and emotional life of human and animal, are possible.  
 
4.3 Bereavement  
Gerwolls and Labott’s study of 49 adult companion animal owners concluded 
that “as pets provide many important benefits of a psychological, social, and 
physiological nature, loss of a companion animal can be a devastating event.” 
(Gerwolls and Labott, 1994:172).  While this may be the case in some 
instances, there can be substantial qualitative differences in the relationship 
between human owners and their nonhuman companions.  Owners may 
relinquish, or have their companion animal euthanized, for a wide range of 
reason, from serious illness and suffering, or because the current companion 
animal sheds fur on the new couch or an owner has simply tired of them (Arluke 
and Sanders, 1999).  As Irvine concluded, whilst studying the relinquishment of 
companion animals to a shelter,  “when a dog or cat does not behave correctly, 
guardians assume there must be something wrong with the animal and they 
become emotionally disconnected from the animal as time goes on” (Irvine, 
2003:559).  Expectations of companion animal behaviour can be idealised and 
unrealistic (Arluke and Sanders, 1994; Irvine 2003) and when the companion 
animal fails to meet these unrealistic expectations an emotional disconnection 
can occur, and the companion animal may be disposed of; either by 
relinquishment to a shelter, simply being allowed to stray or by being 
euthanized, either by a veterinarian or by home euthanasia. In a situation of 
emotional and intersubjective disengagement grief may not be experienced, or 
not experienced as deeply.  
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The experience of grief is understood as being related to both the existence of a 
social bond and a degree of intertwining of self and other;  
 
Grief as it is conventionally understood in survivor theories, is a reaction 
to extreme damage to the social bond.  If we recall Freud’s views, to love 
someone is to place in that person a part of one’s self, so that when that 
person dies so does that part of the self.  (Seale, 1998:193).   
 
An animal shelter worker may euthanize multiple canines without the 
experience of grief, though not perhaps without tensions being felt in their 
identity as someone who works for the welfare of, and cares for, animals 
(Arluke, 2006).  However, in the case of companion canines who are interwoven 
into the life of a human owner, grief and the experience of bereavement at the 
loss of the companion become possible.  Lee and Surething in their study of 
neuroticism and the severity of bereavement among pet owners, state that “the 
death of a loved one is arguable the most emotionally painful experience a 
person will ever endure in his or her lifetime” (Lee and Surething, 2013:62).  
Further, “to the extent that the human-pet bond constitutes an attachment bond, 
a similar response to separation and loss of a pet should be found following loss 
of a human attachment bond” (Field et al., 2009:335).  Whilst these works offer 
a strong justification for the existence of human bereavement in response to the 
death of a companion animal, and therefore serve to highlight what may be a 
less understood aspect of the human grief experience, the loss of a companion 
animal is not necessarily the same as the loss of a human companion.  There 
are qualitative differences between human and companion animal relations and 
human-to-human relations (Irvine, 2004b).  It seems unwise to assume that the 
experience of bereavement will be similar, given the difference in social status 
and dimensions of relationship, in human-to-human and human-to-nonhuman 
relations.   
 
Nonetheless, the difference in qualities between human and companion animal 
relations and human-to-human relations does not mean that bereavement at the 
loss of a companion animal cannot be profound, as Davis et al. highlight:   
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It is now well established that the death of a companion animal is a 
serious loss, provoking a grief response comparable to that for a human 
being in at least some pet owners under at least some circumstances.  
 (Davis et al., 2003:57).   
 
If bereavement is a response to the rupture of a social bond and intertwining of 
subjectivity, the question does arise whether grief is only experienced by 
humans, or whether the companion canines themselves may experience 
bereavement and grief?  In November 2011 a companion canine in China, just 
outside the village of Panjiatun, refused to leave the graveside of their deceased 
owner and kept a vigil there without food or water for seven days.  When found, 
the dog was offered steamed buns and encouraged to leave the grave, but took 
the food and ran back, to remain by his owner’s grave, whilst being occasionally 
fed by local villagers (BBC, 21 November 2011).  The Victorian natural historian 
William Lauder Lindsay regarded animals as capable not only of having an 
inner emotional and psychological life, but also of possessing a moral and even 
religious sense (Lauder Lindsay, 1880), though his work did meet with some 
hostile responses from reviewers (Finnegan, 2008). Still, in Victorian Britain 
there are examples of animals which were understood to have experienced 
profound melancholia at the loss of a loved one, and to have taken their own 
lives in an act of self-destructive grief.  Such as the horse that after prolonged 
mistreatment, leapt to its death in a canal, the cat that hanged herself on a tree 
branch following the death of her kittens, and the many stories of companion 
canines who kept vigil, sometimes starving to death, upon the graves of their 
deceased owners (Ramsden and Wilson, 2010), including of course the famous 
Greyfriars Bobby of Edinburgh, Scotland.   
 
Wellbeing is a multifaceted phenomenon and is influenced by factors beyond 
the biomedical realm.  Loss and bereavement can impact human wellbeing, but 
the meaning and dynamics of how companion animal loss relates to wellbeing 
are not clearly understood.  It is the object of this thesis to shed light on these 
little understood areas, and to that end attention now turns to the methods 
underpinning this research.   
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Chapter 5  ~  The Study  
 
5.1 Methodology  
In terms of general orientation, to quote Sanders, “I will admit at the beginning 
that I really love dogs” (1999:intro vii).  I come from a family of dog owners, 
whose canine ownership goes back as many generations as can be recalled.  
Dogs are woven into the fabric of our family in multiple ways. From my great 
grandparents’ guard dogs and gun dogs, to the working sheep dogs on the farm 
on which I grew up, with innumerable pet dogs living in the various family homes.  
Though being half Scottish and half Sudanese, there is a distinct divide, in that it 
is the Scottish side of the family who live in proximity with dogs.  My Muslim 
family living in Sudan do not keep companion canines, and would not have dogs 
in the home, this being considered inappropriate for a canine in that culture.  To 
the family in northern Sudan, dogs are more likely to be encountered as packs of 
feral scavengers, and regarded as troublesome, and possibly dangerous, to be 
avoided and chased way.  This familiarity with companion canines has been both 
an asset and a challenge, though overall, particularly in terms of building rapport, 
it seems to have been an asset.   
 
With regard to formal methodology, this is a qualitative study, which understands 
reality as being socially constructed, and regards knowledge in interpretivist 
terms (Gergen, 1999).  This ontological and epistemological basis of the work is 
concordant with the majority of recent research in the field of animal-human 
interaction within the discipline of Sociology (AHSG, 2009).  However, this is not 
to suggest that this methodological stance was specifically chosen as appropriate 
to the field, rather it is an expression of the world view of the writer, which is itself 
influenced by her training and context.  Having a foundation in interpretivism 
affects both the research process and how the researcher understands 
themselves in that process (Ezzy, 2002). In this study the research process is 
particularly concerned with meanings, their interpretation and utilisation, and the 
researcher is understood as active in that process.   
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In terms of its applied conceptual framework this study is situated within the 
symbolic interactionist tradition, it is also influenced by the thought of Goffman, 
George Herbert Mead, and to a lesser extent some of the European 
Psychoanalytic social theorists. With regard to the utilisation of a symbolic 
interactionist framework, this course is taken because “with its meticulous 
attention to aspects of meaning-making, in particular the local production of 
meanings, emergent from and negotiated within situated everyday interaction” 
(Allen-Collison, 2009;53), symbolic interactionism can enable insight into a little 
understood area, where meaning is born and shaped in the embodied lives of 
social actors (Allen-Collison, 2009).  A symbolic interactionist framework is also 
sympathetic with most of the work in the young field of animal human interaction 
that this thesis builds upon.  Further, whilst an alternative framework, such as 
actor network theory, may have been a possible choice for the applied 
conceptual framework, and would likely have led to its own flavour of insights, it 
would not be the best fit of researcher to project.  Symbolic interactionism is 
concordant with how I comprehend the world, which means that not only is the 
framework a smooth fit for researcher and project, but also, I suspect, enables a 
researcher to travel further into the territory before them, if they are travelling in a 
fashion suited to their mode of understanding.   
 
5.2 Site of Investigation  
Family is the site of investigation.  The first, and foremost, reason for this is that it 
is within the family structure that canine companions are situated.  They live out 
their lives within the homes of their human owners, except in cases, such as Ted, 
a working dog who was born on a farm, or Fritz who was believed to be puppy 
farmed, companion canines live their entire lives within the family context.  They 
eat, sleep, and play, within the private sphere of the human home.   In an 
increasingly public world, they share in our private lives.  Family is not only a 
household, which is the site of investigation, family is also understood to be an 
activity, which takes on a particular meaning (Morgan, 1996; Finch 2007).    
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5.3 Sourcing, Sampling and Inclusion Criteria   
Purposive convenience sampling was used to select the families, they were 
“sought out”, in terms of both the individuals and the settings (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000:370), and specifically chosen as part of a critical and evaluative 
process (Silverman, 2005).  The families were sourced by way of inquiries among 
informal social networks, contacts from previous research (both through 
academic networks and from those participating), or through general awareness 
of the study.  There were also contacts from some limited exposure following a 
press release (17 December 2009), which resulted in a substantial amount of 
potential families, who were unfortunately unsuitable, given the selection criteria.  
Finally, families became involved through word of mouth recommendation from 
the participating humans.  The families contacted as a result of this snowballing 
were particularly suitable, though this form of “differential access” (Brown-
Saracino, 2014:unlisted pages) brought its own issues.  As my involvement with 
one family would affect how I was perceived by another, and where I may, or may 
not be, welcome.  It also resulted in having families who were friends of each 
other (two sites), or who represented different parts of a single large family (one 
site). Particularly challenging in these circumstances was maintaining 
confidentiality and neutrality, in the sense of not taking sides in ongoing family 
disputes, for example with regard to choice of veterinarian or training practices for 
the canines.  Though, on the plus side, this social proximity between three sites 
also enabled me to encounter, and observe, the wider social web of those 
particular canine participants.   
 
This is a small scale study, whose intention is not to be representative, but rather 
to explore human and companion canine relations in depth. There are ten 
families in this study, the families are comprised of a total of 24 nonhumans and 
18 humans.  Of these there are 16 principal canine participants, and 14 principal 
human participants (this number is greater than ten as some families present 
more than one canine, or human, as their main actor).  In the case of the dogs 
the principal canine participant(s) were self-selected by the human owners.   
Abbreviated demographic details of the participants are listed in Table 1 below.  
Full demographic details, including associated family members of participants, 
can be found in Appendix 1.   
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Table 1 – Abbreviated Demographic Details of Participants  
Principal Canine Participants 
name    gender  age 
Principal Human Participants 
name  gender age 
Bashan*  M  nk** Nathaniel M  nk 
Brandy  F  dec*** Matthew  M   nk 
Braxton  M  12 
Zayne M  4 
Irma F   40 
Fritz M  8 
Glen M  5 
Rowan F  67 
Gregor M  70 
Mason M  3 
Diesel M  2 
Amanda F  51 
Samir M  40 
Mitch M  20 
Sally F  16 
Margaret  F  48 
 
Pandora F  8 Olga F  65 
Rose F  dec Winston M  nk 
Rusty M  5 mth Rebekah  F  42 
Ross M  56 
Sierra  F  13½ 
Ted M  14 
Kari F  7 
Susan F  46 
Frank M  50 
*the names of nonhumans are italicised in this report 
**not known  
***deceased  
 
The inclusion criteria of this project required that the human participants are all 
resident in Scotland, and are fluent in spoken English.  Both of these criteria 
largely reflect pragmatic and economic concerns, being the desire to limit the 
travel involved in visiting participants on the one hand, and to avoid the need of 
working with an interpreter on the other. The inclusion criteria also required that 
the principal human participant(s) had significant involvement with companion 
canines, either those currently alive and living in the home, or dogs they had 
involvement with in the past.   
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All the principal nonhuman participants in this study are the associated 
companion animals of the principal human participants, or other members of the 
family.  The use of spoken English as a principal means of accessing experience 
exerts a significant limit on the project, in that, as none of the companion animals 
use spoken English, the experience of the dogs was not accessed directly.  
Rather the weight of the focus is on how their owners understood and interpreted 
the illness and loss of their companions. To have given greater place to the 
companion animals’ experience may have been possible, to do that I would have 
relied much more heavily on participation with, and observation of, the dogs.  It 
would have been necessary to have a depth of involvement with the dogs over 
extended periods of time, months or even years, similar to the approach of 
Pepperberg (1998) with Alex, the African Grey Parrot, or Patterson (1981) and 
Koko.  Though it is worth noting that both Alex the parrot and Koko the ape could 
communicate directly with the researcher though a shared meaning system, as 
both nonhumans had considerable vocabularies of spoken English, which would 
not have been possible with the companion canines.   
 
Taking a greater emphasis on nonhuman experience was considered at the 
outset of the study, this approach was rejected as not fitting closely enough with 
the project aims.  The aims of the project target the meanings being created and 
sustained during interaction within the family context.  The focus of attention is on 
the principal human actor, the owner, who is the actor largely responsible for 
displaying the family and offering the narratives of their lives.  Whilst I would 
argue that nonhumans are capable of participating in a meaningful framework, 
and are capable of both responding to, and deploying, meaningful action.  I would 
also argue that their capacity to do so is limited, in comparison to the human 
actors with whom they share their lives.  Further, in the wider social sphere, the 
actions of the dogs are mediated by the owner, this process of mediating (and 
giving form and meaning) to the actions of the canines is also of interest, and to 
investigate this it was considered best to focus on the principal human, who is 
also the principal mediator of the behaviour of other family members.   
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It needs to be acknowledged that the approach to sampling in this research is 
likely to have affected the overall picture emerging from the data. Sampling was 
not random, or even entirely by convenience, though general availability of the 
participants was a factor.  The sampling procedure was targeted to focus on 
those families where there was a reasonable possibility of encountering a 
significant degree of involvement of the human family members with the 
companion canines. This criterion reflects the desire to maximise the possibility of 
exploring an interweaving of human and nonhuman relations, by focusing on 
owners having considerable experience with canine companions. Families 
acquiring their first dog with no, or limited, history of canine ownership were 
screened out at the initial contact stage.  
 
Furthermore canines who fulfilled roles in their relations with humans other than 
that of companion, such as canines working with humans as security personnel, 
in agriculture, or as personal assistance dogs, were omitted from the study.  At 
one site there were both companion canines, who lived in the home, and also 
working dogs, who lived outside in kennels.  In this instance only the companion 
canines, Mitch and Sally, were treated as principal canine participants. Mitch and 
Sally’s owner, Margaret, explicitly discussed the differences in her feelings 
towards Mitch and Sally and her kennelled working canines, and how she 
experienced her relations with the different canines, including her response to 
issues of illness and death.  Unfortunately it is beyond the confines of this study 
to explore the dynamics of how canines occupying different social roles are 
understood and related to by their human associates; though it would be 
intriguing for a future study to explore the function of role, in shaping human and 
canine relations in different contexts.   
 
The sample focuses on companion canines in Scotland, and though its results 
could be considered to highlight dynamics that may be apparent in human and 
canine relations in some other parts of the minority world, their relevance to 
human and canine relations in areas of the majority world, may be limited.  As 
Irvine stresses, “animals are not experienced in the same way by all person or 
groups” (Irvine, 2012), and different cultural and physical environments, may 
encourage different patterns of relating.  In Ruiz-Izaguirre and Eilers’ (2012) 
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study of the perception of dogs in farming and tourist villages in Mexico, they 
found that in the village that was focused on tourism, the practice of keeping 
canines as companions was more prevalent than in the farming community.  Also 
the European tourists, compared to the Mexican tourists, had different 
perceptions of both canine welfare and whether the canines were pests (Ruiz-
Izaguirre and Eilers, 2012).  In Scotland at this time there do not tend to be packs 
of free roaming canines, termed “village dogs” (Ruiz-Izaguirre and Eilers, 
2012:75) which I encountered in Sudan, though historically there have been 
issues in Scotland with packs of stray and feral dogs, and it is good to remember 
that rabies is also not prevalent in this country.  
 
5.4 Methods  
The aim of this research is to explore the experience of serious illness, to reveal 
the meanings surrounding death and dying, and to investigate any interplays of 
wellbeing between human and canine, that may be present.  It is in light of this 
that the decisions around method were made.  As the search is one for meaning, 
depth, as far as this is possible within a small study, is the principal concern 
shaping the choice of specific research methods.  This includes a considerable 
amount of time and effort being spent in building rapport.  Hours spent being with, 
walking with, the humans and canines; feeding the dogs, cleaning up after the 
dogs, including extended periods, up to 45 minutes stroking and petting the 
canines.   
 
The data was gathered by way of in-depth interviews “intended to combine 
structure with flexibility” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:141), which were conducted 
over multiple sessions.  These interviews aimed “to explore the complexity and 
in-process nature of meanings and interpretations” (Liamputtong and Ezzy, 
2005:56).  In this study social entities are understood as being socially 
constructed (Gergen, 1999), with data being both gathered and created during an 
interview process in which the researcher is an active agent, encouraging the 
participants to talk and explore their understanding (Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005; 
Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).   
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The interviews were composed of non-audio recorded discussion with 
observational, and participatory, elements.  Each family also had audio recorded 
interviews.  The interviews ranged in time from sittings of 30 minutes to 6 hours 
40 minutes, full details of the interviews are listed in Appendix 2.  Fieldnotes were 
taken for each interview.  There was also ongoing contact by email, text and 
telephone.  
 
The interviews themselves are not neutral in this study, but rather the narratives 
forged during the participant and researcher interaction “perform a complex 
reconstructive task” (Owens et. al., 2008:237).  This task is understood as part of 
the ongoing meaning making (Chen, 2012), and the work of giving meaning to 
the life and place of the ill or lost companion within the family.   
  
Initial contact interviews were largely unstructured and had two main purposes.  
First they gave the families a chance to meet me, and for us to talk about what 
their participation may involve, the nature of the project, and issues around 
consent and confidentiality (copies of the project information sheet, consent and 
de-briefing forms used, are included in Appendix 3).  Initial interviews also 
provide the principal human participant with a chance to make a more informed 
choice regarding their possible involvement in the study, and indeed two potential 
families did decline at this stage.  The researcher wanting access to the home, 
rather than the study involving filling in a questionnaire, seemed to be a factor in 
their decision to withdraw.  Spending time discussing involvement also gave the 
families a chance to let me know what limitations they felt were necessary to their 
involvement, which was particularly helpful to know at the outset.   
 
Second, initial contact interviews also enabled me to get a, albeit cursory, sense 
of the family and the principal human participant(s), and to be alert for a 
potentially unsuitable or unsafe context.  In one instance lack of sufficient 
previous relationships with companion canines, the family having just got their 
very first dog, rendered them unsuitable.  In another instance a disquiet with a 
very keen potential human participant, led me to make enquiries and I 
subsequently discovered that they had recently been convicted of a violent 
assault against their canine companions, having stabbed them with a knife in a 
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moment of extreme emotional distress. Though it would have been very 
interesting to investigate this context, and a part of me still wishes I had, having 
discussed this with my supervisor we considered it unsafe to enter this situation.   
During the course of the study intra-family violence involving canine companions 
was encountered, however that was as part of an unfolding exploration at a site 
where I was already involved, and I was easily able to avoid the presence of the 
perpetrator.  Though there is still an element of risk here, as my supervisor, 
McIntosh, pointed out, it is one matter to become aware of risk whilst you are in a 
situation and manage it, and quite another to enter an environment you know 
from the outset to be unsafe.   
 
The first audio-recorded interview was loosely structured around the interview 
schedule (see Appendix 4).  This schedule was used as a guide and memory aid, 
rather than as a rigid structure that ordered questioning (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). Subsequent interviews, including additional audio-recorded interviews, 
were less structured, and commenced with an opportunity for both my human 
participants and myself to explore any issues arising from earlier sessions.   
 
I was particularly satisfied with the effect of using this repeat interview technique, 
which helped to facilitate trust (Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005).  I also incorporated 
neutral questions into the early stages of each interview for the same reason 
(Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005).  Asking my human participants about their early 
experience with animals for example, gave them time to relax and, in the case of 
audio-recording, some time for them to overcome, at least in part, an inhibitory 
effect of the presence of the recorder (Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005).  I consider 
that using these techniques helped to build rapport and facilitated the acquisition 
of richer data.   
 
The observational and participatory elements involved witnessing the human 
family members interacting with their companion animals, interacting with the 
animals myself, and exploring the homes, with particular attention to the sleeping, 
feeding and play areas of the dogs. The observational and participatory elements 
give this work a flavour of the ethnographic approach, and enabled me to get a 
sense of the context of the interaction between the humans and their canines.  I 
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accompanied family members on visits to the shops or to the vets, and on walks 
with their dogs.  In the case of deceased companions, such as Rose, I walked 
with the owner the routes that they and their companion used to share. This could 
be a poignant, even emotional, experience. 
 
I took multiple photographs of the sleeping, feeding and play areas of the home, 
its local environment, and the dogs, both alone and with their associated humans.   
I also viewed existing photographs and video of the humans and their canine 
companions, past and present, and sought to develop a visual imagination of the 
data, to help balance what Mason calls the “extraordinary dominance of talk and 
text in our research imaginations” (2002:104). The observational element of this 
study was included to help me to gain an understanding of the animal-human 
interplays in context, and to reveal the data in a multi-dimensional way (Mason, 
2002).  It also gave me some direct access to the animal-human interplays, which 
gave me the opportunity to weigh the self-reports of the human participants 
against my observations, and to be alert for discrepancies or taken-for-granted 
interplays that may be significant.  Data was kept in a locked filing cabinet in a 
locked university office, and also on a password protected laptop. 
 
This study relied upon considerations of authenticity with regard to its evaluative 
frame (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  Concerning authenticity, I have endeavoured to 
make this study’s exploration and representation of the life worlds of my human 
participants as authentic as possible.  However, that is not to suggest that the 
views of my human participants are accepted at face value, whilst I have sought 
to honour their voices, the understandings they present are questioned.  Further, 
as “there are no unbiased circumstances” (Alasuutari 1998:135), I make no claim 
to the detached stance of an objectivist ontological view, rather endeavouring to 
be aware of possible influences (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), such as my being a 
companion canine owner.   
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5.5 Analysis  
The data were qualitatively analysed utilising an interpretive inductive approach.  
Though I would question the degree to which the analytic stage should be viewed 
as a discrete part of a study, being in agreement with Ezzy (2002) that analysis is 
embedded across a project’s time line, there were specific analytic practices.  
First, there was continuous recording and memoing of impressions throughout 
the study.  Second, a brief report on the initial data was prepared. Third, the 
audio recorded component of the interviews was transcribed verbatium, by a 
professional transcriber, and the transcripts were input into Qualrus.   
 
Qualrus is a computer assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDA) programme 
developed by Idea Works, a small computer company in Missouri.  It is designed 
to deal with unstructured data, in textual, audio, or visual form, providing a range 
of data coding and analysis tools.  These include visual networking of codes, 
checking for co-occurrences of themes and code redundancy. Qualrus is not an 
adaptation of a framework originally designed to store and process quantitative 
data.  Rather, the programme has its genesis in Howard Becker’s (1961) study of 
‘Boys in White’, and was designed by qualitative researchers to work with 
qualitative data.   It is also the first of a new generation of QDA programmes 
which employ artificial intelligence, which adapts to the peculiarities of the 
particular researcher/project, and evolves with progressive use of the 
programme.   
 
At first the idea of a programme that evolves with the researcher sounded a little 
like marketing hype, however, I found it a different experience to work with 
Qualrus, than say NVivo or Framework.  The adaptive nature of the programme, 
evokes a sense of working with, rather than one of working on.  For example, 
whilst coding a segment of data, Qualrus will suggest codes that may apply, and 
even as these suggestions are accepted or rejected, Qualrus adapts and may 
suggest something else.  This is a qualitatively different experience from working 
on the passive interface of NVivo, which evokes a sense of the subjective 
researcher relating to the object of the data and the object that is the analysis 
programme.  Instead, working with Qualrus creates a sense of researcher 
interacting with the programme upon the object of the data.    
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Whilst this difference may seem subtle, it has implications.  Coffey and Atkinson 
(1996) argued that computer software is only analytic support, and does not 
contribute to the intellectual work of analysis.  Taking an even stronger stance, 
Kelle (1997 cited in Ritchie and Lewis 2003), reject the idea that a computer can 
be involved in analysis at all, stating that QDA is a misnomer and these 
programmes should only be called data administration tools.  While these views 
may have some merit with regard to NVivo and similar programmes, they appear 
dated and out of step with regard to Qualrus, which is experienced more as an 
ally in the analytic process. 
 
Fourth, to return to the specific techniques of analysis, the data was read within 
Qualrus, line by line, and coded, whilst also memoing on the text.  Ultimately a 
total of 61 codes were applied, and unassigned data was also coded. The main 
difficulty with coding was that upon the development of a new code, the earlier 
transcripts had to be returned to and re-read, to check for instances of the new 
code, which was somewhat laborious.   
 
Fifth, an All Codes Report was output and printed from Qualrus, and 61 Specific 
by Code Segment Reports were output and printed.  Sixth, each Specific By 
Code Segment Report was read through, and series of summary reports on 
looking at the coded data were written.  Finally, developed from these written 
reports, and alongside reading the fieldnotes data and viewing the photographic 
data, the raw and summarised data was transformed into a thematic 
interpretation (Ezzy, 2002; Mason, 2002).  This was done with particular attention 
to the original objectives of the study, which were used at this stage to help focus 
in on the pertinent features of the data (Ezzy, 2002); and with attention to theory 
(Silverman, 2005).  It was at this transformational stage that the participants were 
anonymised.   
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5.6 Researching with Canine Participants   
There is a plethora of sociological writing on researching with humans, either 
focusing on different methodological orientations or particular areas, such as 
sensitive research topics or vulnerable groups. However, a search of the Web of 
Knowledge database for key words, including research, canines, dogs, methods 
and methodology, found no methodological works within the discipline which look 
at researching with canines. Having conducted eight research projects, all but 
one of which involved nonhumans, I would suggest that there are some 
differences of method which are particular to researching with canines, and in 
some aspects particular to researching with nonhumans more generally.  Some 
of these have become a little taken-for-granted in my research practice, and I am 
indebted to my supervisor, Punch, for pointing out that these ‘tricks of the trade’, 
as Becker (1928) would call them, should be addressed explicitly.   
 
Researching with companion canines can be an enriching, and sometimes 
challenging, experience.  The main consideration is that it is of equal importance 
to build a relationship with the nonhumans, as it is with the humans.  There is a 
‘knowing’ that has the status of accepted folk wisdom among companion canine 
owners. This ‘knowing’, or informal lore, is that canines have a superior 
awareness and insight into human personality than humans, and that they are 
able to sense the moral worth of a person, and will react accordingly.   
 
For example, it is considered that if an apparently friendly person comes into the 
home, but the dogs will not go to, or hide from this person, then that person will 
probably be found to have a hidden sadistic or unkind streak.  The consequence 
of this is that if the companion canines do not appear to like someone, then their 
human owners are likely to be suspicious of them as well; and as a researcher 
you are unlikely to get as much, or such good quality data, if you can persuade 
the humans to continue to engage with you at all.  An exception to this may be 
the occasional case of a companion canine that is very reserved and avoids all 
strangers, in which case their lack of desire to interact with a researcher is 
unlikely to be given negative significance.   
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On the other hand, if you can endear yourself to the canines, then the humans 
are likely to be more open and relaxed. I have found it good practice to spend at 
least as much time, indeed frequently more, building rapport with the dogs, by 
speaking, petting and playing with them.  It is especially fortuitous to be in the 
position of the canines showing an interest and willingness to be near, or on you, 
when they do not usually show that level of interest in strangers.  This effort to 
appear as an approachable and safe person is made, because, in Becker’s 
words, “I wanted to maximise their freedom to tell me things, especially things I 
hadn’t thought of” (1928:60), or beyond this, to maximise their freedom to speak 
of things that may be potentially discrediting (Goffman, 1968).  To achieve this a 
researcher wants to be as interesting to the canines as possible, that is as 
interesting as possible without becoming an object of erotic attention.   
 
Goffman encouraged researchers going into the field to be conscious of the 
things they did and the impression that they were making on their participants 
(1989). In terms of practicalities, an effective way of being interesting to canines 
is by not being overly clean, as scent is a more developed sense in canines than 
in humans. It is good to have a slight scent on your body, perhaps from another 
canine or general smells from your own skin; it would not be recommended to 
bathe before, or wear freshly laundered clothes to a visit, particularly to an initial 
visit. In terms of presentation of the self, an upbeat and friendly approach, without 
making too many fast and jerky movements, or being shrill (which are prey 
signals), is a sensible way to come into the companion canines’ presence.  
Staying still in one place so that the canines can come to you of their own 
volition, especially on an initial meeting, is a good approach.   
 
Canines are practiced face observers, so a smile and brief (not staring) glance 
assists.  As a stranger coming into the home it is unwise to go into the dog bed, 
or approach the canines in their special places, (special places being areas of the 
home that the canine uses for rest and/or withdrawal – such as a warm place by 
radiator, or partly hidden space behind a chair).  It is better to meet the canines in 
the open.  On meeting a new canine, I would not approach or interact with the 
canine without first asking permission of the human, unless the canine 
approached themselves. If the canine does approach, interact with strokes and 
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pats, and engage verbally, in a playful voice, with a variable tone, for example, 
“and who are you, aren’t you gorgeous, etc.” It does no harm to compliment the 
companion (and their owner) on the canine’s beauty and good behaviour if 
appropriate, as the researcher is an incomer and wants to be accepted by the 
pack.   
 
Having had initial interaction with the canines the researcher can then let the 
canine investigate them and their possessions, though it is also important to 
know and maintain personal limits. There is a lot of variation with regard to the 
norms governing interpersonal behaviour, depending on the specific home.  
Some canines are permitted to lick and kiss their owners’ faces, feet and mouths, 
some are allowed on furniture and in bedrooms, and some are not.  Personally 
whilst I do not mind canines sitting on me and around me, I do not like to have my 
mouth licked, or noses down clothing or in sensitive places.  
 
A good approach is to be aware of personal limits and gently maintain them, but 
to be tolerant if possible. If whilst on site the researcher does encounter canine 
behaviour towards them that is problematic, it is better to try to deal with it, 
without highlighting the matter to the owner, as owners are subject to 
considerable disciplining gaze and judgement by society at large, and can be 
sensitive. So, for example, Rusty made several attempts to mate with my legs, 
and Mason and Diesel, liked to drink the tea from my cup, which I did not want to 
share with them.  In both instances I moved the dog away and discouraged them 
from interacting with me at that time, without asking the owner to assist and 
discipline them.  Indeed if the owner noticed I minimised the incidents to avoid 
awkwardness for the humans.  As a researcher it is preferable to come across as 
one of ‘us’ not one of ‘them’, that is non-dog lovers.   
 
On a practical note it is wise to give some consideration to clothing, it is best not 
to be too well dressed or have an expensive handbag.  It is likely that clothing 
and accessories may be chewed or torn, especially if there is a puppy in the 
home.  With regard to clothing it is best to keep in mind that you will probably be 
urinated upon at some stage.  Fabrics that attract and hold fur are best avoided, 
and trousers are much more suitable than skirts, given the level of investigation 
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that the canines may make of your person, and no clothing should be easily 
removed or untied.  With regard to foodstuffs, again a tolerant approach whilst 
being aware of personal limits is helpful.  I would hold a sausage roll so the dog 
could not reach it, and would not leave my biscuit unattended; overall its best to 
eat the food given to you as soon as possible, rather than to leave it lying around.   
 
There are also some health considerations when researching with companion 
canines.  It is important to be up to date on vaccinations, and it is also important 
that the researcher’s own canines are also up to date. I attended my veterinarian, 
doctor and a specialist immunization clinic prior to commencing on site research.  
The risk is not only to the researcher, but also to those companions to whom an 
illness or parasite may be transferred. In case of fleas, I keep a supply of 
lavender oil in the home to apply to myself and also keep a supply of anti-flea 
treatment for my own canine. It is worth remembering that clothing and 
accessories, as well as the body, can carry unwanted intruders, and sometimes it 
is a good idea to change clothes and wash them on returning from a visit.   
 
Utilising elements of an ethnographic approach enabled me to get a sense of the 
interactions in context, and participant observation helped facilitate rapport.  A lot 
of time was spent building rapport between myself, the canine participants and 
their human owners, substantially more time was spend on building rapport, by 
being with, walking, talking, cleaning up after and helping, than on overtly 
gathering data.  I am convinced that depth of penetration of the life worlds of the 
families, and the richness of the data, including revelations of mental illness, 
domestic violence, complex and contradictory feelings towards socially required 
obligations and criminal activity, was made possible by the time and attention 
given to building trust and ease. In terms of facilitating data gathering, this 
approach of “passing in the field” (Goffman, 1989:126) and endeavouring to 
become an accepted presence, was apparently successful, but it also stimulated 
feelings of ambiguity and guilt. Was the presentation of a friendly persona 
‘sincere’?   
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There was a tension between the interpersonal approach required by a research 
persona, and the cultural values of authenticity in interpersonal relations, 
because “being oneself is a requirement of contemporary social relationships of 
governance oriented around norms of compulsory individuality” (Allen and 
Mendick, 2014:460).  Whilst working with them, some of the humans and canines 
became more meaningful to me and this intensified the sense of guilt. Combined 
with this, “striving to interact positively with all research participants all of the 
time” (Punch, 2012:87) could be tiring, and felt inauthentic, as if I was behaving 
as “just an actor, not sincere” (Hochschild, 1983:187).  This consideration 
connects with the next issue that this work faced, that is the ethical complexities 
and challenges that were encountered.    
 
5.7 Ethical Considerations and Challenges 
In terms of ethics this is a sensitive study, particularly in the sense that it, “might 
uncover painful experiences and lead people to disclose information which they 
have rarely or never previously shared” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:68). This 
happened in every case, even though written information sheets and consent 
forms were used, and time was spent stressing the voluntary nature of the study 
and what a participant could expect. Despite my best efforts to prepare my 
human participants, there were things that could not be planned for, such as the 
death of a canine participant, or a canine being run over and having to be taken 
to the vet.  In the end the unexpected could not be removed from the research 
process, no matter how much thought had gone into the design (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985).   
 
5.7.1 Informed Consent of Human and Nonhuman Participants  
Written consent was obtained from all human participants for their involvement.  
The consent is for voluntary participation in interviews, and the recording and use 
of audio, textual and visual data.  Human participants were “made aware of their 
right to refuse participation whenever and for whatever reason they wish” (BSA 
Statement of Ethical Practice, 2002: Item 17).  The right to withdraw at any time 
and confidentiality are features of the informed consent.   In order for consent to 
be informed the human participants needed to be acquainted with the nature of 
the study, informed of its funders, research team, what to expect from 
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participation, how long it will take, and how the data will be used (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003).  These project details were communicated, in person, at the initial 
orientation interviews, and are also part of the written project information sheet 
(Appendix 4), that was given to the human participants.   
 
As Mason points out, “it is impossible to receive a consent that is fully informed, 
and the responsible researcher should be prepared to recognise this” (Mason, 
2002:82).  She goes on to stress that the limitations of informed consent should 
encourage us to take informed consent more, rather than less, seriously (Mason, 
2002).  These limits are particularly aggravated in a situation where many of the 
principal participants cannot read, write or use spoken English, as in this study.  
In this instance the human participants are regarded as being able to give 
consent on behalf of their companion animals in their capacity as owners/carers.  
Consent for the nonhuman participants is a component of the consent form (see 
Appendix 4). 
 
5.7.2 Confidentiality and its Limits  
As the BSA highlight “because sociologists study the relatively powerless as well 
as those more powerful than themselves, research relationships are frequently 
characterised by disparities of power and status. Despite this, research 
relationships should be characterised, whenever possible, by trust and integrity” 
(BSA Statement of Ethical Practice, 2002: Item 114).  Trying to reconcile trust 
and integrity is particularly complex in this study, with regard to confidentiality.   
 
There was the possibility of personal and sensitive information being shared 
during the course of this study, as indeed was the case.  Confidentiality was held 
as high as possible, without distortion of the data and voice of the participant.  In 
practical terms this involved changing place names and names of both human 
and nonhuman participants. The names of associated humans, animals and sites 
of interaction, such as the names of veterinary practices, have also been 
changed. The planned approach to confidentiality was one of blanket 
anonymising, determined from the outset.  However, I did have a concern with 
adopting this approach.  
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One of the reasons for undertaking this work was to draw attention to a neglected 
area of experience, and provide the opportunity to highlight marginalised voices, 
and call attention to possibly deeply felt suffering.  My earlier studies, which 
inspired this work and touched on these issues, suggest that the narratives that 
surround the serious illness and passing of canine companions are neglected 
narratives. In this study and others, owners have expressed to me deep grief, in a 
context where, as in ‘special deaths’, “both the grief and the bereavement 
experience are poorly understood and the wider social response one that may 
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the pain of those closely affected” (Guy and 
Holloway, 2007: 84). Frequently human participants do not want to be 
anonymous, and feel strongly that their voice should be heard and their 
experience seen as authentic and profound. As if to make them anonymous is, in 
some measure, to deny their experience and increase the pain caused by the 
existing marginalistion of their suffering. I was unable to find a suitable 
compromise, or solution to this dilemma, which would satisfy both myself, and my 
University Ethics Committee, prior to commencement of data gathering, therefore 
blanket confidentiality was applied.   
 
5.7.3 Wellbeing of Human Participants   
Though there is nothing in this study that was expected to be deleterious of itself, 
participation did involve the humans talking about the experience of the illness or 
loss of a companion canine.  Whilst some found this a neutral, or even a cathartic 
experience, others found that at times it stirred up some uncomfortable emotions. 
An appropriate agency to refer owners to on request, The Blue Cross, who offer 
various services, including counselling, had been sourced prior to 
commencement of fieldwork, for anyone experiencing difficulties due to the loss 
of a companion animal.  If an owner found sharing a recollection or concern 
emotional during the course of a recorded conversation, the tape was stopped 
and, in the first instance, I offered consolation as a fellow human being, either 
simply by listening or perhaps by offering to make a cup of tea. The interview 
process was conducted as gently as possible, with multiple opportunities to take 
a break or withdraw if necessary, and all the human participants were informed, 
in advance, that this is how it would be conducted.   
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When encountering unrecognised issues affecting the physical health of human 
participants, I shared my concern with the owners, and suggested that they 
speak to their general practitioner. Had there been encountered a serious or 
imminent danger to the body and life of a human participant, such as immediate 
threat of physical assault or serious sexual abuse, I would have considered 
breaching confidentiality and informing the police and/or social services, and the 
human participants were aware that this was the case. When hearing of the 
physical abuse of an able bodied adult, by the victim, I encouraged them to seek 
appropriate support.   
 
5.7.4 Wellbeing of Nonhuman Participants   
There is nothing in the methods or approach of this study that should reasonably 
be regarded as constituting a risk to the wellbeing of the nonhuman participants.  
They were not subject to any experiment, or interference.  The level at which the 
canine companions were encountered was at the level of a visitor to their home.  
On observing unrecognised issues affecting the physical health of one of the 
companions, I mentioned this to the human owner and suggested that they may 
wish to contact their veterinary practitioner.  In the event that serious or imminent 
danger to the body and life of a nonhuman participant, such as severe neglect, or 
injury had been encountered, I would have considered breaching confidentiality 
and notifying the Scottish Society for the Protection of Animals, and the human 
participants were aware of this limitation to the confidentiality offered.     
 
It did come to light that two of the nonhuman participants were stolen. This was 
something of a dilemma, however, given that the companions had been stolen 
some years before, it was decided to leave the matter, without action or 
comment. This was not an easy decision as it did come to mind how I would have 
felt as a companion animal owner, had it been my canine that had been taken.   
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5.7.4 Wellbeing of Researcher  
It is not only the participants, “researchers who conduct fieldwork also place 
themselves at risk” (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:70), and efforts were made to 
minimise potential risk.  Prior to beginning fieldwork I visited my doctor and had 
all necessary vaccinations. Furthermore, as risk to the researcher can arise 
unexpectedly (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000), a mobile phone was kept with 
me at all times. Though risk cannot be omitted entirely, that the human 
participants were already known, through informal networks and prior contact, 
does serve to lessen the risk.  Specifically helpful in this regard were the initial 
contact interviews.   
 
A particular issue with this study is that not only humans, but also nonhumans, 
are being encountered.  As companion canines, these should not, in principle, be 
dangerous animals.  However, what happens when working with animals cannot 
be entirely predicted.  My own background involves extensive experience of living 
and working with animals.  This experience is comprised of both growing up on a 
farm in central Scotland, and 30 years of companion canine ownership. As 
Letherby points out, “research is not better or worse because we are closely 
connected to it by experience, but the connection does make a difference and we 
need to acknowledge this in our analysis” (Letherby, 2009:257).  This background 
gives me a framework of experience from which to relate to the nonhumans.   
 
There were some minor physical injuries as a result of interacting with the 
nonhumans, including bites, scratches and also some destroyed and damaged 
clothing and accessories. This was not considered of any great consequence, 
what was more challenging was the impact of the death of some of the canine 
participants, particularly Ted, Mitch and Sally.  I had been involved with these 
canine companions for several years and had grown quite attached to them. 
Hubbard, Backett-Milburn and Kemmer, consider that “the emotionality of the 
research process is a vital part of the investigation”, this may be right, but it does, 
as they also point out, “constitutes a risk to the wellbeing of the researcher” 
(Hubbard, Backett-Millburn and Kemmer, 2000:120-121). It was particularly 
painful when my own canine companion, Zak, passed away, and during one 
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interview with Margaret, when she expressed her distress at the recent death of 
Sally, I found it hard to contain my own grief at the loss of Zak, in the face of her 
emotional reaction.  
 
Not only the fieldwork, the analysis could also be emotionally intense, and on 
occasion it was necessary simply to walk away, at least for a time, from reading 
an account of owner’s loss, as it could be difficult to contain the feelings stirred.  
What was not anticipated, but perhaps should have been, was the emotional 
impact of transcribing the audio recorded data upon the transcriber.  She was a 
university approved, professional transcriber, and reported to me several times, 
that she had found herself distressed, sometimes in tears, whilst working on the 
transcripts.  It is easy to overlook that it is not only the researcher, but also those 
who assist with the data, who may have to deal with some of the emotional 
complexities of the research. I began the practice of letting her know, in advance, 
if I suspected that a particular recording may be difficult to listen to, and of 
enquiring how she was, and making sure she was aware that support could be 
arranged should she so wish.   
 
The intent was that this work be conducted sensitively, and relating sensitivity 
also requires attention to how one withdraws from involvement. Ending 
involvement is not a sudden event for the participants, unless they have chosen, 
as Matthew did due to illness, to withdraw abruptly.  Ending the study itself is a 
gradual process.  Thank you gifts, of parcels containing multiple dog treats and 
toys, were sent to the families in gratitude for their participation, and, for those 
human participants who wish it, occasional contact is kept, with an email or text, 
advising about events in the study.  Keeping light contact can also be helpful if 
further consent is needed, for instance for the inclusion of specific photographs in 
a presentation. It tends to become apparent who wishes to keep in contact, as 
some reply to emails and others do not. In the case of non-reply no chasing 
messages would be sent.  The owners also sometimes get in touch if they 
acquire a new canine companion, or to advise if one of the canine participants 
has passed away, or become unwell.  It is to the analysis of what happens when 
a companion canine becomes unwell that this thesis now turns.   
 
Chapter 6  ~  Interpretations of Serious Illness and the Self  
 
The first research question informing this study asks if established sociological 
insight, based on the study of humans, can be applied to nonhuman illness, and 
whether there are possibilities for an understanding of nonhuman selfhood?  To 
take the first aspect of this question, serious illness emerged as constituting a 
challenge to the anticipated lifecourse of the companion canine, and as causing a 
disruption to the underpinning structures of meaning.  That serious illness could 
constitute a challenge to the expected course of the canine’s life at all, indicates 
that there is an assumption that it is normative for the dog to be well.  Wellness 
was not only an ideal that is reached for, but it was also treated as a basic 
expectation of living and living with.  Yet, given the prevalence of injury and 
disease in the canine, and for that matter the human, population, combined with 
a decline in wellbeing associated with canine ageing, this expectation does not fit 
with the lived experience of the humans and the companion canines.   
 
In the sense of frequency it would be unusual for a human and companion 
canine, who have been together since puppyhood, to not encounter periods of 
illness or instances of injury.  Yet this expectation of wellness remains as the 
orientating expectation, and illness and injury are seen as deviations from what 
should be.  The sense is that there may be more going on with the expectations 
of wellness, than a straight forward response to the probability of illness, which 
the high expectation of wellness simply does not fit.  If asked outright owners will 
acknowledge that their dog may be expected to be unwell at times, especially as 
they become older.  Yet it remains that it is not from this position that owners 
orientate their illness narratives, but from the stance that the dog ‘ought’ to be 
well.  In this sense illness is a failure.   
 
6.1. Nonhumans and Illness Narratives  
Sociological attention to the narratives of illness for humans emerged as an area 
of interest in the 1980s, influenced by the challenges being presented to meta 
discourses from the increasing fragmentation of social life (Hyden, 1997), and 
from questions arising within medical studies, from which it specifically emerged, 
about the capacity of medicine to heal everything (Hyden, 1997). Within 
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contemporary British Sociology it is established wisdom that attention to 
narratives is a valid way of researching the lifeworlds and experiences of humans 
(Mason, 2002; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Silverman, 2005).  
 
Though as Czarniawska points out “MacIntyre and many other advocates of a 
narrative approach to social phenomena limit the concept of action to human 
beings” (2004:3), arguing, in sympathy with Mead (1934), that animals cannot be 
authors of their own actions.  It is likely that this theoretical split has limited the 
application, and therefore investigation of, nonhuman illness narratives.  To my 
knowledge, this study may be the first in British Sociology to address whether 
illness narratives, their possible existence and possible interrogation as useful 
tools of research, is also applicable in relation to the lives of nonhumans.  In short 
the answer to the question of whether illness narratives are applicable in the case 
of nonhumans is yes.  Developed, lively and complex canine illness narratives 
were found in profusion in the data for this study.  The difficulty is how these are 
to be understood, and the question of the self, or more precisely from where self 
originates, becomes unavoidable.  If the self is, as in a Cartesian understanding, 
an inner unreachable abstract that expresses itself outward into the world, then 
the applicability of the concept of illness narratives to canines is, quite possibly 
critically, problematized.  However, if, as Mead himself argues (1934), the self is 
actually born in the interaction between agents, then the applicability of the 
concept of selfhood is entirely possible.  These issues are explored more fully in 
Section 6.5, which specifically addresses the canine self, suffice to say for now, it 
is the interactionist understanding of selfhood that is relied upon here, and upon 
that basis nonhuman illness narratives are not only possible, but found.   
 
This is very sudden, oh uh huh, yeah, there's been nothing wrong 
with her until literally a week ago, in fact, it was a week past 
Wednesday. I came back, now I must have been out somewhere, 
and I came back and Dominic was I think through the back or 
upstairs in the study, I'm not sure, and I came in and I thought to 
myself.  You know how you just know when you look at a dog or 
look at anything and you think, 'no there's something not quite right 
about that' and I thought 'mmm?'.  And initially I just thought 'oh 
she's just sitting with her head to the side', you know, as in she's 
just cocking her head to the side.  Cause I'd come in and I thought 
'well no cause she's actually not moved from that position since I've 
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come in the door', and I'm thinking 'that's a bit strange?'.  And I said 
to Dominic 'was everything alright with Sally?' thinking, you know, 
maybe she'd knocked herself or whatever.  And he said 'yeah she 
was fine, she was asleep in the bed when I went out' and I thought 
'oh right fine'.   
 
So anyway I tried to coax her out the bed and she did come out the 
bed, but the minute she stood up on all fours it was like 'mmm' and I 
thought 'no'.  And the lip was quite loose hanging, and I thought 'no 
there's something not right here', and I thought to myself 'this is just 
exactly the same as Mitch, he had the same thing, just suddenly 
just the head just went.  It was almost like the neck just sort of went 
limp, and I thought 'mmm?'.  So she seemed to be alright apart from 
this head thing and then she started twitching in her front shoulder.  
 (Margaret, re: Sally and Mitch) 
 
The dogs, like the humans, are physically embodied creatures, whose bodies are 
a locus of intent and action.  Their physical, and emotional state, can be 
communicated by gesture and sound.  In this case the tilted head is suggestive of 
physical ailment, and the reluctance to leave the security of the bed is 
suggestive, not only of physical difficulty, but also of emotional, and or 
psychological, hesitation.  Companion canines are the authors of their own 
actions, and in their capacity to act expressively and with intent, they contribute 
to the meaningful creation of the social world.  Their actions, sounds and 
gestures, are intentional material from which the creation of everyday interactions 
is forged.  It is not only the humans who act with meaning and intent, and in this 
capacity to act meaningfully, however limited by their lack of human spoken 
language, the companions are co-actors in the social web.  The companion 
canines are contributors to the illness narrative, by virtue of their actions and 
expressions.  The intersubjective dance, from which the illness narrative is 
forged, is born in the space between the human and the canine actors.   
 
The joint human-canine illness narratives found in this study were not 
straightforward descriptions, simply relating what was seen or felt.  Similar to the 
findings of Convery et al. (2008), in their research investigating the 2001 and 
2007 foot and mouth disease outbreaks, the narratives of disease and suffering 
are dynamic and purposeful constructions.  “From our experience and the work of 
others, we know that narratives rarely simply ‘reveal’ what someone thinks or 
feels, any ‘truth’ is a construction” (2008:39).  In this instance a meaningful 
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explanation is being constructed that links the current experience of Sally’s 
illness, with the history and continuity of life and experience within the family, her 
illness is being embraced into the family story, its members and its history.   
 
The creation of this explanation, and the detailed description, seem to echo 
Seale’s (1995:384) findings regarding those being “found” deceased, rather than 
others “learning” of their death, in that there is a happening upon the scene, and 
a “detective-like search for clues”.   In this case there is analysis of how Sally is 
sitting, and speculation regarding what her strange posture may mean.  Seale 
suggests that these “vivid descriptions of the scene were responses to the sense 
of dislocation and shock felt by onlookers” (1995:384).  If this is so, it is 
suggestive of a significant start and disruption, that also impacts upon those who 
suddenly find their companion canine, rather than a human, unwell.  I would 
suggest, that as with Seale’s (1995:384) research, these narratives can be 
understood as “speculative resurrections” or perhaps more particularly with this 
data as speculative reconstructions, of the events that may have taken place.  In 
these reconstructions divergent and disordered events are re-forged, and 
assimilated, into the order of anticipated family life.  With the onset of illness 
there is a disruption to “the sense of the proper order of things” (Seale, 1995:383) 
which these narratives, in part, appear to be attempting to repair.   
 
The illness narratives are not straightforward communications of what happened, 
they are dynamic, constructing and reconstructing tellings.  This was the case in 
both the narratives of human illness and in those focusing on canine illness.  In 
both of these forms of narrative, the worlds and stories of the human and canine 
are interwoven, albeit with varying degrees of emphasis on the human or 
nonhuman, depending upon who was unwell.  The canines were regarded as 
being subject to similar illness as the humans, as experiencing the same 
symptomology and discomfort, and their illnesses were expected to follow a 
similar course to the commensurate human illness.   
 
She was just weeing a lot and probably gone thinner as well, I 
mean, like humans, the same sort of symptoms, and that’s 
obviously one of the things they test.  Just happens, its like in 
humans.   (Olga, re: Sasha) 
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 In terms of Hydén’s topology of illness narratives, that is; “illness as narrative, 
narrative about illness and narrative as illness” (Hydén , 1997:54, emphasis in 
the original), the joint human and companion canine illness narratives found here 
would be representative of illness as narrative.  They are not simply relating 
symptoms, as in narratives about illness, such as when doctors convey clinical 
knowledge to other care staff (Hydén, 1997).  These human and companion 
canine illness narratives are playing, as Hydén (1997) found, a central role.  They 
are part of the meaningful creation of the illness experience, “the narrative is thus 
a way of integrating or solving the problems that confront us” (Hydén, 1997:54).  
The problem being the disruption to the underpinning structures of life and modes 
of living caused by the illness. In short, the problem is one of biographical 
disruption.   
 
6.2. Biographical Disruption  
The emergence of serious illness in the companion was interpreted by the 
owners against the backdrop of knowing the biography of the companion canine 
in the family.  Each companion had its own history, with developed acquisition 
narratives, telling how it came to be a part of the family, and stories illustrating 
personality and highlighting significant events.  
 
Well they were used to Kari because we had known her since she 
was a pup.  Em, so they were, she was introduced to them as soon 
as she had her injections and whatever and Sierra just saw her as a 
game, somebody to play with. Ted thought yeah whatever 
somebody just to annoy me (laughs) but actually it was great when 
we did get Kari, because shortly after that’s when Ted lost his sight 
and he was a bit depressed.   (Susan, re: Kari, Sierra and Ted) 
 
Susan is recounting how the established canine companions in the family, 
reacted, and incorporated, the incoming puppy.  Family here is not a static 
identity, rather it is something dynamic and enacted:  
 
The fluidity of family life is not defined by shifting membership so much as 
by the continually evolving character of the relationship – how individuals 
talk to each other, act towards each other and the assumptions on which 
their relationship are conducted.  (Finch, 2007:69) 
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The companion is embraced in the story and the structure of the family (Tipper, 
2011), and its existing members, human and nonhuman, and the thought and 
feelings of the other companion canines are spoken for.  In this sense each 
canine had imputed to it a self-history within the family, against which its infirmity, 
not being able to walk as far, loss of interest in play, or changes in relating to 
other family members, is understood.  This self-history demonstrates the fourth, 
and final, of Irvine’s requirements of selfhood (2004).    
 
These canine biographies are not absolute, but dynamic and evolving, in relation 
to other family members and in relation to the structures of family life, 
“biographical stories are always positioned, never complete” (Convery et al. 
2008:39).  Yet they remain coherent, offering an explanation and ordering of life.  
Into this anticipated order of life serious illness appears like an intrusion, a tear in 
the fabric of life and experience, which then needs to be fixed.  An intrusion 
which brings with it “profound disruptions in explanatory systems” (Bury, 
1982:169), creating anxiety.   
 
Serious illness, of both human and canine, emerges and unfolds (Bury, 1982).  In 
the case of Sierra she was regarded as having developed a chronic and 
uncomfortable spinal condition, precipitated by her jerking violently on the lead in 
the park.  In the illness narrative there is attention to restrictions in her bodily 
movement and changes in her appearance.   
 
She looks stiff and sore just now but she looks much, much worse.  
Its like the back end’s not working at all.  Although it’s supposed to 
be all coming from the top half, from her shoulder blades.   
 (Susan, re: Sierra) 
 
As well as the focal incident with the neck jerk, there is a gradual element to the 
chronic illness with Sierra, though Bury (1982) tends to perceive biographical 
disruption as a critical and more isolated event, Larsson and Grassman (2012) 
identify that recurring disruptions also threaten the biography.  In the words of 
one of their participants, previously active and now disabled “’Now I am nothing’, 
he said, ‘that has been somewhat of a crisis’” (Larsson and Grassman 
2012:1165).  Restrictions in bodily movement, and limitations in the capacity to 
express the self through action, are also implicated in biographical disruption, 
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indeed perhaps with regard to the canines, limited physical ability to express the 
self through action is even more pertinent, given their lack of capacity to express 
the self in words. The unexpected limitations on action, and changed 
appearance, are read against the family knowing of the canine and its ways.  The 
emergent changes of serious illness are understood against both the established 
the ways of being of the canine, and against expected the ways of relating.   
 
I don’t think she’s nearly as active as she used to be, she’s 
definitely not as active as she used to be.  She plods around a lot 
more and she leans against, it’s funny, she actually walks up to 
Frank and nudges him to tell him that she wants a massage [laugh].  
Because she never used to bother with Frank at all, but now she 
reckons he’s quite good at massage.  Either with the machine or 
him giving her a good rub.  She used to hate it but actually since 
she’s done her back in Frank’s used it a couple of times on her, she 
actually, she asks for it now.     (Susan, re: Sierra)  
 
The biography of the dog is imputed to it, by the human family members, and the 
dog, by its actions, is seen to be reinforcing the new understanding of their life 
and identity. In the case of Sierra the new identity is that of an ailing dog, 
adjusting to the new conditions of limited physical expression, and seeking 
comfort.  
 
~ 77 ~ 
 
Figure 1 – Sierra became an ailing dog, 12 February 2011  
As Bury identifies (1982:169), “chronic illness, is precisely that kind of experience 
where the structures of everyday life and the forms of knowledge which underpin 
them are disrupted”. Though he was referring specifically to humans, in the case 
of the companion canines found here, serious illness also appears to be 
understood as a disruption to the life of the being.  A disruption where the 
accustomed mode of life and living of the creature is compromised, and a new, 
and alien, understanding and way of behaving in the world is forced upon them.  
One of the formative questions behind this thesis was whether biographical 
disruption as a concept would be applicable to nonhuman agents.  The answer 
appears to be in the affirmative, albeit one of biographical disruption-by-proxy, in 
that “the disruptions of the taken-for-granted assumptions and behaviours” (Bury, 
1982:169) are also found in the case of companion canines. In biographical 
disruption-by-proxy, illness leads to a disruption to the everyday framework of 
meaning which underpins family life, and this disruption is imputed to the canine 
companion, by the human family members.  Also, as Bury found (1982), chronic 
serious illness is an emergent understanding. There is an ongoing process of 
interpretation, and reinterpretation, of affect and action.   
 
The impact of the illness is not only physical, in the sense of Sierra having 
difficulty in getting on and off the couch, and being reluctant to move (Fieldnotes, 
26 January 2011), but also touches on an emotional aspect, as the response, 
even need, of Sierra, to seek out comforting massage to sooth herself, is 
assumed. Combined with this are changes in the ways that other family 
members, human as in the case of Frank, and nonhuman, as in the case of Kari, 
relate to the companion as Sierra becomes seriously ill.    
 
She's growling quite a lot, yeah, she's having a growl at Sierra quite 
a lot actually.  Whenever Sierra's coming up to her, she's constantly 
growling. And Sierra at the moment's not able to change position 
very quickly as well which isn't helping, she's having to take the long 
way round to change direction and Kari isn't enjoying that either.  
Because she's too close to me and she's moaning at her and she's 
grumping at her. So yes, I think there's definitely a wee bit of a 
power shift going on, Kari is wanting to be the top dog.  Which is 
quite funny because she's clearly forgotten that Sierra is capable of 
pinning her to the wall [laugh], but I think Sierra's the case of 'd'you 
know actually I'm too sore and I can't be bothered at the moment'. 
 (Susan, re: Kari and Sierra) 
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Relationships are strained as Sierra becomes increasingly unwell, and they need 
to adjust, the “illness thus meant not only a disruption of structures of explanation 
and meaning, but also of relationships and material and practical affairs” (Bury, 
1982:175).  Sierra had changed patterns of walking and activity, eating and social 
standing within the family (Fieldnotes, 12 February 2011 and17 September 
2011).  Whilst some relationships with the ill companion became more distant, as 
in the case of tensions between Sierra and Kari, other relationships become 
closer.  Sierra developed an increasing attachment to Susan.  When I witnessed 
them as a family, invariably Sierra was beside Susan, and demonstrated extreme 
face gazing, she would stand and stare at Susan for several minutes (Fieldnotes, 
2 April 2011).  Often she was up on the human couch (where Kari  and Ted did 
not go) leaning upon Susan, or lying against her feet. There was extensive 
physical contact between Susan and Sierra, which contrasted with the very 
limited physical contact of the other family members with Ted, who spent the time 
largely alone in his basket.  In a three hour interview session there could be no 
physical contact with Ted at all from the humans, and very limited and occasional 
contact with him from the other canines (Fieldnotes, 17 September 2011).  The 
extensive contact with Sierra also contrasted with the lesser degree of contact, 
and interaction, with Kari, who spent most of her time on the floor going between 
family members, human and nonhuman, and frequently attempting to initiate play 
(Fieldnotes, 12 February 2011 and 17 September 2011).   
 
You know, Kari at the moment goes to Connor but.  Since she 
[Sierra] has hurt her back she had been attached to me.  I cannot 
get off the couch without her going where ever I am going.  I think it 
is because when she was a pup and she was really unwell, you 
know, I was the one who was dealing with her all the time and I 
think.  It’s just she knows that’s where the comfort is.  
  (Susan, re: Sierra) 
 
This change in relating, and intensity of interaction, is explained as being 
meaningful from within the context of the family, and with reference to Sierra’s 
biography within the family.  Part of the power of the concept of biographical 
disruption is that it enables a re-conceptualisation of illness as a disruption in the 
social frame, which these shifts in the ways of relating to different family 
members calls attention to.   
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The changes, and the new limitations, brought about by chronic serious illness 
evoked a questioning of the taken-for-granted assumptions and a mobilisation of 
resources in the face of the new order (Bury, 1982). There were special diets and 
changes in walks, sometimes to the extent of carrying the canine outside or 
preparing special routes and pathways.  There were also changes in sleeping 
arrangements and feeding routines, these aspects are explored more fully in 
Chapter 9.  Suffice to say for now that these everyday structures were disrupted.   
Serious illness was regarded as disrupting the physical aspects and expectations 
of being, and interwoven with this, was an understanding of serious illness as 
affecting the emotional and mental being of the companion canine negatively.     
 
He became quite depressed you know he was just lying there and 
obviously not a happy bunny, but although he seems to have lost it 
in one eye.  At first he still had a bit of sight so he just wasn’t quite 
right.   (Susan, re: Ted) 
 
The canines were regarded as being possessed of a subjective inner world, and 
of understanding when things were not as they ‘ought’ to be.  That is when they 
were not healthy and living in happy circumstance, as it was anticipated that they 
should.  The canines were assumed to respond to disruptions to the proper order 
of things, with awareness, sadness, and regret. 
 
 
Figure 2, Ted became depressed and withdrew from interacting with others, Ted and 
Kari, 12 February 2011 
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6.3. Human Watchfulness and Canine Voicelessness  
This disruption, the fracture in the underpinning expectations of life caused by the 
intrusion of serious illness, seems to lead to a questioning of the taken-for-
granted assumptions, and to provoke an anxiety in the human owners.  They 
become hyper vigilant, watchful for the least change in the behaviour or 
appearance of the canine.   
 
Rebekah In that evening, I mean, we just kept watching him all 
 the time.  
Gregor Aye 
Rebekah Yea, we didn’t really settle because you’re watching 
everything, you’re watching every reaction and wanting 
to see is he getting any worse, does he look like.   
  (Gregor and Rebekah, re: Rusty) 
 
The disruption leads to watchfulness, a restless vigilance and searching for other 
indicators of change or ill health.  The owners will feel the canine’s body, listen to 
the canine’s breathing.  The anxious awareness interferes with the humans 
normal routines of life and living, Olga was unable to sleep (Fieldnotes, 15 June 
2011), Gregor and Rebekah were restless, Rebekah was surprised at how 
strongly she felt, and Gregor experienced “uncomfortable and stressful” thoughts 
whilst at his work (Fieldnotes, 11 June 2011).   
 
But this state of vigilance is not limited in time to the day, or the evening, of the 
precipitating event, the event which provoked the shift to regarding the canine as 
ill.  Whilst the human restlessness is more acute around the time of the 
precipitating event, the onset of serious illness appears to usher in a pervasive 
state of vigilance (Convery et al., 2008), which colours the weeks and months 
following the shift in canine identity from well to sick.  The humans observe their 
canine, looking for changes, for small indicators of illness, and during this 
process the canine is brought closer.  Rebekah and Gregor changed Rusty’s 
sleeping arrangements, he began to be allowed upstairs with them at night, 
where he had previously been forbidden.   The changes in the canine are read 
against the owner’s built up knowledge of the companion, their imputed 
biography and their way of being in the family and the home.   
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This is not detached intellectual knowledge, but more a type of ‘ken’, reminiscent 
of a shepherd’s or stockperson’s pervasive and subtle knowledge of their 
livestock, born of a depth and duration of interaction (Convery et al., 2008).  This 
‘ken’ seems to be a deep knowing based on intimate knowledge and experience 
of the animal, and its ways of moving and being, over time.  Perceived changes 
in the canine are read against this knowing.   
  
Yeah, yea, he’s not, put it this way, I think, You know, when you live 
with them, you know yourself, when you look at them you know.  
People say when you see them every day you don’t notice things, 
but I have to say I do notice with those two, you know, but for me a 
lot of it is because they’ve slowed down and that for them is not 
normal.  Whereas with the dogs outside, they’re just, you know, 
hyper all the time, whereas with these guys I tend to notice the 
slowness.   (Margaret, re: Mitch and Sally)  
 
Because Mitch’s cancer, and Sally’s heart condition, has rendered them slow, 
Margaret believes that she now notices lots of small changes, but the fact 
remains that she notices them because she is looking.  Vigilant and aware, she is 
alert for changes which may be related to their chronic illnesses, she is looking 
for indicators, clues, as to their wellbeing.  
Figure 3, Mitch’s cancer and Sally’s heart condition has rendered them slow, and their 
owner begins to notice lots of small changes in them, Mitch and Sally, 29 March 2011 
~ 82 ~ 
 
This searching for clues to the canine’s wellbeing is exasperated by the canine’s 
inability to communicate in human spoken language.  In the words of Irma;  
 
You do worry about them though, don’t you Maria?  
 (Irma, re: Braxton and Zayne) 
 
In the face of serious illness the voicelessness of the companion is a source of 
tension, for the owners.  Because the canines could not communicate in spoken 
English, the attempt to know what is going on with the companion, was 
problematised.  The canine companion could not communicate in words how they 
were feeling, whether or not they were in pain or experiencing an increase in 
symptoms, this canine voicelessness fuelled the human watchfulness.   
 
Yeah.  We were watching everything because we thought we can’t 
tell, he can’t tell us so the only thing, you’re trying to read the signs.  
You know, you’re trying to think, ‘is he just tired now’, you know, ‘is 
he going down’. (Rebekah, re: Rusty) 
 
Just because the animal cannot communicate in words did not mean that the 
companion canine was regarded as having no thoughts, or feelings, about their 
illness to communicate to the owner.  They were not regarded as soulless 
Cartesian machines, who merely mechanically twitched, but rather as creatures 
with a mental and subjective life, who were able to offer signs of their discomfort 
(Rollin, 1989; Sanders, 1999).   It was assumed that they had insight into what 
was happening to them, and an awareness of their new, and more limited, 
existence.   
 
So far as exercise and everything else, she’s pretty much back to 
normal but you can see her recognising that when she does too 
much, she just slows down, whereas before she would just have 
kept going.  So whatever it is, is definitely working and she definitely 
knows that there’s something not quite the same.  But the thing for 
me is, that I’ve noticed is, that now she’s become a lot more clingy, 
you know.  You know, wherever I am she’s got to be, she doesn’t 
even like it at night now when I go through there, she’ll sit at the 
door – she doesn’t whine because she knows that I won’t come 
back and open the door for her, because they don’t get through 
there, but that’s very unusual.   (Margaret, re: Sally)  
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 The canine companions are not regarded as, creatures without consciousness, 
but are assumed to have both an awareness of their condition and a will to 
communicate it.  Winston actively enquired of his companion when she fell during 
their walk, and expected a response, whist simultaneously being aware that this 
was incongruous.   
 
She was off the lead and she was running around and then she 
came back to me and then suddenly she fell, she just suddenly 
went down in a wee heap, and she struggled to her feet and started 
going round in circles. And I found myself saying 'Rose what on 
earth…?' you know, actually speaking to her 'what is wrong with 
you?' you know.  And she was looking at me, but she was still 
walking round in circles and looking at me. And then she kind of 
collapsed again. So I had knelt down with her and I'd held her head 
and stroked her head and said 'you'll be alright, you're going to be 
fine' and I thought.  Her eyes were very glazed, very glazed.  
 (Winston, re: Rose) 
 
 
This level of insight, being aware of an incongruity in his, as a human, asking 
Rose, as a canine, what was wrong, was unusual.  It was more typical for the 
human family members to interpret directly for the thoughts and feelings of the 
canine companion.  Usually the humans would speak for the canine, which 
Sanders (1999) suggests is a similar phenonenon to human caretakers speaking 
for the thoughts, and feelings, of severely disabled children, that cannot use 
human language.   
 
He then decided he wasn’t going to eat that food.  I think he felt 
himself he was sicker and he was blaming the food.  So he just 
refused to eat it at all.  He was still hungry because he would go 
straight into the girl’s dishes after they were finished.  So, I mean, 
he was still looking for food, but he had got it pretty much in his 
head that this, whatever it was that was in this food, was making 
him sicker than he was, so that was him.   (Susan, re: Ted)  
 
Susan speaks, not only for Ted’s actions, also for the thought process and 
meaning that are invested in them.  In essence here the canine companion 
becomes a voiceless other in the subject to subject exchange.  Bekoff (2006) 
suggests that companion animals are voiced, but that their voice is disregarded 
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or denied.  This is an intriguing suggestion, yet I would point out that either way, 
be it lacking voice or denied voice, the companion animal is effectively a 
voiceless other in the intersubjective exchange, though still part of the exchange.   
 
It is a particular feature of animal-human interaction, “that the interactants are 
members of different species and the animal partner lacks the ability to use 
human language” (Sanders, 2003:417).  However, infant humans also lack the 
ability to use human language and their mindfulness, thoughts and feelings, are 
inferred from bodily action and facial expression.  I would suggest that being a 
voiceless other may facilitate the animal being regarded as an infant, since it 
cannot contradict the interpretation given to its actions by the adult human family 
members.  Also the voicelessness of the canine, like the absent voices of the 
deceased children in Owens et al.’s study, means that the narratives of its life 
and experience are not told in the first person of the canine, and this is a feature 
that will “distinguish these accounts from straightforward illness narratives and 
mark them out as extraordinarily complex reconstructions” (Owens et al., 
2008:239).   
 
Voicelessness seems to be a particular issue under conditions of possible 
suffering at the threshold of life.  Under these conditions the owner may watch 
particularly intently, trying to discern what is going on and speaking for the 
apparent, implied, intent of the companion.   
 
Oh I just was… I couldn't sleep, you know, I thought I can't wait to 
phone the vet tomorrow, because I would look at her and she was 
looking at me as if… I know she wasn't pleading with me, but she 
was telling me, you know, her eyes were showing me that she 
was… she wasn't the dog that I knew, she had been damaged by 
whatever and I just thought 'this has been a stroke or something 
like that'.  (Winston, re: Rose) 
  
There is frustration with the companion’s inability to say what is going on in 
human language, but the conviction that communication, indeed rapport, is there 
remains.  Even in the face of apparent brain damage, Winston is convinced that 
Rose is still in communion with him.  That she is expressing to him what has 
happened to her and that there is a mutual understanding between them.  In lay 
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terms it could be said that the relationship is deeper than words, which itself is 
interesting terminology, as there is an implication that communication, in its less 
superficial aspects, is non-verbal.   
 
Human language is not the only mediator of consciousness, but in the absence of 
human language there is a risk that speaking for a voiceless other may lead to an 
assumption of their wishes, or even the projection of the human’s thoughts and 
feelings onto the companion.  The companion cannot verbally resist a human 
projected intent by saying, ‘that is not what I mean’.  Indeed Mead (1934) 
contended that consciousness on the part of the canine companion was a 
projection of the human.  With this greater ambiguity in the intersubjective 
exchange caused by canine voicelessness, there may be increased potential for 
misinterpretation, and also, perhaps, increased opportunity to project that which 
is desired.  Whilst being unable to communicate in human language may 
distance the companion from their owner on the one hand, in that they cannot 
express thoughts and feelings in a direct linguistic way, it may close a perceived 
distance on the other.  By not verbally resisting thoughts and feelings imputed to 
them, it is possible that the canine may be regarded as more closely reflecting 
the ideal characteristics of a companion, and represent a more perfect love.  
Freud, who placed animals outside culture (1948), also considered his own 
canines to embody the highest form of friendship (Marcus, 2007). Canine 
voicelessness may reduce distance with the human, even if this increased 
presumed closeness is based on an unproven affinity of thought and emotion.   
 
Whilst arguing that the companion canine can be understood as a voiceless other 
in the intersubjective exchange, this does not mean that they make no sound, the 
canine participants had a range of vocalisations.  Yet being unable to use human 
spoken language does close down one of the principal modes of displaying 
selfhood, one of the ways of showing that you possess an inner subjective life.  
But it does not close down the possibility of being a subject entirely, subjectivity is 
born in interaction (Mead, 1934), and as Goffman observes, “face-to-face 
interaction has its own regulations; it has its own processes and its own structure, 
and these don’t seem to be intrinsically linguistic” (1964:136).  
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6.4. Subjectivity  
Currently, to my knowledge, there is only one theoretical model within 
contemporary Sociology of the pre-requisites for a nonhuman self, being 
Professor Leslie Irvine’s four part model, based on William James’ (1890) 
explorations of the subjective self.  Irvine (2004a; 2004b) proposes that selfhood 
is an emergent, rather than innate, phenomenon, and, in agreement with Kristeva 
(1989), though without obvious reference to her, Irvine also situates selfhood as 
a pre-linguistic capacity.  Once the self becomes a pre-linguistic capacity, it is 
theoretically possible for both humans and nonhumans to share the machinery of 
consciousness, which can then, like the branches of a tree, be developed in 
different directions.  By situating the self as a pre-linguistic capacity, it is possible 
to avoid an, arguably over reliance, on language (Irvine, 2004a; 2004b).   
 
Avoiding the reliance on language also softens Mead’s (1934) arguments against 
animal consciousness, which for Mead requires a self-referential awareness, 
which he understood to be a prerequisite for language.  Animals, by Mead’s 
(1934) reckoning, have no self-referential awareness, and therefore can only 
have a more simplistic stimulus response style of interaction.  This stimulus 
response style of interaction he calls a conversation of gestures, which “does not 
carry with it the reference of the individual, the animal, the organism to itself” 
(Mead, 1934:145). This conversation of gestures then, is of the same ilk as the 
shrinking of a single cell organism from a toxin or hot coal, as without a self there 
is no complex consciousness, only action and reaction, without consideration.  
Irvine (2004a; 2004b) directly contradicts this aspect of Mead and proposes that 
nonhumans may indeed have a form of self-referential consciousness, which 
Irvine (2004a; 2004b) refers to as coherence, “meaning that you understand 
yourself as a physical whole that is the locus of agency” (Irvine, 2004:9).  
Coherence is involved in defining the boundaries of the self, and, crucially in 
terms of self-reference, Irvine (2004) explicitly relates coherence to naming and 
identity.   
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All the canine companions in this study had their own individual names, and were 
understood as subjects rather than objects.  All the human participants, without 
exception, regarded the canine companions as being possessed of a self; having 
thoughts, feelings and intentions of their own, and as experiencing a rich inner 
life, with desires and preferences.  The companions were understood as being 
capable of experiencing both joy and sadness at their circumstances, and as 
having a degree of insight into their experience. The companions were 
universally regarded as having a rich subjective aspect to their being, and 
understanding themselves as agents, and as the author of their own actions.   
 
When she was with Andrew she was a shoe dog.  [Doggy crying 
sound] and she was told that [to dog: you're not allowed to go for 
shoes!] [laugh]  But it’s funny, when she’s had enough at my dad’s 
house [Doggy crying sound still] she starts this whinging and then 
she starts throwing my feet up and going for my shoes.  As if to say 
‘come on, it’s time to go’ [laugh].  So it’s like ‘right I'm going to be a 
pest until you make me go home’ [laugh].   (Susan, re: Kari)  
 
Not only is Kari expressing her intention to leave, she is making efforts with her 
action, to communicate her intention to Susan.  Kari appears to understand that 
her person and Susan’s person are distinct and separate, and that each of them 
is the author of their own action.  If she did not understand Susan as a separate 
person, why would there be the attempt to spur Susan on to activity.  Kari is 
attempting to influence her.  More than this, going for the shoes is a meaningful 
action.  Shoes are a tool of walking, and walking is a way of leaving.  Agitating 
the shoes is suggestive of a desire to walk away.  In this instance both Susan 
and Kari are occupying a shared frame of interaction (Goffman, 1974).   
 
The canine is understood as exhibiting agency, having preferences and owning 
their own acts.  Of the four features of selfhood that Irvine (2004a; 2004b) 
proposes the first is agency, that is displaying this kind of understanding that you 
are the author of your own actions, and appreciating that others are the authors 
of their own actions.  The suggestion is that this going for the shoes, is not 
stimulus response reaction, as Mead proposed (1934), but an awareness, 
however nascent, of having your own subjectivity, and the impact of your actions 
upon the subjectivity of another.   
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Figure 4, Kari was understood as being possessed of agency and being the author of 
her own actions, 12 February 2011  
 
To be the author of your own actions, you need to own your personal intentions, 
responses, and feelings, with regard to what is going on around you.  The data is 
replete with examples of individual canine preferences and selective responses.   
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Susan  Oh to be fair when Sierra was younger she would run 
 around quite a bit in the house. She wasn't overly 
bothered with toys. Sierra has never really been overly 
bothered with toys but she likes to run around and 
come back and forward between people…  
MD I mean you have quite a large collection of toys. 
Susan Yes. 
MD Have you always had a large collection? 
Susan  Em not really no but it seemed to grow with Kari 
(laughs). She likes her toys. Kari loves her toys.  
  (Susan, re: Sierra and Kari) 
 
Whilst both of the companions enjoy play, there is personal preference in the kind 
of play that each canine participates in.  These differences are regarded as being 
internalised parts of the persona, part of the identity, of each particular 
companion.  Sierra is more people orientated and Kari enjoys toys.  These 
described characteristics are not simply assumptions, not mere projections of 
personality by the human owners, as Mead considered them to be (1934).  The 
field data supports qualitatively, and quantitatively, different modes of interaction 
being displayed by each companion.   
 
 
Figure 5 – Kari displayed a preference for toys, Kari, Sierra and Ted, 12 February 2011 
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At no time did Sierra initiate or engage in play with myself, she was indeed more 
people focused, or more precisely focused particularly on the person of Susan, 
who she was almost constantly beside (Fieldnotes, 26 January 2011).   
 
 
Figure 6 – Sierra  was almost constantly beside Susan, 12 February 2011   
 
With the exception of coming to greet me when I arrived at the home, and a very 
occasional brief interaction with another family member, Sierra preferred to 
interact with Susan.  In contrast Kari sought interaction with me, and others, on 
every occasion I was there.  Kari would also play with me, offering and sharing 
toys, extensively during a visit, sometimes for in excess of an hour on a single 
occasion (Fielnotes, 26 January 2011, 12 February 2011, 2 April, 2011, 17 
September 2011 and 3 December 2011).  These preferences form part of the 
identity of the companions, and this “identity is both the basis for and the 
consequence of interaction” (Sanders, 2003:409).   
 
Not only the preference for toys, but play itself is indicative of subjectivity.  To be 
able to play, a social actor must first be able to recognise the difference between, 
for example, play fighting and actual fighting, and be mindful of the norms 
surrounding each activity (Goffman, 1974). The actor must be able to recognise 
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and respond appropriately to activities with different meanings, to be able to 
distinguish between play chase from real chase.  As for example in Kari’s play 
games with me of competing for the toy, had the game been real there would 
have been more aggression between us, and there would have been no willing 
relinquishing of the toy at the end, in order to begin the game anew.   
 
To initiate play the companion first has to signal to another actor the meaning of 
their actions and frame the interaction as a non-threatening act, in order to 
provoke playful interaction with another being.  All this requires sensitivity to 
meaning and mindfulness.  As Goffman (1974) observed, with regard to the play 
chasing and attacking of otters, animal play demonstrates agency.  Not in the 
primary sense that play makes meaningless activity meaningful, rather “play 
activity is closely patterned after something that already has meaning in its own 
terms – in this case fighting” (Goffman, 1974:40).  As he further observes, 
“another point about play is that all those involved in it seem to have a clear 
appreciation that it is play that is going on .. and furthermore, that it is play in a 
sense similar to what one thinks of as play among humans” (Goffman, 1974:40-
41).  The otters are able to understand, and to signal to each other, that it is play, 
and not real fighting that is going on, and they share this framework of meaning 
during play.   
 
The preferences of the companion canines ranged from the bodily, such as 
preferred places for sleeping, and preferred foods, to the more intellectual, 
relating to modes of interaction and play.   
 
Cause often now she sleeps in here at night, I mean, but that’s up 
to her, or she sleeps in her bed, she often chews on her, I’ll show 
you her pillow, that she often sucks on.   (Olga, re: Pandora)   
 
She wasn’t all that interested in television to be honest, she 
preferred music and a discussion or something.   
 (Winston, re: Rose)  
 
These aspects of the companion are displayed, by the choices they make 
regarding playing, with or without toys, and where, and beside whom, they rest, 
sleep and walk.  These are attributes particular to the individual, the physically 
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localised person of the companion, and they are expressed by the innumerable 
interactions between the canine self, and other family members.   Overall these 
innumerable pebbles of micro-interactions, and the consistency of the 
companion’s actions and reactions within the patterns of these micro-interactions  
form a cohesive pattern, suggestive of a subjectivity and a self-concept.  In this I 
would echo Mamo’s (1983:170) words that “when I speak of self-concept, I mean 
the organization of attributes that have become consistent over time.  
Organisation is the key to understanding the self.”   
 
This organisation is explored more deeply in the coming section.  First there is an 
issue with terminology that needs to be addressed, an issue with which phrase to 
use, self, persona, identity, or personality. Each term comes with its own 
assumptions. Personality seems to speak to a psychologically informed 
phenomenon, a pre-existent individuated construct. Part of the problem with this 
term is that it speaks of a something that is largely assumed to exist for every 
human.  Whether that human is raised in a family, an institution or on a remote 
island with little interaction with others, they are still considered to be possessed 
of, to have, like an object, their own personality, in a largely fixed sense.  The 
matter is simply not so certain in the case of companion canines, therefore that 
term will be little used here. Self, persona, and occasionally identity, will be used 
to describe this something, this constellation of attributes, that is particular to 
each canine.   
 
Within the family contexts found here the canines were understood as enselfed, 
even ensouled.  In this respect the findings of this study echo Sanders results, 
from his exploration of human and companion canine relations, that ”owners 
attribute individuality to their dogs” (1999:26).  The companions were regarded as 
fully subjective beings, and related to, and valued, as such.  For the canine to be 
regarded as less than a full subjective being, as replaceable, more like an object, 
was strongly resisted.   
 
 I said ‘I don't want another dog’ because I was quite upset of them 
even offering me.  I says ‘how can you do that, we‘re still mourning 
for Brandy?’.  Because, d'you know, it’s something that might be 
interesting, I used to laugh at people that spoke to their dogs as if 
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the dogs were sort of human, part of the family.  I used to laugh at 
them.  So see when we got Brandy and that, I spoke the same way.  
I started to speak to her as if she was one of the family and oh.  ‘Hi 
Brandy, had a nice day?’.  But she became part of the family.  
   (Matthew, re: Brandy) 
 
Matthew came to see Brandy as a family member gradually, and this 
transformation in his understanding of the canine emerged from their relationship.  
As Irvine (2004:7) points out, canine subjectivity flowers over time, as if it is being 
built up by the ongoing interactions, “with repeated or sustained interaction, 
people began to explore more facets of the animal’s character and capabilities” 
(Irvine, 2004:7).  However, despite the strength of this emergent subjectivity, I 
would suggest that the place of the companion canine within the family, 
notwithstanding the insistence of many of the humans that the canines are full 
members, is more precarious than that of the humans.  Building upon a passing 
comment made by Sanders, that “caretakers come to regard their dogs as virtual 
persons” (1999:38).  I would propose that the idea of a virtual person, can be 
drawn forth and used as a way of understanding the nature of a companion 
animal’s position, and personhood, within the family context.  That is virtual, in 
the sense of lacking formal status, but having personhood in practice, rather than 
virtual as being related to computer simulations of reality.   
 
Animal identity is heavily context dependent. The keepers of livestock and 
abattoir workers in Wilkie’s study (2005), regarded the animals as objects, and 
this objectification was seen as normal.  In contrast the owners of companion 
animals in Sanders’ study regarded their companions as subjects, with their own 
identity and person (1999).  In light of this I would suggest that the companion 
canines in this study can be helpfully understood as virtual persons.  Their 
personhood, whether or not they have their own inner creative psychological life, 
is instrumentally dependent upon the quality and context of the human-animal 
relations in which they find themselves. The virtual person of the animal does not 
have personhood in the same taken-for-granted, and more robust way, that the 
human family members do.  The animal may more readily be rejected, 
abandoned, or even destroyed, without these practices being associated with as 
high a degree of criminality, and other forms of social censure, that would be 
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applied to rejecting a vulnerable human person.  In short, with regard to disposal, 
the virtual personhood of the animal is a precarious personhood, more vulnerable 
to the whim of the human owner.  If the animal is not good it may be justifiably 
destroyed by a vet (Sanders, 1999).   
 
Animal personhood can be conceived as a liminal state (Sanders, 1999), and as 
a fragile identity.  Sanders (1999) would understand this liminal identity as being 
global, with the attendant fragility covering the entire expression of canine life.  
Though prior to this study I would have agreed with Sanders on this point, I would 
now, for reasons that will be explored more fully in Chapter 9, take a more 
conservative stance.  I now understand the virtual personhood of a companion 
animal as liminal, but only in a particular aspect, specifically their identity is fragile 
with regard to euthanasia and disposal.  Animals are more easily replaced and 
disposed of than humans.  Unlike people, replacement animals can be readily 
bought, and the euthanasia of unwanted companion animals is legal in Scotland.  
Whilst the euthanasia of companion animals is legal, the euthanasia of unwanted 
humans, excepting those under 24 weeks old and still in utero, is not.   
Nonetheless, regardless of how, and in what aspects, the companion canine’s 
personhood may be liminal, they are most certainly regarded by the human 
family members as being possessed of a self.   
 
6.5. The Companion Canine Self  
With the companions being regarded, and related to, as having a self, the 
question then arises, what form and shape is given to this canine self?  The data 
does not suggest a random and unstable construct that shifts and changes with 
every interaction, but something endurable, though mutable, and with particular 
aspects.  In short the data suggests something patterned.  As with the seriously 
ill humans whom Charmaz’s studied, “the self is organised into a structure” 
(1983:170), but what structure?   What are the features, functions and dynamics 
of this nonhuman selfhood?  This is an exploratory work and as such its results 
can only be regarded an initial sketch of an uncharted land.  That said, in an 
unanticipated finding, I found that the data supports an emergent model that can 
be considered as a tentative map of the companion canine self, as this self is 
born in relation to the human owners and to society.  
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 Irvine (2004b) proposed a theoretical model, the only one in the discipline, of the 
pre-requisites required for a nonhuman consciousness to be possible.  As she 
refers to it these are “features of subjectivity”, which “make a good departure 
point for the study of selfhood among animals” (Irvine, 2004b:127). Irvine (2004b) 
argues that for a nonhuman consciousness to exist there would need to be; 
affectivity, coherence, agency and self-history.  Whilst I find Irvine’s (2004a) 
model helpful, it is general and theoretical, and only address the ingredients that 
may be needed for a generic nonhuman consciousness to exist. It does not 
layout the shape or form a particular consciousness may take. It was Irvine 
(2004b) who inspired me with the idea that it may be possible to model a 
nonhuman consciousness (my reasoning being that if the pre-requisites can be 
modelled why not an actual consciousness?).  However, my own model is not 
adapted from hers, but rather I have developed it on the basis of data-grounded 
theory. The model which follows here is an empirically founded one, and is, to my 
knowledge, the first modelling of a specific nonhuman consciousness within the 
discipline of Sociology. The emergent model of the companion canine self is a 
four-fold construct, being formulations of selfhood and kinhood, each with their 
enacted or latent aspects, which is summarised in Table 2 overleaf:    
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Table 2 - Aspects of the Companion Canine Self 
Feature Dynamic Aspects 
 
Enacted Self  displayed 
personal  
● Character, with wants, preferences, likes 
and hates.   
●   Stable nature over time, individuated 
 persona.   
● Outward and expressive action.  
 Shared with family.     
Latent Self  hidden 
personal  
● Private inner world, manifest only obliquely  
 through dreams, phobias and mental 
illness.   
● Mysterious site of wild ancestral heritage.   
● Inward focus, not shared with family.   
Enacted Kin  displayed 
public  
● The role of the family dog, greeting visitors, 
walking in park, stories told of dog to 
others.   
● Not individuated, culture wide, pre-existent 
expectations and functions.   
● Outward expressive focus, relating to wider 
society.   
Latent Kin  hidden 
public  
● The companion self, context specific role. 
● Emerges from rooting in particular family, 
adapts to and learns from context, sensitive 
and responsive to emotions, wellbeing and 
needs of other family members.   
● Intra-family focus, concerned with inward 
cohesion.  Not connected to wider society.  
 
6.5.1. Enacted Self  
The first feature of the companion canine self is an Enacted Self.  The Enacted 
Self is a cohesive matrix of behaviours and attributes, that is localised to the body 
of the companion from which they are expressed.  This aspect of selfhood 
includes the preferences, likes and dislikes, already touched upon in the 
preceding section on subjectivity.    This constellation of preferences, desires and 
wants, is stable over time.  That is not to suggest that it does not develop or 
change, but rather that it is coherent.  The persona of the companion, as 
expressed by their actions, sounds and expressions, is not chaotic or random.  
There are patterns.  If companion canines are devoid of self-concept, how could 
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their agency have coherence?   The very existence of patterns, which lead to 
consistency in action, and therefore predictability, is suggestive of a construct, a 
structure that organises the agency of the being.    
 
The dislike of going for walks, as in the case of Pandora (Fieldnotes, 9 March 
2012), or delight in walking for many miles with their human owner, as with Rose 
(Fieldnotes, 5 May 2011), are enduring preferences, attributed to the character of 
the companion.  Liking or disliking toys, certain foods, sleeping places, all these 
desires and dislikes form a cohesive and coherent construct that can be 
understood as the Enacted Self, and this “self is organized into a structure” 
(Mamo, 1983:170).  This aspect of selfhood is organised and stable over time 
and could be regarded as an individuated persona.  The Enacted Self is shared 
with the family by way of outward and expressive action, and the companion 
canines are known to others as possessing a coherent and stable self.   
 
Winston Was Fred the footballer? 
Nathaniel  No that was Ryley.  
Winston That was Ryley, Ryley right. 
MD Ah. 
Nathaniel They’ve all had very different characters. 
MD What kind of characters? 
Nathaniel Well, Ryley was very keen on playing football with his 
snout.   
Winston Mm hmm and very good.  
Nathaniel Very good, yes, could've made XXX (village name)   
Winston Great ball control. 
Nathaniel Yes, could've made XXX’s football line up easily. 
Winston Oh easily, he easily would've been the star player! 
MD Oh gosh, oh well! 
Nathaniel And speed too [laugh]! 
Winston  And the speed, uh huh. So that was one of the things.  
Fred was different in that he tried to, wasn’t quite sure 
how to play with the ball [laugh], he was interested but 
never got the hang of nosing it around. Charlie wasn’t 
the slightest bit interested but he was interested in 
squeaky toys.  And if the squeak went he lost interest.  
And I had to buy them! 
Nathaniel  [Laugh] 
Winston  So he was the more toughy really.  And he isn't the 
slightest bit interested in balls at all or in squeaky toys.   
  (Nathaniel and Winston, re: Charlie, Fred and Ryley) 
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This sense of a cohesive stable self with preferences and wants of its own, would 
relate to the second feature of selfhood that Irvine identifies (2004a; 2004b) that 
is coherence.  Irvine’s (2004a; 2004b) concept of coherence includes an 
understanding that you have a self that has boundaries, and this would embrace 
a self-referential awareness, that you know what you like and act accordingly, as 
in Kari’s repeated efforts to initiate play.  Implied in this self-referential awareness 
is the idea that others have a self too.  The Enacted Self is expressed in relation 
to others, it is not an isolate.  The football and toys of Ryley and Fred, are 
activities that they engaged in with other family members, who must be drawn in 
to share the game, persuaded to play.   
 
This attribution of consciousness would also contradict Mead’s understanding of 
animals being without self-concept (Mead, 1934), in that to make a plea to the 
consciousness of another it is necessary to have a frame of consciousness 
oneself.  Indeed as Mead himself proposed, to appreciate another, a reference of 
‘I’ is a necessary aspect, though it is not conceived of as an isolate of 
consciousness, but as one vitally embedded in society, for “one has to be a 
member of a community to be a self” (Mead, 1934: 39).  This is consciousness as 
born in the social, not the individual.  “For Mead, who we are, our ‘selves’, is not 
an attribute that we are born with, but one acquired over time through interaction 
with others” (Bauman and May, 1990: 22).   
 
This attribution of agency to the canines was not only in the sense of their ability 
to respond appropriately to human initiated stimuli, such as the call for dinner 
time, but also in their capacity to initiate interaction themselves.  For example, by 
going to stand in front of the kitchen cupboard where the dog food is kept at 
dinner time, or getting onto the chair beside the owner when they were eating, or 
by prolonged staring at their humans, in order to prompt the humans to give them 
food (Fieldnotes, 17 September 2011).   
 
The Enacted Self of the companion was attributed with both a consciousness of 
their own, an awareness of others as separate beings, and sufficient agency to 
manipulate their owners for their own ends.  This agency can even be to the 
consternation of their owner.  As in the case when Fred, whom Frank used to 
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walk in the evenings, gave away the real destination of their walks, when, due a 
back injury, Frank’s wife had to take out Fred, and he made a bee line for the 
pub, went straight in and picked up a beer mat to get his beer (Fieldnotes, 17 
September 2011).  Frank could no longer deny that he went to the pub of an 
evening.   
 
In a final point on the Enacted Self, it is worth noting that the canines have a 
name.  This naming also serves a cohesive function, it seems to call forth, and 
consolidate, the attributes and persona.  As Sanders (2003:411) observes, “a 
major means, therefore, by which the caretaker solidifies the unique identity of 
the animal companion is by assigning the animal a name”.  In a press release 
researchers at St Andrews University announced their findings that wild 
bottlenose dolphins call each other by name, and that they consider that these 
names also serve a cohesive function between individual and group (BBC News 
Science and Environment, 23/7/2013).  With regard to the companion canines 
studied here, the names sometimes echoed the identity of the animal, a 
boisterous name for a strong and boisterous male puppy, a delicate name for a 
small delicate manicured lapdog.   
 
There is a slight curiosity with the names, though I have no explanation at this 
time, almost all of the canines in this study had original, pre-anonymised, names 
that were ‘human’ names, rather than those peculiar to canines, such as Patch or 
Snowie.  I suspect that there may be a shift afoot culturally in Scotland, whereby 
companion canines are increasingly being assigned ‘human’ names.  The only 
nonhuman names that were encountered, were those of historic canine 
companions, from the past, perhaps the companions are being increasingly 
humanised.  But they are not human, no matter how much they may enact a self 
reminiscent of our own, they remain canine, it is not a human on four legs, but 
something other that lurks beneath the fur.   
 
6.5.2. Latent Self  
What are we touching when we touch the physical body of a canine companion?  
Our hand pushes against fur and flesh, meeting resistance in space, but what is 
within the boundary of form, and can it be known?  As has been explored in the 
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preceding section on subjectivity, Mead (1934) declared that animals, particularly 
canines, were not subjects, therefore, by default, they must be objects.  It is easy 
to assume that this is somehow a lessening of their mystery, but Mead’s (1938) 
understanding of the form and function of an object is intriguing.  Mead (1938), in 
talking about physical objects, argues that they are not merely seen, but are also 
hidden.  In the words of Randal Collins (1989), as he explores this lesser known 
aspect of Mead’s thought; “objects have insides; and these insides are forever 
beyond our visual, or even tactile access.  That is, if we cut an object open, we 
still see only a further surface, which has yet a further inside” (Collins, 1989:11).  
We understand objects, Mead (1938) argues, by projecting ourselves into their 
role of resistance to the outside world, by projecting ourselves into them, and 
attempting to understand their mystery through our own.   
 
Identification of the individual with the object is the condition of the 
individual appearing in his [sic] experience as an object and has the 
importance which this indicates.  It follows also, that this content of the 
things is one which is never found in the analysis of the object but is 
always projected into the interior of the part reached by the analysis and 
with which again we identify ourselves.  Analysis of things never gives us 
anything more than new surfaces and contours.  The surfaces are there, 
while the inner resistance is something that is supplied from the individual.  
In supplying it, the individual himself [sic] becomes an object.  
 (Mead, 1938:428)  
 
This is a remarkable aspect of Mead’s (1938) theory of mind, and one which, I 
would argue, has implications for an understanding of canine mind.  There is a 
quality of unknowability that is also encountered in the canine companion, in 
those moments when the owner looks at them, touches them, sits still and listens 
to their breathing and wonders.  They do not encounter the Enacted Self at these 
moments, but they seem to be searching, and to sense a hidden being that lurks 
beneath the fur.   
 
Rowan  So they're unpredictable dogs aren't they really.  
They’re animals at the end of the day, we try to make 
them into wee humans, we try to make them like wee 
children.   
Gregor  And they’re not.  
Rowan  But they’re animals.  (Rowan and Gregor)  
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In their animality companion canines are other, different and strange.  To 
Haraway (2003; 2008) it is this very quality of creatureliness that is the common 
ground between human and nonhuman, in an intermingling of fur, flesh and dirt.    
But to Midgley (1998) this otherness can also be the divide between us, their 
nonhumanness rendering animals beyond our ken, into a mysterious mass of fur 
and sinew.  What are we looking at when we look at an animal, and moreover 
what is looking back at us (Derrida, 2008)?  The Latent Self is this domain of 
otherness, that which cannot be subsumed into human knowing, what Lacan 
(1973) would call the Real and “this real brings with it the subject, almost by 
force” (Lacan, 1973:54).  It is the private inner world of the companion, which 
manifests itself only obliquely through dreams, phobias and mental aberrations.  
This is the mysterious site of wild ancestral heritage, and within it there is a 
canine intelligence, an inward focus, that is not shared with the human family 
members.   
 
We’re not as clever as them, they can understand what we’re 
saying but we can’t always understand what they’re saying.     
 (Nathaniel)  
 
The Latent Self is the realm wherein dwells the Other, and the companion 
canine, as the psychoanalyst Paul Marcus points out “is more other than any 
human Other” (2008:652).  There can be an assumption that that which is other 
is, by its very nature, alienating.  But that is not necessarily so, as Midgley says, 
with regard to children, it is in part the otherness of the animals that draws us to 
them:   
 
No animal is just a simplified human being, nor do children take them to be 
so.  However friendly they may be, their life is radically foreign, and it is 
just that foreignness which attracts a child.  (1998:118).  
 
This attraction to the radically foreign can be seen in the fascination of the human 
owners with the content of their canine companions’ dreams.  As the humans 
wonder what form these canine dreams may take, “oh I’d love to know, I’d just 
love to know what they’re dreaming about” (Irma, 11 February 2012).  The 
owners wonder whether the canines dream of chasing rabbits, or of seeing off 
intruders, and this human wondering seems to be a response to their awareness 
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that there is a hidden aspect to the canine that they cannot simply know.  The 
owners seem to recognise the otherness of this aspect of self, and respond with 
curiosity, to a realm of consciousness and experience that the human cannot 
readily enter or imagine (Fieldnotes, 17 September 2011, 12 February 2011, 11 
February 2012).  As Midgley, echoing Humphrey (1978) points out, there are 
things which make little sense unless animals can be possessed of some form of 
consciousness, and unless there is a striving in them to develop inner 
imaginative powers, of these aspects, “the most striking are dreams, play and the 
apparently unnecessary social interactions which constantly go on” (Midgley, 
1998:141).  Dreams suggest the active imagination of a subject, practicing the 
arts of life, anticipating and exploring experiences and how they may respond to 
them.  Though dreams may be the most striking example of an inner imaginative 
life, there are also other tell-tale signs of strange mental processes.   
 
He can be quite unpredictable, emm, he has some strange ideas 
which is kind of odd since we’ve had him since he was a puppy.  He 
does not like furry things.  Furry things worry him.  You can’t stand 
on furry things.  (Amanda, re: Fraser) 
 
This peculiarity of person is seen as being immune to the moulding of 
socialisation, and alien to the family in which Fraser lives.  These mental quirks 
are treated as evidence of a deep primitive self, the ‘The Wolf in Your Living 
Room’ (BBC, 1988), as popularised by the zoologist Desmond Morris.   
 
It is as if there is a desire to maintain an aspect of the animal’s mystery, a desire 
to link the owner to the realm of the natural and organic, to perceive the spaniel 
in the living room as an echo of the primordial wolf who emerged from mist of the 
ancient past, a joint ancient past, where wolf, nature and human were one.  As 
Fromm would say this desire to dwell with, and connect with, the past, is 
“essentially sentimental” (1964:36).  At times this sense of the primordial 
otherness of the companion reaches even beyond the mysteries of the natural, 
into the prater-natural.  The Latent Self contains abilities which transcend the 
civilised human, such as knowing when the owner is heading home from work, 
(Irma, 12 November 2011), or a superior awareness of passing time. 
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And in the morning its, I don’t know, its like before the alarm goes 
off he knows the alarm’s about to go off.  And the two paws are up 
on the bed as if to say, and you know, trying to waken me up ‘mum, 
come on, its time to get up’.  Even on a Saturday!   (Irma, re: Zayne) 
 
There is a predictive quality here, a superior knowing.  This capacity to know, by 
deep instinct (Amanda, 1 February 2011), and the profound sensitivity to time, is 
also seen around the dying of companions.  Fellow companion animals in the 
home may behave strangely as a companion canine becomes unwell or begins 
to die, they may gather around them (Amanda, 13 September 2011), or offer 
them toys and comfort (Susan, 12 February 2011).  The dying companion may 
also, by virtue of this deep primal self, themself sense the approach of death and 
remove themself from their families, as if they were a wild creature, withdrawing 
into the mist.   
 
And the vet had said to me, she said 'Margaret, there's lots of 
animals do that' she said.  'I don't hear as many dogs, but cats 
certainly it's very common, when it's time for them to die they just 
disappear'.  And she said, 'they literally just disappear'.  She said 
'it's a very strange phenomenon but there's lots of.' I mean, she's 
been a vet for all her life, and she said to me 'you know, people just 
say one minute they were there and the next minute they were 
gone'.  And I said 'well that's exactly what Ray said', he said 'you 
know, he was there and I turned round and he was nowhere to be 
seen'.  And he walked straight away, you know, I mean, Mitch 
wouldn't have run anywhere cause he wasn't able, so to me, you 
know, where did he go?  (Margaret, re: Mitch) 
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Figure 7, one day Mitch just disappeared, Mitch, Sally their owner and her working dogs, 
Rob and Zara, 29 March 2011 
 
6.5.3. Enacted Kin 
The Enacted Self and the Latent Self are both aspects of canine consciousness 
concerned with the dramatization of the particular personhood of the canine 
psyche.  They are concerned with the currents of singular individuality, either in 
its public outflowing, as in the case of the Enacted Self, or in its private pooling, in 
the case of the Latent Self.  The critical point is that “the self is not something that 
exists first and then enters into relationship with others, but it is, so to speak, an 
eddy in the social current and so still a part of the current” (Mead, 1934:182).  
Neither the Enacted Self, nor the Latent Self exist as independent pre-existent 
artefacts, they are echoes, impressions in the sands of substance, born of the 
social, and carried, and contoured, by the physical being.  The social genesis of 
aspects of canine consciousness becomes even more apparent in the final two 
catergories of the model.  Both Enacted Kin and Latent Kin are facets of the 
canine self, concerned with a public, pluralistic, personhood.   
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Enacted Kin can be understood as the aspects of canine identity pertaining to the 
role of the family dog.  I would propose that to be a family dog is to enter a role, 
similar to that of the patient or student, with its attendant expectations and 
dynamics, in Goffman’s words “the normative demands upon someone in [his] 
position” (1969:39).  It is similar, not in its particular requirements, but rather in 
the sense that the expectations exist before the position is occupied by a specific 
individual, and that the presence and activity of the individual is carried and 
coloured by their occupancy of the role.   
 
A family dog is expected to do certain things, but they are also expected to be a 
certain way, both in their actions and in the quality of their actions.  In short the 
role frames both action and consciousness, and this framing of consciousness is 
referred to here as Enacted Kin.  There is quite a sophisticated balance between 
behaving and being that is required.  This is an outwardly expressive function of 
the canine companion, which relates it to the wider society, particularly in its 
capacity as a representative of the kinship group.  For example the canine is 
expected to offer a friendly (but not too friendly) greeting to visitors entering the 
home.   
  
It’s a warm welcome, its not one that we try to encourage but yeah, 
you do get jumped on severely.   (Amanda and Samir)  
 
Amanda and Samir distance themselves from responsibility for the potentially 
discrediting over exuberance of the greeting, as in the case of Diesel and 
Mason’s energetic welcome of barking, licking and leaping upon me (Fieldnotes, 
25 January 2011).  This is despite the fact that I made no negative comment, and 
as far as I am aware no negative action, in response to the warm welcome, which 
I rather enjoyed. The mitigation was pre-emptive on the part of Amanda and 
Samir, heading off any potential discredit (Goffman, 1968).  I would propose that 
this is because the role expectations require a warm welcome, but one without 
noise or leaping upon the visitor.  This normative welcome can be seen in the 
ideal model of welcome, upheld by the behavioural adjustment case studies in 
popular psychologically/behaviourally based television programmes, such as Its 
Me or the Dog (2005) and The Dog Whisperer (2004).   
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In a more extreme case of normative transgression, Rusty, who was prone to 
attempt to mate with visitors, including myself, had his behaviour excused, with 
an explanation (Fieldnotes, 4 June 2011). In essence this excusing of 
discreditable behaviour is a face saving manoeuvre, to prevent moral blemish 
attaching to the family (Goffman, 1969), by them appearing to have an 
undisciplined dog who engages in socially unacceptable behaviour.   
 
In the capacity of Enacted Kin the canine companion represents the group, the 
family.  They are the focus of stories told to outsiders, which present a certain 
image of the family to others, and they are the contact point for conversation and 
interaction in parks, and on the street, with neighbours and strangers.  In these 
interactions the companion serves as “a social conduit” (Higgins et al., 
2013:237), facilitating interaction.  Yet they are not only passive objects of 
conversation, the companion is expected to be a certain way, to have certain 
features to their nature. These required traits are focused on the values of 
pleasantness, approachability and friendliness.  The companion is expected not 
to be messy, aggressive or antisocial, but rather to be playful and ‘good’, 
meaning non-aggressive, especially with children.   
 
 
Figure 8 – Rusty presents an image of his family to others, 11 June 2011   
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In a very real sense the required mode of being for the companion is one which 
serves social interaction, and does not disrupt the flow of social action (Goffman, 
1969) or bring discredit to the kinship group.  In short the companion is expected 
to embody a personality which facilitates social interaction between the family 
and the wider society, and presents the family, in a favourable light, both in 
person and in stories and representations in social media.   
Right, well that takes me back gosh to Blantyre when I was about 
seven or eight, and my next door neighbour had a dog, a big hairy 
dog, fluffy, hairy dog called Shari.  She looked like a sort of 
Pyrenean Mountain Dog.  A lovely dog, a very friendly dog, a very 
happy dog and we used to go walks with Shari, my friend and I, 
nearby, you know, cause it was safe back in the 1950s, early fifties 
[laugh] we took the dog for walks.  So that was really my first 
introduction to dogs.  I never had a dog of my own. (Winston, re: Shari) 
However 2010 came and went and that was the February and Holly 
continued to wear her lampshade until the hair was all grown in and 
the wound had healed, and that was fine and then I could remove 
this.  I was delighted because now I felt it was like a normal dog 
going for a walk with [laugh] but I don’t think she was too happy, 
she got more attention from other people when she had the 
lampshade on!  Yes, and ‘how are you Rose?’ and she would lap 
this up.   (Winston, re: Shari and Rose) 
 
The canines are social facilitators (Well, 2004), but also representatives of 
families, and are expected to make a good impression on behalf of families, by 
behaving in a non-aggressive and entertaining way.  The expectations are not 
individuated, but rather culture wide, pre-existent expectations and functions.  
One wonders if part of the extreme social censure of publically boisterous or 
aggressive dogs in Britain, is in part motivated by their transgression of these 
norms of behaviour, and by their not being disciplined, in the Foucaultian sense.  
The censure is extreme and breed specific (Cohen and Richardson, 2003), at the 
time of writing life prison sentences for the owners of dogs causing human 
fatalities are being considered by government (BBC, 6 August 2013), whilst 
fatality caused by cows meets a low key response (BBC, 15 May 2013) .  Attacks 
on humans in Britain by horses and cattle (which are more likely than canine 
assaults to lead to severe injury or death), do not draw the same social censure, 
or volume and tone of media attention, and do not have the same qualities of a 
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moral panic (Cohen and Richardson, 2003) that canine assaults do.  These 
themes are explored more fully in Chapter 9.   
 
6.5.4. Latent Kin   
While in Enacted Kin there is an outward and expressive inter-group dynamic, in 
the aspect of consciousness referred to as Latent Kin there is an intra-group 
dynamic, concerned with internal group cohesion and pack consciousness.  This 
aspect, like Enacted Kin, is also rooted in the public in that it is a gestalt 
phenomenon, built up of different role expectations and concerned with the 
group.  However, it is not outwardly expressive in its dynamic, but rather a hidden 
latent force, that serves coalescence and intra-group unity.   
 
When Rose came to me the second time Hassan said ‘you’ll find 
her a bit of a handful’ you know, ‘she’s a very self-willed dog’.  So 
when she came the next time, I was aware she was very active and 
lively and so on but, because I'm here on my own, I am, I'm a fairly 
peaceful kind of calm kind of person.  Holly became a very calm 
dog and Hassan remarked on that. He would say ‘I can't 
understand, she does everything you ask her to do, she does 
everything so calmly’, and the times that she would get excited 
would be when she was going in the car or arriving at their house, 
you know, and always when I would take her to the kennels.  The 
lady at the kennels would always say ‘she’s the liveliest dog I know’ 
you know, even when she was nearly 14, but she said ‘I wish I 
knew where she gets all this energy from?’  So she was a lively dog 
but a calm dog at the same time, you know what I mean?  She took 
this calmness and it was part of her life, and I think that’s maybe a 
sharing of the animal for the owner becoming more like the owner, 
that’s, I always maintain that.  (Winston, re: Rose)  
 
Rose had adapted to her new environment, not only in terms of adopting the 
required patterns of where to roam and where to sleep in the home, how to 
deport herself in public and the acceptable ways to await food (Fieldnotes, 5 May 
2011).  Even more than this Rose had assumed a way of being, calm and 
contained in her energy, that reflects the tone of the home, in its sober and 
tasteful décor, and the mode of being of her owner, an intelligent, orderly and 
composed man.   
 
These are not behaviours that are explicitly taught, rather it is a way of moving, of 
holding oneself and of being, that is absorbed.  In a sense the aspect of 
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consciousness that is Latent Kin could be understood as being reminiscent of 
Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of habitus, that embodied way of being that makes the 
creature fit with their environment, it appears effortless and unassumed, but is 
actually absorbed from the many subtle social cues in the milieu.  As Goffman 
(1974) points out these deep structurings of being can be hard to identify 
because they are so rooted, and it is helpful to look to the boundaries, the places 
of tension and flux, where they are likely to be more visible.  One such boundary 
was the leaving of Irma’s husband.   
 
But this year, when my brother was down just before Christmas he 
said how calm he thought Zayne was, but he’s quietened down an 
awful lot.  [Doggy groaning]  And he says ‘he seems like a different 
dog’, I said ‘oh no, it’s still the same Zayne!’ but I've noticed in the 
last year he has really calmed down.  Since my ex left I've noticed 
he has really calmed down, especially with me. I think because it’s 
a calmer environment he’s calm.   
So normally I wouldn’t allow him out where the kids were running 
around, but I was so proud of him Maria, honestly I was so proud 
because he was out, he was well behaved and he came up to my 
niece – my niece was eating something and I thought ‘oh no’ and I 
was sitting here and my niece was there, and he comes up and I 
thought ‘oh no, do I grab him and put him in his cage?’.  No he just 
sat beside her, and she put her hand out to pet him, he let her pet 
him.  Then he sort of cuddled into her and she’s thingmying his 
belly and everything, and my sister in law who was sitting there 
turned round and said.  ‘Can you imagine me doing that a year 
ago?’.  She says ‘no way, I would never have thought that possible 
a year ago.’ 
And I kept saying to him, when they all left, I says ‘oh your 
mummy’s so proud of you!’ I was so proud of him.  I've been a lot 
calmer, yeah.  I've been a lot more relaxed yeah, not on edge, so 
yeah.  And I definitely think that the two are connected, definitely 
think.  And I think because Jack Russells do tend to have one 
master, and when he was here I think he was his master, he would 
only take a telling from him.   (Irma, re: Zayne) 
 
When her husband left the emotional tone of the home changed, and Zanye, and 
also Braxton, adapted, and made subtle changes in their way of moving and 
relating, which both was a response to, and itself helped alter, the overall 
atmosphere of the home, an atmosphere in the home which I had noticed on my 
first visit there (Fieldnotes, 12 November 2011). The aspect of canine 
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consciousness that is Latent Kin is context specific.  It emerges from rooting in a 
particular family, and perhaps place, as the companion adapts and learns from 
the context, and is sensitive and responsive to the ways of being, and ways of 
relating, of other family members.   
 
The virtual person of the companion animal was considered to possess an 
empathic awareness and to be able to respond to the human emotional state in a 
supportive way.   
 
They come to you when you call, they do know what you are 
saying, they do know what you're thinking. My animals definitely 
know what I'm thinking, I know that, but then again they've been 
with you a long time, they get used to your habits just like you get 
used to their habits.  (Margaret)  
 
Mead illuminated that mind is an eddy in the social current (1934), in the aspect 
of Latent Kin, the current of mind has an intra-family focus, and the dynamic is 
concerned with inward cohesion, the accommodation to habits and ways of your 
family, rather than the display of the group and connection to the wider society, 
as with Enacted Kin.  Margaret also touches on another consideration, that the  
construction of canine consciousness is not a one way street, both human and 
canine are affected each by the other.  As both are borne along in the currents of 
connection that forge their consciousness, for “beings do not pre-exist their 
relatings” (Haraway, 2003:6), whether they are a human whose self is birthed by 
the civilising forces of sapien society, or a companion canine whose self is born 
in a human-canine family.   
 
The model of companion canine selfhood presents an understanding of the 
structure of a companion canine self as it emerges within, and is shaped by, the 
context of living in a human family and the wider society.  The Enacted Self, is 
the stable nature with wants and likes, the Latent Self, is the hidden interior 
aspect, the Enacted Kin, represents the canine in the public role of the family 
dog, whilst the Latent Kin, speaks to canine consciousness as shaped by the 
immediate society and dynamics between family members.   
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 6.6. Canine Selfhood and Collective Breed Nature  
Within the family the companions were understood as having individual identity, 
regarding them as interchangeable creatures, was resisted.   
 
You can’t you see, you can’t compare one pet to another.  They all 
have different characters, all very different, the French Bulldogs.  
The baseline being that they’re very affectionate, intelligent and, 
you know one just has nothing but joy.   (Nathaniel)  
 
However there is a tension here, though each companion is regarded as having 
their own personality, there are also considerations of breed, and the owners did 
speak to breed, which would represent collective, rather than individual, natures.  
For example, spaniels were regarded as being stoical and not showing pain 
(Margaret, 19 March 2012).  This understanding, that there are characteristics of 
personality belonging collectively to the breed, exists in tension with the idea of 
each canine possessing a particular subjective self.  Breed natures appeared to 
be used as a reference point, in relation to which the individual canine can be 
understood as accurately exhibiting the breed nature, or as deviating from it in 
particular ways.  This relationship between individual personality and collective 
breed nature, varies not only in inter-subjective terms, with some canines being 
regarded as more closely shaped by the breed nature than others, but the 
relationship also varies in its intra-subjective features.   
 
The same canine, as in the case of Rusty, can be thought of as embodying the 
stereotypical nature of the breed in some aspects of their personality, but not in 
others.  Rusty was considered by his owners to be an exception to the collective 
breed nature with regard to the stereotypical Lhasa Apsos’ dislike of men, which 
he did not display.   
 
We decided we wanted a Lhasa Apso and there was one there [at 
the rehoming centre] and the woman said 'no he'll hate your 
husband, they can't stand men about, you know, they're jealous'.  
So I just said to Rebekah, 'look, if you want a dog get a puppy and 
we'll start from scratch' and that was it. The decision was made 
within a few days.  I think taking you to the Dogs Trust made up my 
mind. Rekbekah says she wants a dog, we're not going to get one 
this way, we'll start with a puppy.  (Ross)  
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 By getting and training Rusty from a puppy, Ross believed he could overcome 
the breed tendency to be misandrous.  The assumption being that the individual 
socialisation of the pup could counter his breed specific nature.  But whilst Rusty 
was regarded as not being misandrous, like his fellow Lhasa Apsos, he was 
firmly considered to possess the sensitivity of feeling, and tendency to become 
despondent in the face of discipline, which is also seen as a personality 
characteristic of the breed.    
 
Rebekah  He’s just a baby, but at the same time he needs his 
discipline, and if we didn’t do it then, you know, you 
could create a lot of problems for the future. 
Ross But we don’t shout at him. 
Rebekah No we don’t shout, they don’t like it. 
Ross  They don’t like it apparently, Lhasa Apsos, they get 
quite moody and depressed. 
Rebekah They do, yeah. 
Ross  So we try and get him to turn round his behaviour and 
when he does the right thing you immediately give him 
a treat and thank him and plaudit him for what he’s 
done rather than shout.  
  (Rebekah and Ross, re: Rusty) 
 
This sensitivity to raised voices and firm discipline is understood as being a breed 
specific attribute, and when, during initial training, Rebekah did have an episode 
of shouting at Rusty, his behavioural, mental and emotional response, was 
interpreted in light of the assumed breed specific psychological and emotional 
make up.   
Rebekah  Well, he was upstairs and I couldn’t get ready and he 
was just chew, chew, chew, chew and biting at my feet, 
biting at my bare feet and he was hurting me, and I 
shouted at him, I smacked his bottom and I shouted at 
the same time that he was a bad dog and he looked at 
me and then he flew out the bedroom into the spare 
room and it was back and forward, back and forward, 
but he was like. It was as if you had stung him, you 
know, just the way he flew out there and he was not at 
all happy. 
Ross Didn’t know what to do with himself. 
Rebekah He didn’t know what to do, it was like ‘I canny handle 
this, she shouted at me’ and they really do not like.  
They do get quite withdrawn when I shout at him. 
Ross So we don’t shout at him. 
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Rebekah They don’t like raised voices in general, but particularly 
to be shouted at.  But I think, I don’t know if you 
remember I was saying that that breed has a strong 
sense of justice.  And if they think your shouting at them 
isn't merited, then they get resentful about that and they 
get depressed about that as well, you know, so we 
couldn’t be a household of shouters, you know.  There’s 
no point in shouting at him, he doesn’t understand why 
he’s being shouted at.  But he would just get quite 
withdrawn and think that was unfair. 
 (Rebekah and Ross, re: Rusty) 
 
Canine selfhood is both enacted and imputed, Rusty’s response to Rebekah’s 
displeasure, is running away, becoming frantic then despondent.  Whilst Ross 
speaks directly for the thoughts and feelings of Rusty, imputing to him an inner 
dialogue, in which the boundaries of self and other, as well and one’s own 
emotional and relational limits, are understood.  Whilst the idea of breed natures 
and collective identities is present, it exists in tension with the understanding of 
the companion as an individual being with their own unique subjectivity.  This 
subjectification is by far the most potent force shaping the understanding of the 
companion and their place within the family. 
 
Summary  
Understanding companion canines as expressive authors of their own actions, 
who exist within the meaningful context of the families, makes it possible to 
conceptualise the existence of nonhuman illness narratives.  The companions 
contribute to these illness narratives, which are recounted by the human family 
members, by virtue of their actions and expressions, which are born of the 
canines being embodied selves.  Nonhuman illness narratives were found in 
profusion in this study.  Moreover, the imputation of an anticipated lifecourse to 
the canine, by their human family members, in combination with the canine’s  
own cycle of being, both sociological, in how they related to others and changes 
in their expression of agency, as well as their biological cycle, makes it possible 
to apply the concept of biographical disruption to the canine companions.   
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This can be conceptualised as biographical disruption-by-proxy, where there is a 
disturbance in the established modes of being, and anticipated lifecourse of the 
companion, with a particular emphasis on physical limitations, as physical actions 
are a primary mode of expression of the self in the case of a family member who 
cannot use human language. This disturbance to the taken-for-granted 
assumptions provokes an anxiety in the human owners, which leads to a hyper 
vigilance of their companion, looking and listening for the least change in 
behaviour or appearance, which may be suggestive of illness or dying.  The state 
of watchfulness is exacerbated by the apparent voicelessness of the canine.  The 
canine’s inability to convey their feelings and thoughts in human language, does 
not mean that they were regarded by the owners as having no thoughts or 
emotions of their own.  Universally the owners considered the companion to be 
possessed of a rich subjectivity, with feelings, thoughts and needs.  Companion 
canine subjectivity is not as robust as human subjectivity, and can be helpfully 
conceptualised as a virtual personhood, that is dependent upon the canine’s 
embedding in the family context.   
 
The discovery of nonhuman illness narratives, co-authored by humans and 
nonhumans, and disrupted companion canine biographies, raises questions 
about the boundaries of subjectivity and the nature of the self. Subjectivity is 
understood as emergent, dependent upon the context, and coherent.  Within the 
data there is support for a four-fold model of canine selfhood, as forged within a 
family.  This model comprises the Enacted Self, the realm of character, with its 
outward focus and display of wants preferences and needs; the Latent Self, a 
private inner world, hidden and personal, only hinted at through dreams; the 
Enacted Kin, which is consciousness as forged by the identity of the family dog, 
an outward expressive focus relating to the wider society; and finally Latent Kin, 
where canine consciousness is moulded by intra-family dynamics.  By being a 
virtual person within the family, possessed of a self, the companion is woven 
deeply into their context, and valued within it, and therefore their illness, or loss to 
the family through their death, is apt to provoke disruption, which is likely to have 
associated with it, and is itself another name for, suffering.  It is towards this 
suffering, born of illness or loss, that the attention of this thesis now turns.   
~ 115 ~ 
 
Chapter 7  ~  Interpretations of Suffering    
 
Having explored the possibilities for a canine self in the preceding chapter, this 
thesis now addresses one of, perhaps even the most, compelling implications of 
the assumption of selfhood.  That is that if you have a self it can be diminished, 
it can be strained, and it can wounded, in short to possess a self is to, 
unavoidably, become subject to suffering.  Even the human narcissist with their 
apparently iron clad immunity to the vicissitudes of being a person and a social 
creature, suffers secretly in their hidden selves (Masterson, 1990).  To be an 
embodied being with selfhood and sentience is to potentiate pain.  Only in an 
extreme Cartesian view, where animals are regarded as machines, without the 
capacity to feel or comprehend, would canines be regarded as unable to feel 
pain or experience suffering.    
 
7.1 Companion Canine Pain  
Inhabiting a social context far removed from the rituals of science that transform 
animals into objects (Arluke and Solot, 1997), the canine companions in this 
study were assumed to be capable of experiencing a wide range of suffering, 
including physical pain.  Further, this suffering was understood as something to 
be avoided, indeed something that it was in the duty of a ‘good owner’, as a 
moral person, to eliminate or alleviate from their canines’ experience.  The 
human owners did not want their animals to be in pain, physiological or 
otherwise, and an everyday event, such as a trip to the vet for a routine 
sterilization, could elicit concerns regarding canine suffering, and with it the 
associated discomfort that these concerns called forth in the human owner.   
 
Ross We were more concerned about how he was feeling.   
Rebekah  We didn’t want him to be in pain or anything.   
Ross And he’s going about ‘I'm alright now’ [laugh]!  
Rebekah Yeah, and he sometimes kind of has a wee lick as if to 
say ‘I thought there used to be something there’! 
[Laughter] 
Ross So after we saw her (the veterinarian) and she said he 
was healing well, I think we started feeling much more 
relaxed. 
Rebekah  We did feel better. 
Ross Yeah, much better.   (Ross and Rebekah, re: Rusty) 
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Here companion canine pain stimulates discomfort in the human owners.  The 
worlds of the human and the nonhuman are not entirely separate (Haraway, 
2008), and the disquiet of one, disturbs the tranquillity of the other.  In this case 
whilst Rusty’s pain is, at least in part, physical, there is also the suggestion that 
he senses something missing from his body, and perhaps from his being.  As 
Bendelow points out (1993), when suffering is initially considered it is the aspect 
of physical pain, as a consequence of either injury or illness, that tends to be 
highlighted first, and this form of suffering is also privileged, as the most 
compelling form of suffering and the most ‘real’ form of pain.  Without exception 
the human owners in this study regarded their canine companions as being 
capable of experiencing physical pain, as a result of injury or illness.   
 
Margaret  She had an emergency hysterectomy about three 
years before.   
MD Why emergency?  
Margaret  She was, I basically came home to find her on the sofa 
writhing in agony, so I just put her in the back of the car 
and took her in and that’s what they said was the matter 
with her, so she just went in and had the operation 
straight away.   (Margaret, re: Sally) 
 
 
Manifestations of physical pain are regarded as indicative that something is 
wrong, and, in this instance, immediate action was taken to identity, and 
resolve, the underlying cause. Sally’s pain here is definitive, regarded as 
undeniable, and constituting an emergency.  But the companion canine pain 
encountered in this study, was not usually as definitive as in the case of Sally.  
Canine suffering was usually more ambiguous, it was harder for the owners to 
tell what was going on, the pain was not always clear.   
 
Wee soul, and I think it’s hard because they can’t tell you how 
they feel, it’s a guessing game all the time.   (Ross, re: Rusty)  
 
The human owners’ ability to discern their companion’s suffering is 
compromised by canine voicelessness, whilst a canine companion may moan 
or yelp in discomfort, they cannot described their pain in human language.  Pain 
is felt within the body, and needs to be expressed in order for it to be perceived 
by others (Hydén and Peolsson, 2002).  As was found in the exploration of the 
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canine self, and discussed in the previous chapter, this voicelessness of the 
canine creates a tension for the human owners.  In the case of possible pain, 
the human urge to mitigate canine suffering is given the status of an imperative.  
It is a requirement of the role of being a ‘good owner’ to minimise canine 
suffering, yet canine voicelessness frustrates the human owner’s capacity to 
identify, and so to take action to alleviate, companion canine pain.   
 
Spaniels are notoriously very stoical [laugh] so they have to really, 
really be in pain before they’ll show you.  So that is maybe slightly 
worrying because he may well be in pain and I might not know it, 
but equally I can’t go inside his head to know that.  But at the 
moment I wouldn’t say that he’s suffering in any way so that’s all 
that matters.   (Margaret, re: Mitch) 
 
 
Margaret touches here on the concept of pain as an internal, private experience 
(Hydén and Peolsson, 2002), which requires expression to be observed.  
Canine voicelessness is particularly problematic in the context of pain, given 
pain’s importance interactionally and its significance to owner identity.  
Combined with this pain was regarded as being a critical deciding factor in the 
decision of whether or not to choose euthanasia.    
 
My view is when they’re in pain that’s the time to, you know, call it a 
day.   (Margaret)  
 
This laying of significance upon companion canine pain, its entanglement with 
owner moral standing, as well as it being a potentiating factor in canine 
euthanasia, makes the difficulties of discerning and evaluating companion 
canine pain even more fraught.  A further complicating factor emerges, not from 
the owners’ attempt to understand, and take appropriate action, with regard to 
canine suffering, but rather from the agency of the canine, potentially exploiting 
the interactional significance given to expressions of pain.   
 
Generally the companions were viewed as being authentic in their expressions 
of pain, they were usually regarded as accurately and genuinely representing 
their subjective experience of physical pain, through their vocalisations and 
actions.   But this was not always the case.  The companions were understood 
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as being sophisticated in their appreciation of pain, and of the prominent place 
that pain was given within the interactional context.  The canines were not 
viewed as merely exhibiting a crude stimulus-reaction aversion response to a 
noxious stimuli, as Mead (1934) suggested, but rather as engaging, creatively 
and expressively, in the display of pain, and manipulating the performance of 
their suffering for their own ends.  In short, it was considered that sometimes 
the canines would deceive. Pandora would give demonstrations of 
psychological distress, freezing and sitting down, and refusing to move, to 
shorten an unwanted walk (Transcript, 9 March 2012), and Sierra would give 
prolonged displays of discomfort and moaning at home.  These performances of 
pretend suffering could range in intensity from exaggerating a small physical 
discomfort, like an ache, to the outright faking of pain, with accompanying 
vocalisations, a refusal to move and facial and bodily displays of distress.    
 
Susan She was moaning and groaning quite a lot and she 
was, looking as if she was in an awful lot of pain and 
she was just not.  
MD When was she moaning?  
Susan Most of the day.  
MD Really.  
Susan Yes.  She was just miserable.  (Susan: re Sierra) 
 
Sierra’s prolonged performances of pain were regarded by Susan as way of 
avoiding taking unwanted medication.  Physical pain holds a privileged place in 
the interaction between the owners and their companions, attempts by the 
canines to manipulate their owners by using displays of pain, is suggestive of 
the canines being aware of the power of this display, and would represent a 
sophisticated grasp of interactional dynamics on the part of the canines.  It 
suggests that the canines appreciate the significance given to pain displays and 
can, knowingly, manufacture a display to provoke the response in the owner 
that they desire. This would require the canines to have, at least a basic 
understanding that the human is Other, that the human has their own mind, 
separate from them, as well as the canine having an understanding of gesture, 
and a rudimental grasp of the meaning associated with pain gestures, in order 
to manipulate the meanings. Such an understanding on the part of the canines 
would represent a manifestation of consciousness far removed from the crude 
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stimulus-response basis of nonhuman gestures Mead (1934) assumed.  Indeed, 
such an understanding is approaching the territory of a language of gestures, 
which would involve the capacity to apprehend, display and manipulate 
meanings.  Even as humans can manufacture displays of emotion in order to 
promote an impression or to manipulate other humans (Hochschild, 1983).   
 
To state that the companion canines can manufacture displays of emotion with 
regard to pain, assumes that the owners were correct when they declared that 
the canine pain they witnessed was not ‘real’.  I did not witness any of these 
displays of manufactured pain directly, and even if I had, I am uncertain how 
effectively one might distinguish ‘real’ pain from manufactured pain. Particularly 
as pain is, on the one hand, a subjective experience (Mennie, 1974), and on the 
other hand, “pain is, moreover, a contextual phenomenon, i.e. pain is 
interwoven with specific types of situations, actions or movements” (Hydén and 
Peolsson, 2002), rather than being a fixed object. Perhaps ‘real’ and 
manufactured pain could be distinguished by the type and tone of the gestural 
display?  However, without more direct data this can only be supposition.  
Nonetheless, given that this phenomenon arose, independently and unprobed 
by me, at two of the ten research sites, it is tempting to assume that there may 
be some fire behind the smoke, and that some form, or degree, of manipulation 
may be present in a proportion of the performances of companion canine pain.         
 
7.2 Non-physical Suffering and Loneliness  
Whilst a contemporary Western understanding of pain is “dominated by 
biomedicine and concentrates upon the neurophysiological aspects” (Bendelow 
and Williams, 1995:140), the majority of canine suffering that the owners spoke 
of was non-physical.  It remains the case that physical pain held a privileged 
place in the human-canine interactions, but it also mingled with non-physical 
aspects of suffering, such as disruptions in sociability, emotion or mind.   
 
Rebekah He was always downstairs sleeping, but we felt 
because of what he'd been through and he had the 
cone on his head and everything, we would take him 
upstairs so we could keep an eye on him.  He cried the 
whole night.   
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MD Whilst he was with you upstairs?  
Rebekah  Yes.   
Ross Aye.   
Rekekah  But I think that was the, the anaesthetic can do that to 
them.   
Ross  Aye, and he'd this big cone on his head as well.  
Rebekah And he couldn't settle.  
Ross And he's banging off the door and wandering about, 
you know.  
Rebekah Aw it's a shame, it was horrible.  
  (Rebekah and Ross, re: Rusty) 
 
Different homes have different spatial boundaries regarding where the canine 
companion is permitted to go.  In this case Rebekah and Ross, who had had 
Rusty since puppyhood, had not permitted him to go upstairs, where the 
humans slept (Transcript, 11 June 2011)   
 
 
Figure 9 – Rusty’s suffering justified a change in his sleeping arrangements, 28 
January 2012   
 
Three issues spring to mind here: first, this relaxation of the downstairs only 
rule, appears to be an attempt to compensate Rusty for the misfortune of his 
discomfort and perhaps is also an attempt to calm him.  Second, whilst at first 
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glance it appears as if a rule has been broken and the interactional structure 
between human and canine has been weakened, the high degree of intergration 
between canine companion and their owner, can make possible acceptable 
lapses, which do not then threaten the established interactional frame. In 
Goffman’s (1974) terms these minor, informally approved lapses, actually 
reinforce normal functioning within an interactional frame, rather than being 
frame breakers. They support established practices of intersubjectivity rather 
than undermining them.   
 
The third issue which leaps to mind, is whether permitting Rusty upstairs at 
night also served to alleviate the discomfort his owners were experiencing at 
having had him castrated.  The sterilisation of a companion animal can cause 
stress, sadness and guilt for the owner (Cocia and Rusu, 2010).  Rebekah and 
Ross had not particularly wanted to do this, and they were concerned that he 
was aware of what had been done to him and was missing that part of him 
which was now lost (Transcript, 15 October 2011). Rusty’s subjectivity was 
regarded as compromised, he was now incomplete.  Moreover, the discomfort 
of the canine companion impacted upon the owners, who were conflicted and 
concerned, the procedure and its effects had been disturbing to them 
(Transcript, 15 October 2011).  In short, something which impacted the canine 
companion’s subjectivity also impacted the human owners’, this intertwining of 
human and canine, and its implications for wellbeing, are explored more fully in 
Chapter 9. 
 
To return to the observation at the beginning of this chapter that to be a subject, 
rather than an object, is to open the door to suffering, there is a related 
consequence of possessing personhood that emerged from the data. To be 
regarded as having an inner creative subjective life, also means that your 
subjectivity may be perceived as being injured or malfunctioning, and 
aberrations of subjectivity may be interpreted from deviant behaviour and 
difficulties in intersubjective life.  In short to be accorded the status of having a 
mental life, means that you may also be accorded the status of having mental 
distress.   
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In Midgley’s words, “sentience is important because of the very dramatic 
difference it makes in the kind of needs which creatures have, and the kind of 
harm which can be done to them” (1998:90).  To be sentient is to be subject to 
forms of pain without physical injury or bodily disease.  Injuries to the sense of 
self and personal security, social and emotional distress, and trauma resulting 
from intense experiences, all become possible.   
 
Amanda  Mason had to go, well he didn't have to, we decided 
that for his health reasons that he should be on 
tranquilisers for bonfire night. So he went on them 
about two weeks beforehand and he still barked at 
everything, he looked like a womble.  He just looked 
stoned for a whole two weeks!   But, in saying that, he 
didn't foam at the mouth, he did piddle in the kitchen a 
couple of times, that's fine, don't worry about it.  In 
response to the fireworks, but he didn't howl, he wasn't 
hiding under things, he was quite happy just to sit 
beside you and have` a cuddle.   
MD I didn't know he was like that with fireworks?   
Amanda Oh he's dreadful, I thought he'd had a heart attack last 
year, he just collapsed and started foaming at the 
mouth and I thought I can't put him through that again.  
MD What d'you think it was?   
Amanda Shock, he's terrified, he just doesn't like, and of course, 
that had affected the little dog as well, wee Diesel.   
Nothing bothers him, but because Mason was 
frightened he was frightened, so he was hiding under 
the bed - his response isn't quite as bad. But certainly 
calmed him down a bit, not completely. 
  (Amanda, re: Mason) 
 
Mason’s suffering is non-physical, he is understood as having an intense 
emotional reaction to the unusual sound of the fireworks, which is then 
translated into somatic symptoms of distress, with collapsing and foaming at the 
mouth.  This experience is regarded as having caused such trauma to his inner 
mental world, that it led Mason to develop a phobia.  For this to happen Mason 
would have to recognise the sound of the fireworks as unusual, and then 
ascribe to them a threatening meaning, to which he then had a violent 
emotional reaction.   
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Figure 10 – Mason was understood as having an inner emotional life and as 
experiencing emotional distress, 8 March 2011 
 
To have an emotional life and affectivity, is one of Irvine’s (2004a and 2004b) 
four prerequisites of personhood, and all the companion canines in this study 
were regarded as being possessed of their own inner emotional life.  Having 
emotions makes possible new forms of suffering transcending the physical, 
“feeling and emotion cannot be reduced to the body” (Burkitt, 2002:152).  In the 
case of Mason, having an inner emotional life made possible terror and trauma, 
of an order beyond physical distress.  As with the humans in Chandler’s study, 
there seemed to be operating, in the way that Mason’s suffering was 
understood, “a clearly dualistic model of the body and of pain, with physical pain 
framed as different from and preferable to emotional pain” (Chandler, 
2013:718).  
 
Whilst, for both human and canine, being a subjective creature with an inner 
emotional life makes possible non-physical forms of suffering, it also makes 
possible forms of intersubjective relationship that are experienced, at least by 
the human, as valuable, beneficial and enjoyable. Further, in the sense that the 
~ 124 ~ 
 
companion canines seek out the presence of, and seek to interact with, the 
humans, it is not unreasonable to assume that the canines may also enjoy 
relations with their human owners.  Though given the gross power imbalance 
between human and companion canine (Arluke, 2006), such an assumption 
needs to be handled with care.   Nonetheless, it emerges strongly from the data 
that a major aspect of companion canine ownership for the humans, is the 
condition of being together.   
  
I did find them good company, it was nice coming home. I wouldn't 
have liked coming home to an empty house, you don't realise how 
much you appreciate them until you actually come into no human 
person, you know, not a human being here and you've got two dogs 
sitting waiting on you who are really pleased to see you, so it gives 
you something to focus on. But they were my only company which 
was nice. Someone to cuddle!  (Amanda) 
 
Being together is both physical, in the sense of someone who is responsive to 
touch and can be held, and being together is also non-physical, in the presence 
and welcome of another being, preventing the home from being empty.   
Figure 11 – Amanda found the companions presence stopped the home from feeling 
empty, Amanda and Diesel, 8 March 2011 
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The being together of the human and companion canine appears to be potent to 
assuage, defend even, against the existential loneliness of being for the human, 
to prevent them from being “absolutely alone and trembling on the brink of 
oblivion” (Becker, 1973:91).  The human owners do not consider themselves to 
be alone when they have their canine companions, even if the companions are 
not physically present.  In the words of Margaret:  
 
You’re not maybe chatting to them all the time, or you’re conscious 
they’re there.  The fact is they are there, you know, so even 
although I’m through there and they’re through here, I know that.   
 (Margaret, re: Mitch and Sally) 
 
Being together, like Finch’s definition of family (2007), or Morgan’s emphasis on 
family practices (1996), is also an activity, more than it is a passive state.  Being 
together involves both sharing physical space and a mutual participation in the 
routines of everyday life, these aspects of being together are explored more 
fully in Chapter 9.  Being together also involves the shared involvement in 
activities within the home.  The canines in Rowan and Gregor’s household took 
part in both the social and spiritual aspects of family life. 
 
But they used to sit through prayer meetings and bible studies, the 
pair of them, they would just lie and sleep, and they must have 
been touched by it, I think some of it my of, but she was just 
brilliant.  (Rowan and Gregor)   
 
The companions are not regarded as passive objects, even when sleeping, but 
as subjects, who are part of, and moved by, the religious atmosphere in the 
home. Being together embraced not only social activities undertaken with 
others, but the canines were also embraced in more solitary activities, such as 
studying at home.   
 
Yes, but she was a wonderful dog, she was a great companion, a 
great companion. I could share all of these studies with her, you 
know, I’d never told her anything that would cause her concern if I 
was worried about anything, I never shared that short of thing with 
her, but my studies certainly from when I started doing English 
language, then the Spanish, then the Greek and the Latin, the Latin 
and the Greek, she just lapped it up, it was wonderful; and all the 
walks that we did were just great, great.   (Winston, re: Rose) 
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Being together is an activity more than it is a state, as in Finch’s (2007) 
observation that “contemporary families are defined more by ‘doing’ family 
things than by ‘being’ a family” (2007:66).  Not being human, however, and 
having less social status than a human, creates ambiguities around the power, 
and appropriate place given to the significance of being with a companion 
canine.  When Olga’s mother’s consultant physician telephoned her, in Scotland 
from London, he first asked Olga if she was alone, before proceeding to tell 
Olga that her mother was in the process of dying (Fieldnotes, 9 March 2012). 
Olga’s reply to her mother’s consultant, and her thoughts on the matter, touch 
on both the power of being with a canine companion, and some of the 
ambiguities inherent in this human and nonhuman togetherness.   
 
You know there's something.  I think then you know there's 
somebody there, you know what I mean, it's a sense of presence. 
Yes, I mean, it's.  I know I didn't count Pandora, but, and I think he 
was really, you know, 'is there any other human being there that 
you can talk to?' No that's what he means, no I mean, the dog 
wouldn't, somebody you could talk to or somebody who could put, 
yes.  I think when you normally say you're on your own, you're 
alone or you're on your own or whatever you say, it really means is 
there anybody else in the house who can make you a cup of tea 
sort of thing, you know what I mean [laugh] she hasn't learnt that 
yet [laugh]! But you know what I mean, that can do things with you.  
But I mean, it is good that she is here, it would've been (pause) it's 
bad enough, I tend to walk around a lot when I'm upset, and she 
would just lie there, but it's good that you can just, you're not just 
talking out loud to nobody cause.  It's quite nice that you can cry in 
her fur, you know what I mean, it's nice, it is something that's very 
consoling, with a dog that will let you.   (Olga, re: Pandora) 
 
Olga pinpoints the sense of the presence of the companion, and the co-
existence of human and canine, as part of the substance of togetherness, whilst 
also touching on the limits of this condition of being together.  Once again the 
issue is voicelessness, the companion cannot speak in human words or perform 
a ritual of human consolation, such as the making of a cup of tea.  Nevertheless 
the companion canine can still comfort, though not with words, but they can 
comfort with their body, physical presence and fur.  The physicality of the 
canine seems able to assuage the loneliness of the human, both in its actual 
and existential aspects.   
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Figure 12 – Pandora comforted Olga when her mother died, 15 June 2011  
 
The companions appear to connect with the owners at the point of a powerful 
aspect of being human, the human need for mutual society, for humans are a 
fundamentally social species (Goffman, 1974).  As Becker says of the child "if 
he [sic] were abandoned to himself his world would drop away, and his 
organism [sic] must sense this at some level; we call this the anxiety of object-
loss" (Becker, 1973:13).  This aversion to aloneness is within a human being 
from their earliest stages in the world, we simply cannot survive alone.  
Aloneness for the infant human is death, as Sorokin learnt, from the orphaned 
babies in the Russian orphanages during the Communist revolution, even if all 
the physical needs of security and sustenance are met, without sociable 
interaction with other living beings, the human child will slowly wither and die 
(Sorokin, 1942).  It seems to be at this point of connection that the canines 
acquire a presence in human society, within the human family and home; 
They’ve got a habit of, they worm their way in (Rowan).  In the words of 
Nathaniel, the canines are able to insinuate themselves within the homes and 
lives of their human owners:  
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Because everyone needs a companion.  And a doggy is actually 
brilliant because, as I say, they’re always pleased to see you and it 
doesn’t matter they haven’t seen you for five minutes.  And 
generally their behaviour is much superior to humans.  You can’t 
say to me that they’re all, you know, that humans are always 
pleased to see each other.   (Nathaniel) 
 
Indeed not only are the canines considered good companions, they can be 
considered to offer better companionship to the owners, than other human 
beings. The canines connect with the human need for companionship in several 
different ways. First the companion canines offer a tangible presence of another 
living being, with the sounds and feel of their physical bodies:  Another body, a 
breathing body that’s, you know, it is I mean, she’s good company in that 
respect  (Olga, re: Pandora).   
 
Second, there is, as earlier mentioned, the shared activities of life, such as 
studying or socialising together.  Third, the sense that the home is not empty, 
but is peopled by another living being; and fourth, the apparently empathic 
presence of the listening canine, who senses the human emotional state, and 
offers comfort to their owner.   
 
Yes I definitely think they know. I definitely think they know. 
Braxton, he knows, I mean, I lost my dad last year as well.  And he 
knows when I'm down, I mean, I don’t even have to cry, he just 
knows, he’s just fabulous.  He knows.  Because he comes up, he 
puts his two paws on my lap and the head goes to my shoulder and 
it’s just as if he’s cuddling me.   (Irma, re: Braxton).   
 
In the Chapter 6 it was explored how canine voicelessness is, in reference to 
the illness or pain of the canine, experienced as frustrating by the human 
owners.  However, in the case of a nonhuman offering comfort to a suffering 
human, it may be that canine voicelessness can, at least seem, to enable the 
canine to offer superior consolation and a deeper understanding.  The canines 
have no words to give in comfort, but they also have no words to minimise the 
hurt or critique the human’s expression of pain.   
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Without the possible contradiction from words a greater empathy between the 
social actors can be assumed, and we are after all, as humans, also mammals, 
and also part of the wider body of living things.  That comfort and consolation in 
our time of pain and loneliness may come, wordlessly, from the wider body of 
life, has in itself a certain mystique that denies the cruel fantasy of human 
isolationism.   
 
7.3 Suffering Together  
Whilst the intertwining of togetherness between human and canine companion 
can offer strengthening, and empathic consolation, to the human who is 
suffering, this intertwining of subjectivities also means that human and canine 
may face stressors and trauma together.  During the course of this study a 
situation was encountered in which a female owner was experiencing domestic 
violence by her husband, who was both verbally and physical violent towards 
her.  The female owner was in the process of separating from her husband 
during the data gathering stage of this project.  The two canine companions 
were not immune from the volatile situation in which the owner found herself.  
As Flynn observes: 
 
… the unequal relationships between men and women in families makes 
power and control issues in understanding domestic violence.  Given the 
dependent status of companion animals, their smaller physical stature, 
their lack of legal standing resulting from being considered property, their 
inability to protest against abusive treatment, the difficulty (and thus, 
frustration) in attempting to control them, and their emotional ties to other 
family members, it should come as no surprise that companion animals 
are often victimised by family members, especially by violent men.   
 (Flynn, 2000:107) 
 
I was able to elicit from the owner that the dogs had been present during, and 
were affected by, violent altercations.  On first entering, the home seemed 
pervaded by “a feel of dark and depression” (Fieldnotes, 12 November 2011). 
This itself gave me what I can only describe as an interactional instinct, and, off 
tape, on the car journey whilst being taken back to the station (human 
participants will sometimes say things as you are leaving, that they may not 
mention in the main body of an interview), I gently enquired, and heard, the 
story of what had been happening to the owner and to her companions.   
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The companion canines and their female owner had suffered the aggression 
together, with both being distressed by it.  However, the two canines were 
understood to have quite different personalities and to take quite different 
orientations towards the atmosphere of violence.   
 
Zayne was regarded as “more of a man’s dog” (Transcript, 12 November 2011), 
he was seen as being fearless, not frightened, but bold, and aggressive.  Zayne 
was regarded as being able to manipulate his owner, getting his own way and 
competing with her for territories in the home, such as who got the furry cushion 
(Fieldnotes, 12 November 2010). Zayne could be aggressive towards his 
owner, refused to be disciplined by her, growled at her and would bite if she 
tried to pick him up.  He bit the other companion canine, particularly on the legs, 
and he bit other human family members who, including the men, where afraid of 
Zayne (Transcript, 11 February 2012).  Zayne bit me when I first met him 
(Fieldnotes, 12 November 2011), being bitten by a companion canine is actually 
quite rare for me, as I am careful how I react around them.  I concealed the 
bleeding from the owner by keeping my hand in my jean pocket (I did not want 
to upset her or undermine the rapport), and Zayne tried repeatedly to get at the 
hand again.  In short it appeared that the owner was being bullied by Zayne, 
whose aggression, entitlement and dominance echoed the descriptions of her 
violent partner, whose persona he seemed to manifest. Though having acquired 
him as a puppy, Irma spoke of Zayne as her husband’s dog (Fieldnotes, 12 
November 2011).   
 
In marked contrast to the persona and presentation of Zayne, Braxton was 
regarded as non-aggressive, loving and sensitive.  In observational terms the 
canines behaved differently in my presence, both towards their owner and 
towards me.  Braxton tended to stay physically beside his owner, with his 
attention focused on her.  In Irma’s words he positions himself; 
  
Basically by my side and it’s the same when anybody comes in, you 
know, he’s basically by my side. [Doggy playing noises]  If the gas 
man was to come in.  I mean, I've had quite a lot of engineers in 
because my heating’s been playing funny and when they came in 
he’s by my side, if I move he moves with me.  
 (Irma, re: Zayne and Braxton) 
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Figure 13 – Irma experienced Braxton as protective and caring for her, Zayne, Braxton, 
and Irma, 11 February 2012  
 
Irma regarded Braxton as being protective, empathic, and caring, and I 
experienced him as having a calm presence.   
  
He’s very protective of me. Basically, you know, when I go up to my 
bed at night it used to be he used to lie outside the door, that’s 
when my husband was still here, but now because I'm by myself he 
comes in.  He opens the door and comes in and brings his bed in 
and he’ll actually lie at the side of the bed. 
 
And when my husband used to go and kiss me the dog would growl 
and bark at him.  To let you understand, my husband wasn’t that 
good to me, so it was like the dog was warning him that just, you 
know.  You know, so yeah he’s very, very protective.  If anybody 
comes into the house that he doesn’t know, you know, as in male, 
you know, maybe the gas man or some engineer or whatever was 
to come in, he sits by my side and will not leave me.   
 (Irma, re: Zayne and Braxton) 
 
In his gentleness and shyness, Braxton echoed Irma’s own persona, Irma 
attributed to him empathy and insight into her emotions, and a capacity to sooth 
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her.  Irma seemed to place Braxton, much as Flynn (2000) found in his study of 
battered women owners, in the role of comforter: 
 
It was clear from the interviews that, because of their close relationship 
with their companion animals, the animals were very important 
emotionally to the women following a violent episode.  Some indicated 
that their pets could sense that something was wrong, and that, as a 
result, they provided comfort and unconditional love.  (Flynn, 2000;113)     
 
The dynamic Flynn (2000) encounters of the canines being cast in the role of 
comforter, is also found in relationship of Braxton and Irma.  However, whilst 
Braxton, was cast in the role of comforter and also protector, Zayne was 
regarded as aggressive and wilful.  It seemed as if the two companions had 
undergone some form of psychosocial splitting, in which an intolerance for 
ambiguity leads to a distortion of reality, where good and bad are no longer co-
mingled, but separated, remembered, and experienced, in the extreme (Siegel, 
2006).  As Siegel observes, “although splitting is an intrapsychic defence 
mechanism, it has a profound effect on intimate relationships” (2006:418).  In 
this case it effected both the everyday interactions with, and the way that the 
two companions were understood by Irma.   
 
Zayne she speaks of as her husband’s dog, is this also a reference 
to his aggressive nature and that he does not obey her as Braxton 
does?  Braxton, the gentle one.  As if Braxton is part of her and 
Zayne is part of him, extensions, reflections.  Zayne is kept in a 
cage [in the hall under the stairs], Braxton sleeps in her room.   
 (Fieldnotes, 12 November 2011)  
 
The canine companions were caught, inexorably, in the interactional dynamics 
of the family, and were coloured by, what Denzin would call the “negative 
symbolic interaction”, as the violence permeated their world and appeared to 
shape their very nature (Denzin, 1984:490), even as it shaped the nature of the 
human canine bonds themselves.  
 
I mean, I’ll be the same with him, but I don’t have that same bond.  I 
mean, I love him to bits but I don’t have the same bond with Zayne 
as I do with Braxton.   (Irma, re: Zayne and Braxton) 
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It would be hard to love the extra-psychic image of your abuser.  Irma needed to 
be protected and wanted to be loved, and in the atmosphere of violence which 
both human and companion canines were suffering together, there was a 
strange blurring of the boundaries of self and of the other (Allen-Collinson, 
2009), and a splitting of the good and bad pet, and the good and bad person. 
 
Yeah, he is, he is, he is my big baby.  I mean, I love them both to 
bits, but Braxton’s just, just extra special I think.  He’s just, I just feel 
that with Braxton he’s always there, he’s always there for me.  I 
keep saying to him, ‘why can you not be a human?’.  [Laughter].  
Because he’d make a wonderful man [laugh].   
 (Irma, re: Zayne and Braxton) 
 
The mutual suffering had shaped the everyday interactions, the persona of the 
canines, and the role to which each companion was assigned, and ultimately, it 
affected the nature of the bond, and the depth of human-canine connection 
itself.   
 
7.4 Dying Alone  
Being together, whether in conditions of flourishing or under condition of mutual  
suffering, was of profound importance to the human owners, and this emphasis 
on the significance of being together, held true even at the threshold of death.   
 
Nathaniel  And Harris and I had about, not much more than two 
years I don't think.  And he developed, sort of, leaning 
over and falling over.  The vets didn't know what was 
wrong at all.  And he literally died on the hearth rug. 
MD Oh gosh.  
Nathaniel Well, erm, I was with him and that's a great thing.  You 
must be with them and if you can, I always think that, 
well, anyone that has any dog that has to be put down 
for one reason or another should be, if possible, put 
down at home with his owner.  
MD Why d'you think that?  
Nathaniel I think it relaxes them a bit. They're in familiar 
surrounds, that's why. Because very often you hear that 
they don't like visiting vets for their annual MOT.     
  (Nathaniel, re: Harris) 
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Nathaniel’s underscoring of the importance of being with the companion, 
echoes the “ideals of accompaniment” (Seale, 1995:385), of the dying found by 
Seale in his studying of dying alone.  Combined with this Nathaniel’s emphasis 
both on being with the companion, and on the companion remaining in their 
own home if possible, hints at the importance of maintaining continuity.  This 
can be seen in the interaction between Olga and Fleece.  
 
Olga She just died, I mean, she’d not been well, she was 13, a 
bit arthritic but she always used to spend, you know, 
come down here a lot visiting but also to stay and sadly it 
happened when Chris was away which is awful.  But 
she’d been going downhill and she died.  I couldn’t go to 
bed that night, well she was not well and she’d actually 
gone and hidden herself in a bush.  And I carried her 
back into the house and we covered her over, Pandora 
was here by then, you know, and they got on fine.  So we 
kept talking to her and, you know, just letting her. 
MD Why couldn’t you sleep that night? 
Olga Well because she wasn’t right obviously, so I didn’t want 
to go to bed and leave her, d'you know what I mean? So I 
couldn’t go to bed and leave her, I thought ‘I can't do 
that’, so I stayed with her and she died about one o'clock 
in the morning, and then I couldn’t go to bed and leave 
her then either, and ironically Chris was coming home 
that night but late at night.  (Olga, re: Fleece) 
 
Olga could not leave Fleece, even though she was not her dog.  It seems to me 
that for Olga, as Seale found with one of his participants who lost a human 
companion, that the companions dying alone “disrupted her sense of the proper 
order of things” (Seale, 1995:383).  It is not enough to simply die, it also matters 
that a being dies in the right place, and dies in the right way.  This finding was 
also apparent in Convery et al.’s (2008), study of the foot and mouth disease 
outbreak.  Part of the grief of the human farmers whose animals were culled, 
which was difficult for some non-farming community members to appreciate 
given that the animals were to die as livestock anyway, was grief stimulated 
because the animal died in the wrong place, and died at the wrong time 
(Convery et al., 2008). The sense of proper order of things was disturbed, by 
the possibility of dying alone, and with it there is “the threat to the moral 
reputation of the speaker in not ‘being there’” (Seale, 1995:387) at the death of 
the companion.   
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It is interesting to theorise whether the importance attached by the owner to 
maintaining an image of goodness, either generally (which is addressed in 
Chapter 9), or particularly when choosing to euthanize a companion (as 
explored in Chapter 8 Section 5), may also relate to a phenomenon emerging 
from Clive Seale’s (1995a) research on dying alone.  Seale (1995a) found that 
the image of dying alone (which could range from meaning physical aloneness 
to having no one being aware of their passing), was resisted.  Effort was made 
to emphasise, where possible, that the deceased did not die alone (Seale, 
1995).  A “discursive construction of membership in a caring community” 
(Seale, 1995b:607) was deployed, to refute the impression that the person had 
died alone.  Where the actuality that someone had died alone could not be 
denied, Seale (1995) found that explanations were given to justify the absence 
of others, in order to preserve the moral reputation of the speaker.     
 
Dying alone appears to imply an abandonment, a form of failure of society in its 
widest and most fundamental sense, that is to be a community.  Seale 
highlights the importance given to what he terms the “emotional 
accompaniment” (Seale, 1995a:376) of the dying.  This concept of emotional 
accompaniment would link with Kubler-Ross’ (1970) emphasis on the ideal 
death as one of awareness and talking, which she assumes as leading to a 
dignified and accepted death, rather than leading to an emotionally and 
psychologically isolated death.   
 
The good death of a companion canine, in the sense inspired by Kubler-Ross 
(1970), would be one that occurs within the family context, manifests little pain, 
is richly debated and discussed with the family, and has the full involvement of 
veterinary professionals.  One such narrative was encountered, in the case of 
Ted, a 14 year old Border Collie, with multiple health issues.   
 
I just looked at Frank and I says 'right, come on, we've got a 
decision to make here'. And [laugh] Frank was doing that 'could 
we do it tomorrow?' [laugh] I says 'no wait a minute Frank, look at 
the dog, just look at him' and he did, he looked miserable and we 
thought 'oh d'you know'.  And Norman was lovely, he says to us 
'I'll give you five minutes' and he went away out the room and just 
left us. So we had said our goodbyes to Ted and all the rest, and 
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we said 'no it's time, we've got to do it for him' that's what I says to 
Frank 'we would only be holding onto him for us and it wasn't fair 
on him, you could go tonight, you could put him on a drip, you 
could get all these bloods done tomorrow and nothing will come 
out of that and tomorrow we'll have to make the same decision 
you're putting off tonight' and he went 'aye you're right'. Then 
Norman came back in and he says 'no we're doing it, just get 
everything ready'. So he took him away, he was lovely.  They took 
him away and they put a wee cannula in his paw.  
 
And then one of the nurses came through with a lovely blanket 
and put that on the floor [laugh].  Which is lovely, of course, 
because he was starting to get a wee bit worried at this point, so 
the vet says 'right, I'm going to give him a wee sedative just to 
calm him down' because he was starting to pant a bit, and he was 
like 'we'll give him a wee sedative' and d'you know it was 
gorgeous because he just lay down and he fell asleep.  And 
actually to the point you just thought he was sleeping.  And it was 
really, really nice because the last time we lost Ted and he had 
wet himself and everything because I was primed or 'oh my God, 
he's going to be peeing everywhere!' but actually because he was 
so dehydrated there was nothing in the poor wee soul [laugh] to 
do that. But it just actually [pause].  It was like he was just lying on 
his bed, it was beautiful and I must admit [pause].  Tears coming 
down my face at the moment but it was a beautiful ending and 
that's all we can actually hope for, for him [Susan upset]. 
 
Ted’s death is presented as one surrounded by kind and caring veterinary staff, 
with open discussion and debate between the family members, representing the 
ideal of an aware (at least for the owners), medically managed death (Kubler-
Ross, 1970).  The narrative of Ted’s death shares these ideal features with the  
case of the human ‘good death’, described in Bhatnagar and Joshi (2012) and 
addressed in Chapter 3.  Moreover, Ted’s death is also, like the case of 
Bhatnagar and Joshi’s patient (2012), a ‘beautiful death’; where thanks to the 
care of the medical professionals and family members, a painful and unclean 
death has been transformed into a beautiful and uplifting experience.  Ted was 
dehydrated, unable to eat without vomiting, had spent many of the preceding 
nights with urinary and faecal incontinence, he was withdrawn, and his sleep 
seemed to me to be full of dreams (Fieldnotes, 17 September 2011).   
 
In the face of this it is possible that the narrative of the ‘good death’ serves as a 
form of defence against suffering, both the apparent suffering of Ted, and the 
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discomfort of his family who had to witness his deterioration.  The ‘good death’ 
is a powerful narrative, however, it needs to be said that, to the degree that it is 
developed in this case, it was only found in a single instance of companion 
canine death encountered in this study.  Whilst other cases had elements of a 
‘good death’, Rose had caring veterinary staff, and Harris died in his own home, 
only the case of Ted, was the narrative so pronounced.   
 
7.5 Grief  
There is another aspect to the power of being together, a dark implication 
buried in this intertwining of self with other.  The dark aspect of togetherness is 
the potential to experience loss of companionship, with possible acute and 
sudden aloneness, upon separation.  Winston, a retired senior professional and 
bachelor, who, apart from his one canine companion, lived alone in a two-story 
house in a village in central Scotland, was very much a distinguished person 
about town, dignified and respected (Fieldnotes, 19 March 2011). This 
composed man was reduced to public tears following the death of Rose, when a 
fellow church member happened to ask him how his weekend had been 
(Transcript, 23 June 2011).   
 
 
Figure 14 – Winston on the road he used to walk with Rose, 5 May 2011 
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His outward composure was broken and his inner distress laid bare, a distress 
which was not only present in public but also followed him home; I really miss 
her and the house is silent without her (Winston, re: Rose).  If to be with a 
canine companion is to assuage some of the pain of existential, or actual, 
human loneliness, then what becomes of the human owner when that presence, 
to which they have become accustomed, is ripped away?  Winston had spent 
years studying at his desk with his companion canine lying beside him, talking 
to her in Greek, Spanish and Latin, discussing art and philosophy for hours, 
until the day of her euthanasia.   
 
So I no longer talk to the dog about Leonardo, I’ve just let that go just 
in case it becomes a total habit [laugh]!  Thinking ‘he’s doo-lally, there’s 
not even a dog there and he’s still talking!’ [laugh]   (Winston, re: Rose)  
 
The conversation between Winston and Rose had been curtailed abruptly, as 
had the long walks together.  During a walk with Winston, he shared how the 
landscape of the countryside was rich with many memories of things Rose had 
done, animals and people they had encountered, and stories of dangers faced 
and storms seen together (Fieldnotes, 5 May 2011).  He says the house is too 
quiet now, and he plays music to try to conceal the silence, and sometimes, 
when he is walking alone, he still speaks to her (Fieldnotes, 23 June 2011).   
 
Time had a curious relationship to grief in the worlds of the human owners.  I 
had expected that the pain of grief would strike at the moment of the death of 
the companion, as it did for Frank: 
 
Frank was like a Greek widow when Fred died [doggy whine].  Oh 
my God, he was all over the body and everything, lying in the vet’s.  
Oh, you know how they have him on the table from the injection.  
And Frank was in such a state, he was howling over the dog.    
 (Susan, re: Frank and Fred) 
 
Grief struck suddenly in this case, at the moment of separation, and with great 
force for the family of Fred.  As Wolpert observes, “separation, whether physical 
or psychological, is a basic cause of human sadness” and the origin of grief 
(Wolpert, 1999;77).  It would be expected that grief would descend at the point 
of separation.  But it also endured: 
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 So unfortunately we had to get rid of Fred.  Which was it is 
devastating.  Frank I think it probably took the two years for Frank 
to actually get his head back round to having another dog to be 
honest.  Because he was so upset at losing Fred.  
  (Susan, re; Fred and Frank)  
 
Although the acute experience of grief passed, a missing, and a poignant 
remembrance continued for multiple owners, for many years.  You know, I 
thought I would never and will never forget her, good lord, I could never forget 
her  (Winston, re: Rose).  The relationship to time is complex, and the pain of 
grief did not necessarily strike in all its fullness with the act of dying of the 
companion.  As Davis et al. (2003) also found, grief may take time to settle in.  
Sometimes, as in the case of Rose and Winston, the acute pain of grief could 
ignite several days after the actual passing of the canine, in response to a 
chance event or enquiry. Grief was not straightforward, it did not emerge as a 
pure expression of inner anguish, though this was an element, it was 
responsive to the world around the owner.  The seeing of a photograph, or the 
telling about the death, could itself evoke a powerful experience of bodily grief, 
and this included the telling of the stories of loss for this study.  Moreover, the 
sympathy, or lack thereof, of those around the owner, seemed to function to 
enable, or restrain, the manifestation of human grief.   
 
Grief could also descend, in a less acute, but more chronic form, before the 
companion had passed away, as in Margaret’s experience with her two older 
canines.  Margaret stresses that she tries not to dwell on the pain that the 
coming death of her companions will cause her, yet it remains in her thoughts 
(Transcripts and Fieldnotes, 6 October 2011), wrapped around her mind, almost 
as if this “anticipatory grief had the power to serve as a safeguard against the 
sudden experience of a death” (Fulton and Gottesman, 1980;45).   
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Grief could fall suddenly at the point of death, unexpectedly in the days or 
weeks after the loss of the companion, or settle like a cloud upon the mind 
before they died.  It was even considered that grief could occur against the 
apparent will of the owner.   
 
Rowan You know, you maybe think, ‘I’m not going to get over 
attached to this dog because I was so heartbroken the 
last time, this dog’s not going to, I’m not going to be like 
that this time’.  And there’s Fritz!  You know, for all the 
problems we had with Fritz when he first came into our 
family.  I gave him away and then I brought him back 
and look at him, you know.  You think, I call him for 
everything at times and think, ‘I won’t miss you boy 
when you go”’. 
Gregor You will [laugh].  
Rowan But yeah, I will.  I love him, and I keep saying I don’t 
know why I love you, you’ve wormed your way into my 
heart [laugh].    (Rowan and Gregor, re: Fritz) 
 
Human grief at companion canine death is a problematised grief.  The human 
owners justify the presence and degree of their grief at the loss of their 
companion canines: because they are your family (Susan).  They are more than 
just animals, they are regarded as nonhuman family members who share a 
domestic space (Charles and Davies, 2008).  Nonetheless, the depth and 
display of grief at the loss of a canine, lacks the social acceptance given to the 
death of a human family member.  It is tempting to theorise whether the death 
of a companion animal may constitute a form of ‘special death’.  Guy and 
Holloway’s study explored, by focusing on deaths related to illicit drug use, what 
they termed ‘special death’ (2007).  This is death that may be stigmatising or 
existentially problematic.  These deaths lack full social sanction and may relate 
to hidden relationships (Guy and Holloway, 2007).  They observe that in special 
death: 
 
The grief and the bereavement experience is poorly understood and the 
wider social response is one that may exacerbate, rather than 
ameliorate, the pain of those closely affected  
 (Guy and Holloway, 2007: 84).   
 
The dismissal of grief at companion canine loss may intensify the suffering.  As 
companion animals also have a marginal personhood (Arluke and Sanders, 
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1996), it is possible that grief at their loss is fraught with similar problems, such 
as a lack of, or limited, social approval.  The marginalised status of canines in 
society, and the disputed nature of canine personhood, problematizes the 
expression of grief over the death of a canine companion.  In a public display of 
grief the owner risks being regarded as over emotional, and as having an 
inappropriate level of concern for what others consider to be “just a dog” 
(Arluke, 2006:1). One owner, Amanda, did share experiences of having her loss 
disregarded, and had her suffering treated as the “disenfranchised grief” of 
those who “do not have a socially recognised right to grieve” (McCreight, 2004: 
344).  However, the more common account from the owners was to present the 
grief as justified, and to give reasons in defence of why it was appropriate.  This 
included stressing that the companion had been with the owner for many years, 
or that they were valued as a member of the family, or as a friend.  
 
Because Brandy was my friend.  Brandy was my best friend and to 
lose her.  I’ve really, I did suffer.   (Matthew, re: Brandy) 
 
In essence this is a form of face work (Goffman, 1955), and information control, 
particularly ‘covering’, to minimise the impact of the potentially discrediting 
behaviour (Goffman, 1968b:125). Yet co-existing with this, there is a movement 
carried by the increasing use and availability of social media, in which the grief 
of companion animal loss is not only recognised, but facilities exist by which 
canine companions may be remembered, even immortalised. Pet cremation 
services and cemeteries, such as Elysian Fields in Scotland, taxidermy, having 
a pet’s ashes turned into a diamond and worn, In Memorial pages for pets on 
Facebook, or on specialist sites, these are just some of the options available for 
the grieving owner.  For the more private mourning, the pet may be buried in the 
garden, as Amanda and family did, and photographs and memorabilia may be 
displayed in the homes, a practice that was occasionally found with the families 
in this study.  Also, The Blue Cross, provide a helpline and counselling for those 
affected by companion animal bereavement.  The existence of all of these 
practices and services, suggest an increasing place being given to the grief of 
companion animal owners, and that there may be an increasing social 
acceptance of human grief at the loss of nonhuman companionship.   
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Sometimes the pain, fear and loss would seem to be too much, and the death of 
the companion would be, permanently or for a time, denied.   
 
D’you know when my dog died I took a week off work.  I couldn’t go 
and work.  I couldn’t concentrate.  I cried and the night that I buried 
Brandy I must have been dreaming or I’ve heard a dog barking, I 
woke up and I said.  ‘Brandy’s not dead, she’s not dead’.   
 (Matthew, re: Brandy) 
 
These sentiments begin to touch on interplays between companion canine loss 
and human wellbeing, aspects that are explored in Chapter 9.  On a personal 
note, my own canine companion, Zak, passed away the week I was due to 
commence writing this chapter.  It took over two months for me to acquire 
sufficient distance to begin to write up others experience of companion canine 
loss.  I was particularly taken aback by how physical, how expressed by the 
body, the response to loss was.   
 
Feel a strange tired inside, at times very cold, but warm heaters and 
socks don’t help.  Feel like I have flu, but no temperature.  Very 
dark bags under my eyes.  Lost 6 lbs in 2 days.  Spots and eye 
ulcers.   
 (Fieldnotes, Friday 20 September 2013, a week after Zak’s death) 
 
With the benefit of hindsight I would have probed more for experiences of 
canine companion loss which had a somatic component, and enquired whether 
the owners considered that they may be connected to the loss.   
 
Writing this chapter so close to a bereavement has been something of a double 
edged analytic sword. On the one hand, it has given me vivid, imminent, 
personal insight into the described experience of the humans in this study.  On 
the other hand, my emotions are complex.  At times it takes effort to contain 
them, particularly when provoked by working with the descriptions of the grief of 
other dog owners.  Many of whose deceased canine companions were also 
dogs known to me, through the process of this research, and more than a 
couple of these canine participants I have been particularly fond of.  One of 
these canines I felt fondness for was Ted, I also shared with Ted’s owner a 
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curious experience, that of dreaming, vividly almost tangibly, about my 
deceased companion, shortly after their death.     
 
I dreamt Ted yes, the other night.  It was funny, it was because 
[pause] I dreamt that Ted was with us in the house.  And he was 
actually here, he was looking great, he was actually looking.  He 
wasn’t as heavy as he was before, and his coat was really shiny 
and looking really, really good.  And he had come back because 
Frank hadn't coped with him going.  And until he thought that Frank 
had got it into his head that it was the right thing to do, he was 
going to be there.  So he was there in my dream and then of course 
I woke up and I had gone to the toilet and came back, and then as 
soon as I got back to bed, I remembered what I was dreaming 
about and d'you know, there was an overwhelming sadness, it was 
like losing him [laugh] all over again.  But actually it was, and it was 
really quite comforting because he was looking beautiful [laugh]. 
 [To bird: yes he was] 
Funny because Frank says, he says ‘he probably [voice trails 
away]’.  He actually thinks that was true, he says ‘it probably [voice 
trails away]’.  He says ‘what makes you think he wasn’t there?’.  I 
says, ‘well maybe you're right actually’.  Because he was always a 
very intuitive dog. [Bird flying sound] 
He was one of these dogs, if you were upset he would always come 
over to you [laugh].  Yeah we've spoke about that before, about 
dogs comforting people and things like that, they definitely do. 
 (Susan, re: Ted) 
 
For Susan and Frank the relationship with Ted, goes on, and he continues to 
care for his human family members, from beyond the grave.  To Hepworth’s 
(2000) eyes, the relationship with the deceased can continue after death.  This 
directly contradicts Mamo, who considers that “death embodies a permanent 
loss of personhood” (Mamo, 2000;14).  The data supports, and I would agree 
with, Hepworth (2000).  The sense of rewarding togetherness between owner 
and their canine companion found in this study, is reminiscent of his discussion 
of belonging and loneliness (Hepworth, 2000).  He conceived of loneliness, 
drawing on Wood (1981), not as a lack of physical beings to relate to, but rather 
as “failed intersubjectivity” (Hepworth, 2000:65).  Hepworth goes on to illustrate 
how successful intersubjectivity can be maintained with a disembodied 
personhood, upon the death of a human, and also with objects (Hepworth, 
2000).   
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 Although animals are not addressed, I do not consider it to be stretching his 
point, that if humans can have fulfilling intersubjective relations with a ghost or 
an object (Hepworth, 2000), that they can also have them with a living member 
of another species.  In this way the companion animals could be understood as 
alleviating some of the existential loneliness of being human (Laing, 1959).   
 
7.6 Vanishing and the Afterlife  
Not all the canine companions were lost through death, four simply 
disappeared.  In canine disappearance, not knowing emerged as a form of 
suffering, and was particularly acute.  The owner is faced with a sense of having 
to let go, to release the hope that the companion may be alive, and to actively 
embrace the pain of grief.  
 
We were looking everywhere, where we wouldn’t thought.  And I 
spoke to the bin men.  ‘Have you seen?’.  ‘No, we’re asking where 
he was, where’s Turner, we don’t see him?.  And he must have 
went away somewhere and died, but as I said, we never found him.  
  (Matthew, re: Turner) 
 
Matthew searched for Turner, and enlisted the help of others, and though 
ambiguity remained, he determined that his companion was dead, and would 
not return. However, this was not always the case, sometimes an owner, or 
other family members, would resist the disappearance. They would not believe 
that the dog was dead, and would remain convinced that it was still alive, or had 
been given away in some nefarious fashion.   
 
Don’t know whether he’s wet the floor or whatever he’s done, but I 
didn’t believe that dog went into a rabbit’s hole.  But Fraser tried to 
convince us that he’d got the fire brigade out, the man with the 
sounding equipment.  It just didn’t sit right with me, and other 
people who heard the story said to me, ‘well so what d’you think?’.  
I said, ‘I’m keeping my piece.’  I says, ‘I know what I think’.  And 
they says ‘ well, we’ll tell you what we think, we think she’s got rid of 
the dog’.   (Matthew, re: son’s dog) 
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 The ‘good owner’ cares for their dog, and is expected to keep them safe, to be 
responsible for them and to know their whereabouts, because to abandon a 
canine companion is to invite social censure (Irvine, 2000). The owners of 
vanished canines composed multiple possible explanations of what may have 
happened to their companions, as if to provide an explanation would somehow 
transform the nonsensical vanishing, back into a more manageable, meaningful 
event.  There must be a story, and it must be coherent, “one of our most 
powerful forms for expressing suffering and experiences related to suffering is 
the narrative” (Seale:1997:49).  The absence of definitive information in the 
case of canine vanishing problematises, possibly even critically, the narrative of 
human and companion canine togetherness.   
 
Canine vanishing appears to be an acutely painful experience for the owners, 
one they did not wish to experience alone.  Margaret was not alone when she 
went out to look for Mitch, the two workings dogs and her remaining canine 
companion, went with her.   
 
Margaret believes that had she been searching alone, the pain would have 
been amplified.  There is, what seems to be, an almost intolerable ambiguity in 
losing the companion through sudden disappearance, rather than through 
death.  This professional and usually composed woman wept in my arms, I held 
her, and I also held her last remaining canine companion, who was soon to be 
put to sleep.  As Wolpert observes, the:  
 
Loss or disappearance of someone to whom one is attached, whether 
parent, lover or friend, provokes a powerful urge to find that person.  The 
failure to do so results in distress and pining.  In the case of death, … 
there is still an urge to find that person.  The fruitless search results in 
the pain of grief which, with depression, is probably the most powerful 
psychological pain in human experience.  (Wolpert, 2001:93)  
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Figure 15 – Mitch vanished suddenly, Mitch 29 March 2011 
 
Margaret searched for Mitch, day after day, ranging across the countryside, for 
weeks after his disappearance, to no avail.   
 
So I don't, it's not, for me it's not an option now and the door is 
closed on it because I think if you don't, it would just, it would just 
destroy you.  You'd be going out looking every single day and, you 
know, for the rest of [words trail off].  And how long d'you do that 
for?  Especially when you've got other animals as well, you know, 
it's not, and that was the other thing, I was very fortunate cause I 
thought every time I went out I took them [the three other canines] 
with me cause I thought if there's something around they will get it.  
  (Margaret, re: Mitch)  
 
Ultimately Margaret forced herself to let go of the hope that Mitch might be 
alive, either living wild or having been taken in by another person (Fieldnotes, 
24 August 2012).  There is a sense that she relinquished the object of her 
search in order to preserve her own intrapsychic wellbeing; also the 
requirement to be ‘a good owner’ is present yet again, and presses upon 
Margaret, even in a state of suffering, to let the hope of finding Mitch go, in 
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order to be able to be there, to be present and well, so that she can tend to her 
other animals.   
 
But hey, you don’t know, and I think for me that’s the worst part, is 
the never knowing.  Because you don’t have anything feasible, not 
feasible, nothing tangible, as in a body for want of a better world.  
To be able to say, ‘Well that’s it’.  And you can, you know, bury him 
or cremate him, or whatever if its that you want to do.  I don’t have 
that, so you’ve just got to hope that wherever he is he’s in a better 
place.     (Margaret, re: Mitch)   
 
Without a body, Mitch’s death remains uncertain, the owner’s suffering has no 
object to attach to, there is a lack of story and a lack of meaningful explanation.  
Mitch has died in the wrong place, and not at the right time, his vanishing is 
outwith the boundaries of appropriate death, this itself is a subtle form suffering. 
As Convey et al. (2008) found, in the grief of the farming families whose barns 
and fields fell unnaturally silent after the culls of the foot and mouth disease 
epidemic.  Pain is compounded if the animal dies in the wrong place and in the 
wrong way, outwith the normative boundaries of the human and companion 
canine world.   
 
The question, ‘where are they now?’ haunts the owners of the vanished 
companion canine.  In conversation the owners offer multiple possible 
explanations, one after the other, as if they are being driven to attempt to 
salvage some sense from the senseless.  Margaret wonders, as occasionally 
did some of the other owners of lost or deceased canines, whether her 
companion is in a better place.  This study found, with Davis et al., (2003), that 
the religious background and experience of the human did not appear to be an 
indicator of the degree or duration of grief.  There were owners who were 
deeply involved in the religious life of their community, and those with only a 
nominal connection to the religion of their family, who both experienced 
profound loss.   
 
There were differing views of what becomes of the companion’s personhood 
after death.  Olga was unsure, and thought that afterlife was like prelife, a state 
so strange that it cannot be recalled (Transcript, 9 March 2012).  Rowan relied 
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upon the teachings of her church and denied to the companions any continuity 
of personhood, such as a human would be expected to experience.   
 
Well, they say a dog doesn't have a soul so if it doesn't have a soul 
I think a dog just dies and that's it. I think that's the end for a dog.  
Unless you believe in reincarnation, which I don't.   (Rowan)  
 
Most of the humans were much less definitive than Rowan, they were unsure 
what would become of their companion’s being and soul, but generally the 
owners did believe in the continuity of companion canine personhood after 
death.   
Yeah, but I think, you know. They definitely go somewhere else, 
you know.  I'd like to hope that they go to a nicer place as humans 
do, and I'm sure that they do. It's not something that I dwell too 
much on, but that's a lot to do with my own personality, I like to live 
in the now and then, you know, because I don't think you can really 
legislate for what's going to happen in the future.  (Margaret) 
 
Margaret also understood her dying companion as continuing through the 
bloodline of her other living dogs, and considered that this eased the suffering 
of her grief (Transcript, 30 June 2011).  To her, if their children remain, they are 
not completely gone.  This idea of the continuance, of being with, albeit in 
another form, either in the blood and personality of the descendants, or as the 
souls in heaven, was the general assumption.   
 
Mmm, I like to think that they go where we go. Because I really 
would like to think that Fred is with my mum, because those two 
were inseparable before [laugh].  And he would still be sitting there 
trying to get her toast [laugh] cuddled in. She was terrible, she used 
to sit, she would make toast for herself in the morning, a slice of 
toast for herself, but she would also put a second slice of toast on. 
   (Susan) 
 
Human and companion canine society is assumed to continue, the being with, 
may change form, but it does not end.   
 
Schaefer (2012) points out, the bulk of studies considering animals and 
religious life, argue from the viewpoint of understanding animals against the 
backdrop of human ethical and religious life; rather than by looking at the 
religious experience of animals themselves.  The companion canines in this 
~ 149 ~ 
 
study were regarded as having an ethical sense, they were considered to be 
able to discern human natures and human motivations, And dogs know whose 
good for them (Winston). The companions were also regarded as not only 
understanding death, contrary to what Mead (1934) and Elias (1985) would 
claim, but they were, on occasion, attributed with a superior, almost 
supernatural, awareness of the suffering of others, and a presentience of death.   
 
Copper lay right down beside her.  The other dog that we still had at 
the time.  Probably lay sort of in between her paws and Splodge, 
the little black and white cat, lay on top of her.  So they were just 
totally were all round her.  They would all lie together, but not like 
that.  So Yeh, the animals seemed to realise that there was 
something terribly wrong, and it was as if they were saying goodbye 
to her.   (Amanda, re: Sheba) 
 
To know pain, loneliness and grief, were regarded as not purely human 
experiences, but as forms of suffering that both human and canine may share.    
It does need to be said, however, that this research has intentionally focused on 
sites of investigation where there is likely to be a depth of bonding between the 
human and the canine. How far such an understanding of canine 
consciousness and ability to know pain is reflected in the wider human society 
cannot be answered by this research.  Nonetheless it could be argued, given 
the depth of attention and involvement, of the human owners encountered here, 
in the lives, bodies and ways of their canine companions, that if canines do 
suffer, as humans do, then these owners would be in a position to perceive it.   
 
Summary 
The aim of the first research question was to explore illness and suffering in 
human and canine relations.  This chapter has addressed suffering, with regard 
to physical pain, born of injury or illness, and nonphysical forms of pain, which 
are made possible by the companions in this context having a self. The 
companion canines are understood as being capable of experiencing physical 
pain, in a manner equivalent to that of their human owners.  Indeed, minimising 
companion canine pain is held as a moral imperative, bound up with the identity 
of being a ‘good owner’. However, the existence of companion canine pain, and 
therefore the owner’s ability to alleviate it, is problematised by the voicelessness 
~ 150 ~ 
 
of the companions, who cannot express their suffering in human words.  Yet the 
canines can express pain through bodily actions and vocalisations, and they 
were regarded as being able to do this in a meaningful, and sometimes 
opportunistic, way.   
 
Viewed as minded social actors, the companions were also regarded as subject 
to non-physical forms of suffering, such as phobia and loneliness.  A mutual 
vulnerability to loneliness, and desire for companionship, appears to be a 
powerful point of connection between the humans and the canines.  Being 
together emerged as both a practice and as an ideal, that moulded the human-
canine relations.  It offered comfort for the human owners in distress, possibly, 
once again due to canine voicelessness, even a superior solace to that found 
from purely human society.  This being together of human and canine, was, in 
an unexpected finding of the study, found to take on a particular form, of 
merging and blurring of roles and identity, in an environment of domestic 
violence.  Being together also emerged as a moral imperative of being a good 
owner, shaping the relationship with a dying canine.  It was seen as unfitting for 
a companion canine to die alone, and a good owner would endeavour to be with 
their suffering canine, even in the face of their own distress.  In a single case 
the ideal and narrative of a ‘good death’, was used to transform suffering and 
physical deterioration into a beautific death.   
 
Grief brought with it a silence, and an abrupt change to the experience of 
activities and pastimes that the human and canine had shared.  What they had 
always done together, was suddenly done without the companion.  Grief had a 
complex relationship to time, it could settle upon the human owner, in a slow 
and insidious way, before their companion had died.  Grief could also strike 
abruptly, and with violence, at the moment of companion canine death.  
Alternatively it may take hours to seep into consciousness, or be triggered days 
after the loss of the companion, by a chance event, encounter, or seeing of a 
photograph.   
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 In circumstances where the companion has vanished, the sustaining narrative 
of human and canine togetherness is seriously disrupted.  It becomes very 
difficult for the human owners to maintain a meaningful coherence. This 
disruption to the underpinning framework of meaning upon which the human  
and canine lives are interwoven, is a source of profound suffering for the 
owners.  Combined with this is the expectation, coming from the construct of the 
‘good owner’, that the humans should know where and what has become of the 
companion for whom they are responsible. In most cases togetherness, in some 
form, was understood to transcend death, either in the ongoing companionship 
of the canines with deceased family members in heaven, the enduring 
watchfulness of the deceased canines over the living, or by the act of continuing 
the interaction with the passed companion, by still taking the walks and even, 
sometimes, by still having the conversations. These efforts to continue 
togetherness bring this work to its next chapter, and turn attention to the second 
research question. Which asks what are the meanings surrounding the death 
and dying of a companion canine to their owner, and those in the animal’s 
immediate society? 
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Chapter 8  ~  Interpretations of Death and Dying  
 
During the time spent with the families it became clear that there was a 
consciousness of “the stark inevitability of death” (Blaikie, 1999:196), and 
references to this awareness were peppered throughout the data gathering 
experience. This was a particularly sensitive area of questioning, it was 
confessed the way a person would confess a secret, and a painful secret at 
that.  This awareness was pervasive and potent, in all the families, and it 
coloured the ongoing interactions between human and canine, even despite the 
best efforts of some of the humans to prevent it from doing so.  In short, death 
was not a surprise to the owners, at least in the sense of death not being a 
consciously denied phenomenon.  No one expected their companion canine to 
live with them forever, but this awareness of the inevitability of death did not 
mean that companion canine dying was without pain or complexity, quite the 
reverse. The passing of a companion was a complex and a subtle 
phenomenon, yet it was not a wholly unique happening to each family.  While 
the suffering itself was subjective and experienced as particular, there were 
features of the phenomenon of companion canine dying that were consistent 
across the research sites, and it became evident that there where 
characteristics of a process that could be charted.   
 
8.1 Gradual and Sudden Death 
Companion canine dying emerged as a negotiated process, which could be 
gradual or sudden, depending on the nature of the precipitating event, whether 
dying was the result of gradual aging with increasing infirmity, or a sudden 
illness or injury.  Gradual dying was the more prevalent, with 25 of the 38 
canines who died during, or prior to, the study experiencing a gradual demise.   
 
Fred, oh gosh, he was, his back end and everything was going, 
that’s why we ended up.  He had cancer and it had started.  And he 
also had stomach problems, and things like that, and then of course 
when they talked about giving him chemotherapy, but the vet 
actually says ‘We’ve got his stomach under control, that’s going to 
upset his stomach’ and plus he had arthritis.  Which is why he was 
on Rennies for his stomach [laugh]  And we went ‘no, this is just 
silly, that’s just not fair on the dog at all’.   (Susan, re: Fred) 
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There is a sense of there being a compound effect in the case of gradual dying, 
as if the difficulties are being stacked higher and higher against life, until the 
health of the canine, and perhaps the resolve of the human to continue efforts 
to support the failing life, collapse.  Gradual decline can continue for days, 
weeks or even many months, five being the longest process of gradual decline 
encountered in this study.  The exception is, Sally, who despite having been 
understood as in the process of dying for over 8 months, remains alive at the 
time of writing.  Sometimes veterinary intervention can seem to stall the 
process of decline, at least temporarily. This ‘active’ process of increasing 
infirmity then being suspended, held at bay, whilst a time of apparent normalcy 
returns.   The human awareness that the companion has touched the process 
of dying, even if to withdraw from it into a renewed, if temporary, state of 
normalcy, is never lost.   
 
Matthew  And then she began to labour again, not feeling herself, 
not wanting to get up and out, so I said ‘there's 
something wrong with her’ so I took her down to the vet, 
and the vet says ‘well, we need to take her in to 
investigate’. So they took her in and Stacie phoned me 
up at my work and says ‘’Brandy’s got cancer...’ 
MD Oh gosh. 
Matthew ‘He’s found five different tumours’. 
MD Five? 
Matthew Five tumours.  He says ‘but what's happened is they're 
all in a cluster, but what he’s going to do is move them 
to different areas of her body and it’ll extend her life.’ 
MD Where were they? 
Matthew They were all round about the tummy area. 
MD Right, all round the tummy. 
Matthew So what he did. I don't know where he moved them all 
to, but he moved them.  I don't know if at any point he 
took any out, we don't know that, but he says that’ll 
extend her life a little bit. So two and a half year Brandy 
was lovely and happy, we watched her, we cared for 
her, we loved her. (Matthew, re: Brandy) 
 
In gradual death, a state of watchfulness ensues.  There is ongoing observation 
by the humans, with marked attention to changes in wellbeing. These changes 
can be small, such as slight differences in gait, or frequency of drinking water, 
or quite subtle changes in behaviour.   
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We just put it down to old age; he was slower, he couldn’t get up on 
the furniture like he did and what not, however, he wouldn’t settle 
one night and we phoned the vet and took him down early in the 
morning and the results of the scan that they’d given him were that 
he had a massive tumour on his liver.   (Amanda, re: Sam)  
 
This is suggestive of considerable, and prolonged, attention by the humans 
which is focused on the minutiae of the companion’s day to day activities, and 
state of being, a feature I shall return to later, in Chapter 9. There is also 
ongoing discussion and negotiation, with family, friends and professionals, 
throughout the process of gradual demise.  I would suggest that it may be a 
very different experience, qualitatively, than that of sudden death.  My sense 
was that the watching and waiting during the process of decline was a potent 
source of tension and distress to the owners, requiring more than a little 
courage to endure.   
 
At station waiting for train.  Margaret cried on tape, unexpected for 
such an independent and composed woman.  Have agreed me to 
go back in a couple of weeks … Saw Mitch’s growth, it is the size 
of a small lime, did not seem red or leaky.  I felt that Margaret’s 
willingness to take things as they may come was quite courageous 
and wanted to say so.  But didn’t, especially as tape was on – an 
inhibiting effect, can you compliment a participant?   
 (Fieldnotes, Tuesday 10 May 1.55 pm)  
 
Margaret’s resolve had moved me, and in retrospect I wish I had said so, as she 
had impressed me deeply.  Perhaps Ernest Becker is correct that "we admire 
most the courage to face death" (1973:11). This quality of courage was 
displayed by other human family members, but in the case of Mitch, given his 
advanced age and visible, terminal, cancer, it was particularly vivid.   
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Figure 16 – Mitch, 19 March 2012 
 
The physical evidence, and therefore the awareness, of Mitch’s dying was 
unavoidable in the day-to-day interaction.  It could not be pressed to the back of 
consciousness. “The process of dying is therefore a time of particularly pressing 
anxieties as the customary ‘forgetting’ of the inevitability of death becomes 
increasingly difficult to maintain” (Seale, 1995b:598).  The poignancy and depth 
of emotion that awareness of Mitch’s dying evoked broke through Margaret’s 
composure, and threatened mine as well.  I would feel tired after being with 
them, and wonder if I had just been with him for the last time (Fieldnotes, 10 
May 2011 and 30 June 2011).  The tangible proof of his mortality that the 
tumour presented made it impossible to repress the awareness of his dying, 
which, as Becker (1973) emphasised, is so vital for day-to-day functioning in the 
world.  To be stripped of our defences, our ability to repress the awareness of 
death, is to risk profound, and ultimately irreconcilable, tension (Becker, 1973).  
Because "the great boon of repression is that it makes it possible to live 
decisively in an overwhelmingly miraculous and incomprehensible world, a 
world so full of beauty, majesty, and terror” (Becker, 1973:50).  
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 There was simply no way to pretend that Mitch was not going to die, indeed, 
that he was already dying. Nevertheless, Margaret maintained a focus on the 
everyday management of Mitch’s sleeping, eating and drinking, in an almost 
ritualistic fashion.  It was as if this attention to the everyday process and needs, 
of life and living, would by some act of “sympathetic magic” (Goffman, cited in 
Manning 1992:141), ward off his inevitable dying.    
 
Witnessing the gradual death of a canine was disturbing, not only in the sense 
that the owner was faced with the inevitability of losing their companion, but 
also because they were forced to encounter a reminder of their own mortality, 
and their own fragility.  We are creatures, both animal in our physicality and 
symbolic as members of culture, but there is a tension here, in our deepest 
being.  "The essence of man [sic] is really his paradoxical nature, the fact that 
he is half animal and half symbolic" (Becker, 1973:26, italics in the original).  
Humans strive to transcend their animal existence, and society provides them 
with hero systems, ways to symbolically overcome their state, ways to deny 
death.  But how complete can these systems of forgetting ever be?  When our 
canine companion dies, what dark shadow of the Real, in a Lacanian sense of 
“the unknown that exists at the limit of this socio-symbolic universe” (Homer, 
2005:81), passes over our consciousness?  Because to be human is to be 
overwhelmed with the awesomeness and dangerousness of existence (Becker, 
1973), so culture gives the human animal ways to deal with this terror of being.   
Ways to repress the rawness of creation, and human vulnerability within it, so 
we are not frozen in terror, paralysed in a schizoid state.  Whilst the insane, with 
weak or limited powers of repression, are overwhelmed with the reality of their 
plight, with the flood of reality (Becker, 1973).  In this sense insanity is a kind of 
truth, in that the insane lack the cultural inoculation against reality and the 
inevitability of death, therefore reminders of death can be deeply disturbing, to 
the walls we have built around our madness.  
 
This gradual diffuse process over time is a very different picture from that of 
sudden death, which is focused temporally around a single event.  In 13 cases 
the families experienced a sudden loss of their companion. This is not to 
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suggest that canine passed away very rapidly, though this was often the case, it 
is more that the human family members experienced, described and 
understood, the loss of the companion as sudden.   
 
Sudden death, rather than emerging from an ongoing process of living and 
coping, appears like an intrusion, a break or rupture in the fabric of everyday life 
and experience of human and canine. There may be physical collapse, 
disappearance, or violent assault.  The pattern of everyday expectations is torn, 
the dog is suddenly no longer there (Alison, re: Mitch), the garden where it 
should be is inexplicably empty (Helen, re: Morgan), or they fall, never to rise, 
on the hearth rug (Nathaniel, re: Harris).  
 
 
Figure 17 - Bashan on the hearth rug where Harris died, 17 December 2011  
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This abrupt intrusion of the unexpected can be seen in the case of the German 
Shepherd Yara.   
 
And I mean John Quinn our vet was absolutely gobsmacked 
because he had just checked her over. However, we think she had 
had an aneurism and of course he couldn't detect that and she bled 
to death very very quickly.  One minute she was scrounging a crisp 
off of Kaitlin and next minute she was dead. That was very very 
sudden quite and shocking, I was devastated. So there was no dog 
in the house.    (Amanda, re: Yara) 
 
While witnessing the gradual death a canine companion can be a disturbing 
reminder of others, and our own, mortality and creatureliness, the unexpected 
nature of sudden death also presents an additional difficulty.  That is its assault 
on meaning.  The dying body moves beyond that which can be subject to care 
or cure, that upon which we can act, because “in leaving the field circumscribed 
by the possibilities of treatment, it enters a region of meaninglessness” (de 
Certeau, 1988:190).  The dying suddenly move out with the realm in which a 
subject can act, and can be acted upon.  They unexpectedly cease to function 
within the interactional frame that gives form and meaning to our worlds.  They 
are “removed from common experience and thus arriving at the limit of scientific 
power and beyond the familiar practices, death is an elsewhere” (de Certeau, 
1988:192).  The companion abruptly enters an elsewhere which, in a Lacanian 
sense, cannot be embraced in the symbolic and cannot be absorbed by the 
imaginary.  They are “a subject that does not work” or “an object that no longer 
even makes itself available to be worked on by others” (de Certeau, 1988:192), 
causing us to stumble in our daily dance of life and living.   
 
This fracturing of the anticipated, the expected, draws our attention to the 
underpinning framework of meaning upon which life is sustained, and it draws 
attention to its fragility.  As Lacan himself attempted to get us to do, sudden 
death forces the human “to confront the limits of meaning and understanding 
and to acknowledge the profoundly disturbing prospect that behind all meaning 
lies non-meaning, and behind all sense lies nonsense” (Homer, 2005:12).  
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It is not only the explicit sense of the meaning, but also the pervasive, and 
constant, reliance on the underpinning framework of the meaningful order, that 
is suddenly illuminated by a cold light of awareness. The power of the 
underpinning framework of meaning to make the world solid, is strong because 
it is hidden in the shadows, the workings of the underpinning social framework 
are dim to us and we do not dwell on them consciously (Berger and Luckman, 
1967). So we do not see, as we move through everyday life, the thin ice of 
taken-for-granted assumptions beneath our feet, upon which all social action 
and reaction relies. As Timmermans tells us, “sudden, unexpected deaths 
threaten the social order because they suggest unexplainable randomness” 
(2005:995).   Our very existence as sane and social beings is dependent upon 
there being order and meaning.  Randomness cannot be endured, "society itself 
is a codified hero system ... a defiant creation of meaning" (Becker, 1973:11); 
defiant because the social order is created to overcome the randomness of 
unassimilated reality, in the face of death, and terror (Becker, 1973).   
 
In extremely sudden, instantaneous, death, the process of negotiation is 
truncated, but it continues in the narratives which are woven around the loss of 
the companion.  These narratives embody “the nature of the sense-making 
task” (Owens et al., 2008:237), and meaning continues to be forged even in the 
face of sudden “biographical disintegration” (Owens et al., 2008:237). 
 
Uh huh a wee bit, she was getting breathless and I suppose just the 
way we would get when we get old and our heart's starting to give 
in, but you don't think the dog's going to go and that's the thing, the 
vet didn't expect her to go, he thought she would last for a wee 
while, but she actually died. So we came home early and she died 
on the Sunday night.  (Rowan, re: Kyra)  
 
The telling of the story itself appears as a process of meaning creation, an 
attempt to bring order and coherence to the threatening randomness of the 
sudden death.  In this sense it could be argued that the narratives have not only 
the power to share and communicate experience, but that they also contain the 
possibility of transforming it.   
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Rowan They both died at, she had a heart murmur and he had 
a heart murmur. 
Gregor No it was her insides that come out. 
Rowan Yes but she had had a heart murmur for a number of 
years but she wasn’t on any medication, but then when 
I think about it myself and I think ‘well that’s how the 
dog felt because he was breathless’. 
MD Cause you’ve got a murmur? 
Rowan Yes, uh huh, so obviously, and he was on heart 
medication and he was on water tablets.  The same as 
humans get, he was on Furosemide and Ramipril.  So 
that’s our little family of dogs that we've had over the 
years. (Gregor and Rowan, re: Shelby) 
 
This finding, that the narratives of dying are actively related to raw experience, 
in the sense of meaning creation, and sometimes transformation, supports 
Taylor’s (2010) findings with regard to the dying narratives constructed by 
hospice nurses.  Telling the story not only shares the experience, giving the 
listener a window into the speaker’s world, more than this:  
 
… stories allow people to be understood as subjective beings, whose 
objective and subjective experiences are meaningful in terms of the 
context in which they find themselves. Raised awareness that comes 
through storytelling can be communicated not only to the teller in the act of 
the telling, but also to other people as they listen to, or read these 
accounts.  The stories take on meaning as they resonate within the teller 
and also with another person’s experience.  The meaning that is 
generated then becomes a source of possibilities for future action.  
 (Taylor, 2010:106) 
 
Taylor is however discussing narrative in relation to human being, this thesis will 
now turn to addressing the question of narratives in relation to human and 
companion canine relations.   
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8.2 Narratives of Arrival and Departure  
In every family there were highly developed acquisition narratives.  These 
narratives tell the story of how the companion animal arrived, and came to be 
embraced, as part of the family.  They tell the stories of their origins, and the 
experience of other family members, both human and nonhuman, with regard to 
the arrival of the companion.  These narratives also seemed to help situate the 
companion in the family, clothe them with the beginnings of a personality, a 
history and biography within the family context.  In this sense the acquisition 
narrative is an imputing of biography, through the gifting of a history.  This fits 
with Irvine’s (2004a; 2004b) theorisation on the structure of nonhuman 
selfhood, as having four requirements for a self, the final of which is self-history.     
 
Even beyond this the narratives themselves seemed to form part of what it was 
to be family, in the sense of family as an activity, a doing (Finch, 2007), or a 
practice (Morgan, 1996). The acquisition narratives served to embed the 
nonhumans within that active construction of family. This phenomenon of 
situating narratives is echoed in the stories of the dying canine companions 
encountered in this study.  There is a story of how the companion came to be 
within the family, and a corresponding story of how they left it.  These narratives 
of the companions departure were also highly developed, and sometimes there 
was the explicit sense of listening to an oft told tale and “many of the stories 
seemed well-rehearsed” (Owens et al., 2008).   
 
Yet despite being a practiced re-telling, the story was still being co-constructed 
and adjusted to the particularities of each audience during each telling (Holstein 
and Gubrium, 1997), and this includes the story being refined during the 
process of research questioning and interview (Owens et al., 2008; Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003).  Similar to the parents in Owens et al.’s, study, the owners seem 
to “use the interview to perform a complex reconstructive task, striving to piece 
together … shattered biographies and repair damage to their moral identities” 
(Owens et al., 2008:237).   
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 Winston  So she said 'the kindest thing would be if'. And she 
explained everything to me, so I said 'right, we'll just 
need to do that then'. So she said 'do you want to stay?' 
I said 'oh I want to stay' and you know, Rose was there 
with her head on my lap and everything, and they just 
prepared her. The one came through and she held 
Rose, she didn't need to hold her because Rose 
couldn't move, but she held her and I was holding her 
and the vet went off and she got whatever she had and 
then she injected her, and she told me that, you know, 
she'd go into a deep sleep and very shortly that'll be 
her. And they left me with her and she said 'take as 
long as you like', so I think I stayed for about an hour 
[laugh] until I said to Rose 'I need to go, this is getting 
ridiculous [laugh] if I don't go now'.    
MD  Did you speak to her?    
Winston  I did oh yes, I did [laugh] I spoke to her quite a lot 
during that, I didn't just sit, we spoke [laugh] because 
Rose and I, well I talked to her often, I mean, she was a 
great.  She never argued back!  (Winston, re: Rose)  
 
 
Winston spoke with Rose as he always did, suggesting her persona, her 
person, remained intact, even whilst she was dying.  The authority of the vet 
reinforces the decision to have the companion put to sleep, and they are 
together, she is not alone, but with each other in a kindly and meaningful way.  
Kindness and care are focal issues in this telling.   
 
As with the earlier encountered acquisition narratives there were features that 
were repeated across multiple death and departure narratives.   Three features 
in particular stood out in the departure narratives, these being: a concern with 
suffering, an emphasis on ‘putting the dog first’, and the enactment of a moral 
project through the narrative, in order to construct, and defend, a positive moral 
identity for the owner and the family.  These were not arbitrary tellings without 
thought or intent, quite the reverse, for the owner, like the deceased parents in 
Owens et al.’s study, “it is clear that their stories are highly sophisticated and 
selective reconstructions, designed to serve strategic purposes both within the 
research interview and beyond” (Owens et al., 2008:241).    
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In the departure narratives there is an acute concern with suffering, and an 
emphasis on the moral purity of the owner, particularly in the sense of 
apparently prioritising the dog’s wellbeing over the wants and needs of the 
owner.  All three of these features can be seen in the narrative for Mitch.   
 
I don’t want him to suffer, I’d rather put him down actually, not that 
that maybe the nicest thing but it’d be the kindest thing for him… I  
don’t want him to suffer and he won’t suffer em you know.  I think I 
am very I am quite matter of fact about things like that.  I would 
not see him suffer or keep him living any longer.  I don’t, I don’t 
agree with that much as much as he is a part of my life, but I but I 
wouldn’t keep him alive just for me.  (Margaret, re: Mitch)  
 
This ‘putting the dog first’, was implicated in the process of deciding to choose 
euthanasia, presented as a selfless choice, a hard and painful decision made at 
personal cost and in the best interests of the companion.   
 
We said ‘no it’s time, we’ve got to do it for him’, that’s what I says to 
Frank.  We would only be holding onto him for us and it wasn’t fair 
on him’.   (Susan, re: Ted) 
 
Frank had been weeping over the dog, crying inconsolably; wanting to do 
anything to keep him alive.   
  
He would have wanted to keep him as long as possible.  And it was 
the dog is really in pain.  He is not a happy dog.  (Susan, re: Ted) 
 
However, there is a tension here, in the sense that the dog’s explicit wishes are 
not known, and can only be inferred. To Gergen (1999) all consciousness is 
inferred, and in a symbolic interactionist understanding the self, and its 
preferences, are born in the space, in the interaction, between agents (Mead, 
1934).   
 
Nonetheless in, at least some, intra-species communication, it is assumed that 
wants and preferences can be made known to another being.  For humans 
there is shared language and gesture to communicate even subtle and complex 
wants.  Zoologically it is also reasonable to consider that within a particular 
species there are ways for one individual to make its desires known to another; 
from the ‘beware of me’ rattle of the snake, to the ‘feed me’ chirps of the chick.  
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But to assume complex inter-species communication of a desire to no longer 
experience bodily discomfort and a preference for death, is a complex matter, 
fraught with difficulty. Even the question of whether a canine can understand 
the state of death is unclear. To owners such as Margaret, her dogs do 
understand. I think he must have known he was dying  (Margaret, re: Mitch). 
 
Yet in terms of a scientific understanding of canine awareness, this is highly 
controversial (Arluke and Sanders, 1996; Irvine, 2004). Being unable to 
appreciate the nature of death is considered a marker that sets humans apart, 
as distinct in the nature of their consciousness, from nonhuman animals (Mead, 
1934; Elias, 1985).  That aside, even if the canine is not perceived to be 
actively seeking death, they are considered to want to avoid suffering, and 
furthermore that a state of discomfort renders their life not fit for living.   
 
Whilst euthanasia was advocated as being an option to use in the best interests 
of the dog alone, “it is when death (the termination of treatment) is being 
advocated ‘for the good’ of the victims themselves, that one recognises 
evidence of the ultimate oppression” (Bytheway, 1995:27), that is, that the 
gross imbalance of power in the animal-human relation can become evident 
when death is advocated.  As Gunnarsson points out “actual lives reflect power 
relations and processes” (2009: 35-36).  Despite how the humans stress that 
the dogs give their love freely, the dogs are in a relation of dependence upon 
their owners, who are the keepers of food, providers of warmth and have the 
power of life and death over their companions.  Power is operating here at the 
micro-level of social relations, in both an oppressive and productive way 
(Foucault, 1991). 
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8.3 Negotiated Order and Privileged Knowledge  
Companion canine dying in this study emerged as a negotiated process, that is 
that “the negotiations were patterned, not accidental”.  As Strauss found, by 
accident during his 1950s research, this study also happened upon non-
accidental patterning, which served to structure an area of the interactional 
world and constituted a “negotiated order” (Strauss, 1978:5).   This “negotiated 
order had to be worked and … continually reconstituted” (Strauss, 1978:5), with 
different voices assuming varying roles.  Roles were not equal, and within this 
negotiated order the voice of the ‘expert’, the veterinarian, is privileged.   
 
And I said ‘right okay, that’s fine, I thought that’ she said ‘and 
there’s nothing that we could’ve done Margaret’ you know.  She 
said ‘its that same as Mitch, you need to decide what you’re going 
to do’, you know.  The problem is she’s already got a heart murmur 
which doesn’t help matters but it’s under control cause she takes 
the medication, but Corinne said ‘you know, you need to have a 
wee think about, you know, cause there’s only so many injections 
I’ll give her before I would then say to you’  (Margaret, re:  Sally) 
 
The decision to put a dog down was not made alone, it tended to be the fruit of 
ongoing interactions and conversations with other family members and friends, 
and frequently involving the veterinarian.  The opinion of the veterinarian was 
given particular weight in the narratives told of the decision making.  The status 
of the expert and their opinion seemed to be utilised to reinforce and to justify 
the decision to choose euthanasia, rather than keep the dog alive.   
 
… and we went 'no, this is just silly, that's just not fair on the dog at 
all' [giving him chemotherapy to keep him alive, rather than 
euthanasia].  And the vet actually, when we had said that, he went 
'if it was my dog I wouldn't have done it either' [laugh] he said 'but I 
had to offer you it'. I said 'well that's fine'.  (Susan, re: Ted) 
 
Sanders also encountered this negotiated process in his study of interactions at 
a veterinary practice in New England.  He found that “veterinary interactions 
typically involve overt negotiation between the doctor and the client” (Sanders 
1999:75), by which he means the human.  The overt negotiations that Sanders 
found in “judging legitimacy and negotiating death” (1999:75), appear to have 
been more muted in this study.  Though the example above is quite pointed, it 
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was the exception.  The majority of negotiations with the veterinarians in this 
research were found to be more akin to a gradual and guarded process of 
information giving, shaped in such a way that there is a subtle guiding towards 
a particular treatment option, by the veterinarian.  But this is less overt, and 
quite guarded.  Even in a situation where the veterinarian appears to have been 
clear that the preferred treatment option is euthanasia, there seems to be 
considerable circling around the possibilities, rather than a direct statement of 
what course of action is considered to be best.   
 
But she said 'what I'll do is, you need to have a think about what 
you want to do'.  You know, and I more or less said 'well, it doesn't 
sound like there's anything you can do?’.  And she said 'well no, not 
really cause normally I would take her in tonight and I'd operate, 
and the chances are we most probably would just flash it off and 
we'd take the toe off’.  And I said 'Yes but that's under normal 
circumstances isn't it, as in young dog, not one that's got a history 
of heart problems?'.  She said 'exactly Margaret.  Those are the two 
biggest things, if she hadn't had a stroke last week I would've 
actually said to you maybe.  Maybe, not we'll do it but maybe, cause 
she's really too old'.  But she said 'not having had that stroke last 
week, the chances are she wouldn't come round'.  And I thought 
'you know, why put her through that?  Why put her under sedation 
and try and do something with her and then you can't get her to 
come round again?'.  To me that's almost going to the point of... not 
mutilation cause it's not, but I mean, there's no need.  I don't think 
there's any need for that.  There's no need to put her through 
anymore distress than potentially, you know, she may have 
anyway. So I said to Corinne.  'Well, what d'you think?', and she 
said 'look, I've put that on, you've not got to make the decision right 
now, but I know what you're like and the chances are you most 
probably will call me'.  [Margaret becomes upset] (Margaret, re: Sally) 
 
The veterinarian seems to be guiding the owner towards a decision, whilst not 
explicitly making that decision. Though less overt than in Sander’s findings 
(1999), I do not consider that the more subtle process of negotiation 
encountered in this study to be less significant.  It was simply necessary to look 
a little deeper for the patterning, than what was overtly said.  Yet it is none-the-
less potent for being lodged a little further into the background, into the taken-
for-granted framing of the interaction.  Indeed it could be argued that the 
ordering may be more powerful, by virtue of being more obscure, but “the 
crucial importance of negotiation to social order” remains (Strauss, 1978; 
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Strauss et al., 1963, 1964).   This more indirect approach was evident both in 
the recollections of owner and veterinarian interactions offered by the owners, 
and in my observations of the single occasion in which I was able to observe 
the veterinary consultation in person.   
 
There was a reliance on medical knowledge and an acceptance of the medical 
view, and prognosis, as representing ‘reality’.  Medicine is a powerful and 
autonomous profession (Freidson, 1970), whose claims to “pure” knowledge, 
that is knowledge of illness that is objective and systematic (Freidson, 
1970:344), give it expertise in an area of gross uncertainty.  As Collins (1982) 
argues, this capacity to perform as an expert in a field of uncertainty grants 
formidable power and status.  Medicine is a privileged discourse, which makes 
powerful claims to be able to define and to chart reality (Foucault, 1973).  A 
substantial amount of the meaning given to the canine’s dying was founded in 
the medical view of biological and physiological process.  In the way of 
understanding the body, as biomedicine does, as a biological machine.   
 
I mean she had had another stroke I think it was the Monday night.  
Someone who she was very fond of came to visit.  And she got very 
excited and she had another stroke so that following day she 
started to be sick and it was actually bits of her own intestines she 
was bringing up.  Because the cancer had got so bad.  
  (Amanda, re: Findlay) 
 
A biological explanation is intertwined with an emotional and relational one in 
Findlay’s case, but it is the biological that is the main source of reference.  This 
was the case with most of the departure narratives, excepting those where the 
companion died due to an act of violence, or disappeared and a cause for 
death was unclear.  Yet even in cases where the biological explanation was not 
foremost, such as in the case of Mitch who went missing, illness and a reliance 
on aspects of a biological understanding are present. There was a single 
instance of death due to a broken heart, who was the Labrador cross Samson. 
However, overwhelmingly there is a leaning towards, and support of, the 
biological and medical discourse in the work of interpreting the companion’s 
dying.   
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When a medical explanation was unclear, or veterinary opinion varied, this 
caused frustration, and was difficult for the human to deal with; they wanted a 
definitive medical view.  
 
 
Figure 18 –  as he became increasingly unwell lack of a definitive diagnosis was 
frustrating for Ted’s family, 12 February 2011  
 
It was really frustrating not being able to find out what it was that 
was wrong with him, but I.  Yeah, I was absolutely convinced it was 
another cancer. And the more we talk to different vets, I think they 
were pretty damn convinced about that as well, but the only way of 
knowing that was opening him up and there was no way we were 
going to be doing that.    (Susan, re: Ted) 
 
This desire for a definitive medical view, and the owner’s low tolerance of 
medical ambiguity, may relate to a need to ground their understanding of what 
was happening to their companion, and bringing order to the events.  Diagnosis 
can be a category tool of medicine and an administrative tool (Jutel, 2008), but 
it also “provides structure to a narrative of dysfunction” (Jutel, 2008:279).  It is in 
this capacity of diagnosis to provide “a picture of disarray” (Jutel, 2008:279), 
that it seems to be utilised in these narratives of departure.   
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My sense was that the medical/veterinary view was privileged, not only in the 
sense of it being used to justify potentially discreditable action for the human 
owner, but also it was used to represent the fundamental, foundational level of 
reality, concerning the life of the canine.  The biomedical view was treated as 
the objective, the real, and the vet’s word was the last word. However, 
privileged as the veterinary discourse may be, there is a tension here. Unlike 
medical services for humans provided by the National Health Service, 
veterinary services are bought, it is a consumer relationship with a service 
provider, and commercial concerns are involved1.  Sanders (1999) also 
identifies that ultimately it is the companion’s owner, as purchaser of the 
veterinary service, who has the final word regarding treatment. This observation 
was made, quite succinctly, by Margaret.  
 
I think the thing with Corine [veterinarian] is that, you know she tells 
you the way it is and the, you know, inevitably the ball is now in my 
court and I have to make that decision, which is the way it should 
be of course because its my animal.   (Margaret, re: Mitch) 
 
However, by being focused on the interaction at the point of the veterinary 
consultation, Sanders (1999) did not encounter the wider, and in temporal 
terms both the earlier and later, aspects of this negotiated process.  Unlike 
Sander’s research (1999), this study did witness these wider aspects; both by 
encountering the narratives of previously departed companions, and also 
observing the stages of decision making in the weeks before the owner chose 
euthanasia, and in the months afterwards, as the family, both its human and 
nonhuman members, adjusted.    
 
The negotiated order does not stand alone in the veterinary consultation, but is 
formed by ongoing interactions between family members, as they decide for 
example the story to give to the vet (Fieldnotes, 1 February 2011).  It is also 
constituted by family members as they interact with other non-family persons, 
such as the other animal owners in the veterinary practice waiting room, to 
whom the family, and their story for being at the vets, are presented (Fieldnotes, 
1 February 2011). In this sense I would suggest that this work can be 
                                                 
1 In private human healthcare in Scotland medical services are also bought, how this affects the relations 
between medic and patient I do not know, but it would be an interesting area of study.   
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considered to both affirm Sanders (1999), in the sense that the presence and 
significance of negotiation is also found in this research, and to build on his 
work.  This research builds on Sanders (1999) work, in that the negotiated order 
surrounding companion dying is found to exist beyond the confines of the 
veterinary consultation itself.   
 
8.4 The Veterinary Voice: Acquiescence, Resistance and Invalidation 
While the voice of the veterinarian was privileged, it did not exist in isolation, 
nor did it have a purely top down effect.  Rather it was a privileged voice, 
treated as a source of authority, particularly when speaking to the ‘reality’ of the 
companion’s condition.  As such it is a voice positioned within the narrative, it is 
part of the material used in the negotiated process.  In essence the veterinary 
voice can be understood as a device, as a position within the inter-subjective 
dance.  In relating to veterinary pronouncements as a positioned voice, the 
human owner did not always simply bow to veterinary wisdom, there were a 
range of stances that the human could take towards the veterinary voice.  
These positions included acquiescence, resistance and invalidation.    
 
Usually the owner utilised the voice of the veterinarian to reinforce their position 
with regard to choice of treatment, or withdrawal of treatment, and positioned 
themselves as acquiescing to medical authority in a fashion akin to that of the 
Parsonian, ‘good patient’ (Parsons, 1975).  In this case it would be a feature of 
the ‘good owner’, as explored in Chapter 9, to acquiesce to veterinary advice.  
This was particularly the case with regard to choosing euthanasia, when the 
veterinary pronouncements were used as the last word.  It appears that relying 
on the authority of the veterinary voice may be being utilised to help deflect 
some role tension.  A tension which is caused by the owner being in the 
ambiguous position of, as primary carer for the companion, also being the one 
arranging for their demise.   
 
The device of the veterinary voice operates within the narrative to “perform the 
vital function of defending the moral reputations” (Owens et al., 2008:239), in 
this case defending the integrity of the owners.    
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I said, ‘this is cruelty, we need to get the vet in’.  So the vet came in 
and said ‘I could give her an injection to boost her for a wee while, 
but it would be cruelty, the dog’s dying, she is dying’.  So she said, 
‘what I’ll do is, if you leave her just now for a couple of days and see 
how she is after a couple of days’.  So a couple of days later we 
phoned the vet and it was the husband that came out and he just 
looked at her, examined her and said, ‘her heart’s getting weaker 
and weaker, it would be nice if you put her to sleep.’.   
 (Matthew, re: Brandy)   
 
In this way, by both having a principal concern for the dog’s wellbeing and 
desire to avoid cruelty, and also by complying to veterinary expertise, the owner 
is able to opt for euthanasia, whilst keeping the impression of being a ‘good 
owner’, who cares for their dog, and is a conscientious member of society, 
intact.  Avoiding a potentially “debasing identity discrepancy, breaking up what 
would otherwise be a coherent overall picture, with a consequent reduction in 
our valuation of the individual” (Goffman, 1968b:59).  Though it should be said 
that here Goffman was referring to visible stigma signs, whereas in this case, it 
is a matter of the management of potentially discrediting information.   
 
Not only is the impression of the ‘good owner’ maintained intact, the choice of 
the owner, and it was a choice, to have their dog put down, is reframed as 
compliance with veterinary authority.  In this way, after the fashion of the staff in 
Timmerman’s two Midwestern American hospitals, it is possible to “obliterate 
the impression that the staff killed the patient” (Timmermans, 2010:23), or as in 
this case, that the owner killed their dog.  There is an “orchestration (emphasis 
in the original) of the death as an inevitable transitory process with a measured 
balance of action and nonaction” (Timmermans, 2010:23).  With the ‘good 
owner’, like the Parsonian (1975) ‘good patient’, being compliant and obedient 
to medical, or rather here to veterinary, wisdom, authority and control.   
 
Even in acquiescence, regardless of how passively the veterinary voice may 
appear to be accepted, that does not mean that it is a unilateral decision, or that 
it reflects a singularity of agency.  There was invariably a plurality of agency 
and negotiation.  As Nettleton points out, having considered a range of doctor-
patient studies:  
  
~ 172 ~ 
 
… what becomes evident from these studies is that although 
professional-patient relationships are inherently unequal, both 
participants are able to influence the outcomes of the consultations.  
Patients are not simply passive recipients of care but they are also active 
participants in the process of health care work.  (Nettleton,1995:145).   
 
I would suggest that this is particularly the case in the negotiation with human 
owners of companion canines, where the extreme of say a comatose human 
passively having decisions made regarding them by emergency room doctors, 
does not exist.  It is not doctor-to-patient relations involved here, which at a 
minimum is a duality, but veterinarian-to-owner-regarding-canine relations, 
which at a minimum is tripartite.  The medical expert does not deal with their 
patient in isolation, but alongside their proxy.  In the case of stray dogs, it is of 
course possible that an emergency veterinarian may make a unilateral decision 
about a canine, without apparent or known ownership, but no such cases were 
encountered in this work.  Even if they were, we cannot assume that canines, 
stray or otherwise, are devoid of agency simply because they are not human.  A 
nip or a struggle to get away may be as poignant an expression of a desire not 
to be given an injection, as a human vocalisation of ‘no’. It is an important 
principle that even under conditions of extreme coercion, agency remains 
present (Collins, 1982).  
 
The human owners do not always take the stance of acquiescence to the 
veterinary voice, in the role of the good owner.  It can be resisted, it may, for 
example, be seen as failing to speak accurately to the underpinning physical 
and physiological reality.   In which case the veterinary voice, predilicted as it is 
upon the assumption of having privileged access to the underpinning 
biophysical reality, becomes unstable, and its authority is then contested.   
 
So I took her through and he studied her and, I mean, she really 
looked worn and done, she was just lying there with the glazed 
expression and he said 'now I think…' and he prodded her and 
poked her and all the rest of it and he said 'maybe she's got an 
inner ear infection?' And I thought 'he's clutching at straws' because 
I had an inner ear infection when I was young, 18, and I think they 
now call it Labyrinthitis - Freda's had Labyrinthitis - but I could tell 
this was not Labyrinthitis or any inner ear infection, this was a 
serious thing.  (Winston, re: Rose) 
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Winston resists the veterinarian’s 
pronouncement, relying instead on his 
own understanding of the symptoms 
of ear infection.  He is not invalidating 
the medicalised voice, but resisting it 
from within the same discursive 
framework.  The owner could also 
orientate themself in opposition to the 
voice of the veterinarian, by 
positioning themself as the ‘true’ 
expert, by virtue of their intimate 
knowledge of their companion and 
longstanding day-to-day observation 
of their activities and wellbeing. 
 
 
Figure 19 – Winston relied on his own  
understanding of Rose’s illness, owner’s image,  
8 November 2005   
 
Lay knowledge, which is not just one knowledge, can present a challenge to the 
authority of the expert (Brownlie and Howson, 2005).  In the case of Rose the 
authority of the veterinary expert is challenged by the depth of understanding of 
the owner for their own canine, and their own human experience of illness.   
 
In contrast some owners positioned themselves as accepting of the veterinary 
voice, and responding appropriately and compliantly to veterinary wisdom, as a 
sign of their positive moral status as a good owner.  At the other extreme, some 
owners, going beyond resisting by balancing the veterinary voice with lay 
knowledge, outright rejected veterinary pre-eminence to define the situation of 
their dying dog.  They invalidated veterinary authority, by attacking its supposed 
privileged access to knowledge, and right to speak to the conditions of that 
reality, and its function of social control.  They challenged the assumption that 
veterinary pronouncements speak to the fundamental condition of their pet, and 
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position themselves in opposition to the veterinary voice, as the real expert on 
their animal, its circumstance and right to life.  This can be seen in the case of 
Matthew’s son.  Fraser had come home to discover that there had been a 
violent assault by one, or both, of his larger dogs, upon his Jack Russell, Rollin, 
whose throat had been torn open.  Fraser and the vet had different 
understandings of what they thought had taken place, as only one of the larger 
dogs had clearly been part of the incident.   
 
So Fraser just got... he grabbed Rollin, wrapped him up in a towel, 
put him in the car and then he got the big dog shoved her in the 
back of the car and away to the vets. The only vet that was open 
was somewhere in city centre, went down and he said 'your wee 
dog's barely alive' so he jagged it, put him to sleep. Fraser said 'put 
that one to sleep and I'll be back in half an hour'. He went and got 
the black Labrador, it wasn't a Lab but a cross, took her in and the 
vet says 'you're not putting her down are you?' 'yeah, put her down' 
'why?' he says 'because she's got blood', he says 'aye, but she 
might have not been part of the killing, this one looks as if it had...' 
because it had it in its mouth and everything, but anyway, he said 
'no I want rid of it'. So that was all the dogs put down.  (Matthew)  
 
It is perhaps telling that whilst Fraser invalidates the veterinary voice, he still 
maintains positive moral status, as a good owner and conscientious member of 
society, even in the face of veterinary authority.  This expertise, and superior 
access to knowledge about the condition of their canine, is based upon the 
intimate, long term knowledge and observation of their own companion, that is it 
is based upon “relationality and familiarity” (Brownlie and Howson, 2005:1125).   
 
Whilst they invalidate the veterinary voice, this is not to suggest that owners 
taking this stance were rude or overtly hostile to their veterinarians.  Indeed in 
the instance where I was able to observe interactions during the veterinary 
encounter directly, with the family of Mason and Diesel, whose owners had 
taken this stance of invalidation towards biomedical expertise, they were most 
polite and sociable (Fieldnotes, 1 February 2011).  Yet they were not 
submissive to veterinary authority and were not automatically accepting of 
veterinary wisdom and perspective.  Even when superficially they appeared 
accepting of the assurances offered by the expert, once outside the 
veterinarians in the car park, Mason and Diesel’s family, laughed and made it 
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clear that they did not accept the veterinarian’s view (Fieldnotes, 1 February 
2011).  In this family, as Brownlie and Howson also found, though a display of 
trust, as a lay person is expected to offer before a medical expert, is given, 
“doubt is not really being suspended”, (Brownlie and Howson, 2005:1134), and 
veterinary authority is simply being disregarded.  It was a stance of such 
profound resistance, that it was tantamount to invalidation of the assumed 
privileged biomedical access to reality of veterinary knowledge, and the social 
prestige, that it is based upon (Nettleton, 1995).   
 
8.5 ‘Natural’ Death and the Paradox of Euthanasia   
The data indicates that there is a preference for ‘natural death’, that is death 
without human intervention, particularly the meaning seems to be death without 
euthanasia performed by a veterinarian; without the human owner having to 
decide to have their companion euthanized.   
 
Margaret  The day he doesn’t want to go out for a walk will be the 
day I’ll really have to sit down and thinking ‘ well, you 
know, it’s maybe come to a point now where he’s not, 
he’s just not got it in him anymore’.  But I think just due 
to their breed I don’t think he’ll go particularly easily.  I 
would like him to just fall asleep.  That would be, I 
would be better for me.  And that’s very selfish but 
(becoming upset).  
MD  D’you want me to stop?   
Margaret No, no, no, you’re fine.  I think I don’t want to have to 
put him down.     (Margaret, re: Mitch) 
 
Two issues leap to mind here.  First there is the assumption that a natural death 
is possible, and that it is good, and second, hiding behind this issue, is a 
paradox.  For if natural death is good, then veterinary assisted euthanasia, the 
opposite, which a good natural death is defined against, must in some manner 
be regarded as unnatural, as not good.   
 
To take the first of these issues, the preference for ‘natural’ death in this study 
seems to be akin to the preference for the ‘good’ death for human beings.  In an 
unusually definitive finding for qualitative research, Borgstrom, Barclay and 
Cohn (2013), in their study of Cambridge medical students encountering dying 
patients, found that they “invariably draw on the notion of ‘good death” 
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(Borgstrom, Barclay and Cohn, 2013:391).  In my research the emphasis was 
not as clear cut.  Though widely present the preference for a ‘natural’ death, 
was not inevitable for the canines.  It seems to operate more as a particular 
grounding point of reference, to orientate the actors and their understanding, 
and telling, of the canine’s passing, than as an invariable launching point for 
their actions and evaluations.  However, this difference in degree of reliance 
upon the construct of ‘natural’ or ‘good’ for canine or human death, does not 
seem to suggest a difference in phenomena.   
 
I would suggest that the two constructs are operating in a similar fashion within 
the interactional world.  Both the ‘good’ death of the human, and the ‘natural’ 
death of the companion canine, seem to provide “a certain approved way of 
dying” (Borgstrom, Barclay and Cohn, 2013:395).  That having been said, the 
concepts are not identical.  The ‘good’ death of a human, which in relation to 
companion canines and pain, is explored more fully in Chapter 7, implies an 
awareness, absence, or control, of pain, and it also implies an adherence to a 
particular sequence of psychological states. These, allegedly normative, 
psychological states, are the five stages of denial, anger, bargaining, 
depression and acceptance, described by Kubler-Ross (1969).  Whilst the 
‘natural’ death of the companion canine, perhaps because access to the 
psychological state of the canines is more difficult, is focused upon a lack of 
human/veterinary intervention, and, like the human ‘good’ death, an absence of 
pain.   
I mean, as long as they don’t suffer, that’s the most important thing 
to me, they have to have a nice quality of life.  The minute that 
stops then I don’t that that’s right, but then I think that’s the same for 
humans as well.  I think once you get to that point, you know, but 
you know, with animals a human makes that decision, humans 
don’t get that [laugh] which is, you know, maybe not always the best 
way.   (Margaret, re: Sally  and Mitch) 
 
If avoiding pain and seeking the most ‘natural’ death, that is the one with the 
minimum of human intervention, is the ideal that an owner must act on when 
their companion is dying, this is not without complexity.  Which leads to the 
second issue with the construct of ‘natural’ death.  If death without human 
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intervention, but also without suffering, is the goal, what happens when the two 
principles conflict? 
 
I think I don’t want to have to put him down.  But, you know, equally, 
if it gets that bad then I wouldn’t hesitate to do it.  But it’s just, but 
it’s like everything in life, there’s a nicer way of going and there’s 
not a nicer.  And there’s an intervention and I would far rather he 
died naturally, but hey that’s for me, that’s not for him.  Well equally 
I actually would prefer that for him too, but I actually don’t think that 
will happen.  I have a feeling that won’t happen.  But you know.   
 (Margaret, re: Mitch) 
 
Margaret makes it clear that in the event of conflict between the desire for a 
‘natural’ death and suffering, she would have Mitch euthanized.  This is a 
profoundly ambiguous position.  The moral integrity of the ‘good’ owner, which 
is more fully explored in Chapter 9, rests upon the assumption that the owner 
will act in a caring way, and seek the wellbeing of the companion.  This 
imperative of seeking the good of the companion is also present in the idea of 
desiring a ‘natural’ death, rather than the, therefore unnatural and not good, 
death at the hands of human intervention.  I would suggest that this thread of 
meaning, if followed, leads to a paradox.   The paradox is that the owner, 
whose moral identity is invested in them being the primary carer and guardian 
of the canine’s wellbeing, is now being cast in the role of the one destroying, or 
arranging the destruction, of the companion.  The person most responsible for 
their wellbeing, which implies a duty not to harm, is having them put to death, 
which could certainly be regarded as a form of, if not the ultimate, harm.   
 
Arguments in support of human euthanasia tend to rest upon principles based 
on concerns regarding quality of life, and the privileging of choice (Pitcher; 
2010, Warnock and MacDonald, 2008; Scott Peck, 1997).  The first of these, 
suffering and the complexities, and contradictions, of evaluating and 
interpreting companion canine suffering, were explored in the previous 
interpretive Chapter 7.  Suffice to say for now that suffering is a powerful 
consideration in the negotiated process of companion canine dying and in the 
decision to choose euthanasia.  I don’t want him to suffer and he won’t suffer 
you know (Margaret). 
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 The second aspect, of privileging choice, which echoes a Cartesian idealisation 
of mind and rationality, is particularly problematic in the case of companion 
canines.  We have lost the concept of animal psyche, and the possibilities for 
animal mental illness and suicide, as considered by Victorian thinkers, such as 
the Scottish physician and botanist, Lauder Lindsay (1880).  So if you cannot 
assist a suicide, because the creature has not the mind or will to seek it, how 
then is it not murder, if the living cannot choose to die?   
 
A distinction can be made between passive euthanasia (this can be understood 
as assisted suicide, where the means are provided by not administered, 
(Gamliel, 2013; Warnock and MacDonald, 2008), and active euthanasia (where 
the means and final act is provided by another, but is still regarded as voluntary 
(Warnock and MacDonald, 2008).  In the case of companion canines, who are 
not understood to be capable of administering a lethal agent with intent, putting 
to sleep could be categorised in these terms as active euthanasia, akin to the 
Groningen Protocol, which permits the euthanizing of severely ill neonatal 
humans.  Yet this still leaves the thorny issue of volition.   
 
A further distinction can also be made between voluntary euthanasia, where the 
dying ask for death, and non-voluntary euthanasia, when the dying either do not 
ask for death, or are regarded as being unable to make a meaningful choice 
(Jotkowitz, Glick, and Gesundheit, 2008; Cohen-Almagor, 2003).  The choice 
may be regarded as not being meaningful either because of coma, very low 
intelligence or the dying being too young to understand.  This category maybe 
of significance with regard to companion canines, who, being in the position of 
having virtual personhood, as in the case of children with severe mental 
disability, which Sanders (1999) original understanding of the term virtual 
personhood was based on, could be regarded as being unable to make a 
meaningful choice.   
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This is not to say that companion canines cannot choose, or that they lack any 
agency at all.  It would also be quite possible to argue that the euthanasia of a 
companion canine may fall in the category of involuntary euthanasia.  Where a 
being that makes no request to die (Cohen-Almagor, 2003), and may otherwise 
have chosen life (BBC Ethics Guide, 2013), is killed anyway.  Perhaps in the 
case of companion canines the choosing of life could been seen as being 
expressed by continuing to eat, drink, and move around; seeking interaction 
and comfort from their fellows, or avoiding interaction, pulling their paw away, 
and resisting the threat of bodily injury, that the veterinarian’s needle presents. 
With that resistance to the pain of the needle there is also a tacit, but 
nonetheless significant, action by the canine in the direction of life, in the 
direction of freedom of motion and freedom from injury, which is, by implication, 
action which seeks to avoid death.   
 
There exists a tension, which I would suggest is tantamount to conflict between 
the roles (Goffman, 1959).  This tension is between the paradox of the owner 
being the primary carer of the canine, the one primarily responsible for 
maintaining the companion’s wellbeing and preserving its life, and the owner 
also being the agent organising the euthanasia, and quite probably involuntary 
death, of the companion. There appear to be three responses to this role 
conflict: recourse to the imperative to avoid suffering, an appeal to choice and 
rejection of role as primary carer.   In the first of these, the tension seems to 
lead to suffering, and the moral imperative to alleviate it, assumes a preeminent 
status.  
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Figure 20 – the imperative to avoid suffering, such as Sierra’s pain, and maintaining the 
life of the companion, caused role conflict for the owners, 12 February 2011 
 
There is an emphasis on the mediating importance of alleviating suffering, 
which acts to override the primary role requirement of the owner to seek the 
wellbeing, continued life and liveliness, of the companion.  So the owner can 
have their companion involuntarily euthanized, whilst still maintaining their 
status as a morally reputable person who seeks the best interest of their dog 
unselfishly.   
 
He would have wanted to keep him as long as possible.  And it was 
the dog is really in pain.  He is not a happy dog.  We took him to the 
vets and Norman the vet says to be fair if it was my dog I would do 
the same.   (Susan, re: Fred)  
 
In the second case, the paradox can be responded to, though more rarely, by 
retaining the critical aspect of choice, as in the contemporary arguments for 
human euthanasia in Scotland. Here there are attempts to frame the euthanasia 
as a voluntary choice, not of the human, but one of the canine itself, for whom 
the owner acts as interpreter of their wishes.     
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I knew. I knew looking at her and the way she was looking at me 
that this was serious. I would look at her and she was looking at me 
as if.  I know she wasn’t pleading with me, but she was telling me, 
you know, her eyes were showing me …  So anyway, I phoned on 
the Saturday morning and said ‘if anything she’s much worse’ and 
now who was.  It was a young lady vet, not the one from before, a 
really charming one.  And she said ‘can you bring her in?’ …  I 
remember thinking ‘how can you be so distraught about, you know, 
it’s a pet after all?’  I was overwhelmed by emotion and, I mean, I 
was weeping … I've never been like this ever in my life you know, 
even with close friends and family, never had I had an experience 
like this.  (Winston, re: Rose)  
 
Finally the owner may respond to the tension inherent in the paradox of 
euthanasia, by rejecting the role of primary carer of the canine completely.  In 
this case the companion is presented as being a ‘bad’ dog, one morally 
unworthy of care, and any potential stigma associated with moral failing on 
behalf of the human for not fulfilling the requirements of their role, is made 
distant (Goffman, 1968b).   
 
And he looked a lovely dog but we had to have Luther put 
down.  Because he was just such a psycho.  We just, well, I had 
gone away for the day, Gregor was working and the kids were 
all older, but he had got out the garden and he had gone to the 
garden across the back and, of course, they were trying to 
chase him away with a brush and everything, and I don’t know if 
he had bitten somebody or nipped them or something like that, 
but they made such a hooha about this dog, and we knew he 
was a problem, so I had him put down.  (Rowan, re: Luther)  
 
In Britain today it would not be legally justifiable to destroy a ‘bad’ human in the 
way it is to destroy a bad pet.  I would propose that this is a reflection of the 
higher status given to human than animal life in contemporary British society.  
Least it be tempting to assume that this is a natural and not a socially 
constructed value, it may be worth remembering that under the Nazi regime this 
situation was reversed, at least with regard to certain human groups within 
society.  Nazi Germany having one of the highest, if not the highest, level of 
protection of an animal’s right to life under the law.  The lives of animals being 
protected in their own right, rather than in relation to humanity, whilst this social 
system simultaneously legitimated the destruction of segments of the human 
population (Arluke and Sanders, 1996).   
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These three ways of dealing with the paradox, manifest different reactions to 
the primary role of the owner as canine guardian (Irvine, 2004b) and carer.  The 
first of these, an appeal to suffering reinforces the role of owner as primary 
carer of the companion, whilst an appeal to choice attempts to mediate the 
responsibilities, with reference to the wishes of the canine, and the final option, 
represents a rejection of the role and its incumbent responsibilities altogether.   
 
8.6 Causes of Death 
Part of the work of the narratives of departure, and a feature of their 
composition, was the identification of a cause of death.  The dog’s passing was 
placed within a context of meaning, where the biomedical model of life was 
privileged, and an intelligible explanation of the companion’s passing was 
forged.  In some instances a multifaceted cause was given, but in no case was 
there an absence of identified, at least probable, cause of death or loss.  One 
wonders if an absence of cause was in some way intolerable, unendurable.  
Sources of possible explanation were drawn from medical models, past 
personal experience, family lore and rumour.  These possible causes may at 
times have been remote, or even fanciful, but they were never absent.  In short 
it appeared very important for there to be an identified cause of death, one that 
could be woven with the experience and biography of the companion and their 
family.   
When Yara died she had an aneurism.  She was about 11 years 
old.  She had been a rescue dog who was found in a flat in Wester 
Hailes in a cupboard.   (Amanda, re: Yara)  
 
Though in the case of the German Shepherd Yara,  a single identified medical 
cause is given, this was an exception.  Usually, whilst a biomedical explanation 
tends to be focal, there would be a range of explanations, merging and mutually 
reinforcing.    
 
[Laugh] but, you know, its just something I’ve noticed with him and I 
haven’t ever had an ageing dog before, so, well not as old as him.  
The two we had to put down well one had a stroke so we didn't 
need to put Heather down, but Fonz we needed to put down cause 
she had cancer, but she wasn't as old as Mitch, I think she was 14 I 
think when she died, but she had to be put down cause she just 
was losing weight and not eating and everything else. So I've never 
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really had a dog that's been as old as him, so it's a bit of a learning 
process for me to but I just try to make it comfortable for him that's 
the main thing. He doesn't totally get the run of the house but he 
more or less does! (Margaret, re: Mitch)  
 
Here the biomedical reasons are meshed with aspects of everyday living and 
being, which, as critical considerations in the negotiation of dying, are explored 
more fully in Chapter 9. In this instance explanations are drawn from three 
areas: naturalistic ideas regarding lifecourse and degeneration are drawn from 
the realm of lay understanding of the natural and social world, explanations are 
drawn from the biomedical realm, and also from the everyday sphere of activity 
and being.  Margaret’s statement highlights, that there is a reason, there was 
no instance devoid of explanation, and this explanation tended to be 
multifaceted and complex, weaving differing sources of understanding together.  
Yet the question remains, why this urge to explain?   Could it be a consequence 
of the need for narrative, of the embedding of the companion within the story 
that is the family?   
 
It also should be mentioned that this study has targeted humans who are likely 
to have closer relations with their companions, so it is possible that in families 
where the dog is less of a ‘person’, and perhaps performs rather more as an 
interchangeable occupant of the role of the family dog, that there may be less 
urgency to explain their demise.  A cause was always given, but that does not 
mean it was always put forward without issue, offering a cause of death could 
be problematic, if either an explanation was difficult to forge, due to lack of 
information, or if the given cause was in some way contested.    
 
When there was a lack of information from which to build an explanation, as in 
cases where the companion suddenly disappeared (which is explored in terms 
of the suffering engendered by a disappearance in Chapter 7).  There seemed 
to be a distinct sense of frustration at the lack of being able to construct a 
sufficiently valid cause, and also a sense of disorientation.  This is perhaps 
suggestive of the purpose that a defined cause of death may serve.  This 
frustration and disorientation can be seen in the case of Mitch who 
disappeared.   
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 And the other thing too is yes he could’ve wandered off to 
somewhere and somebody might have picked him up and taken 
him home, and that would be great, he could be lying in front of 
somebody’s fire and still having another two or three years left in 
him, and that's a nice way to think about it, but I don't really think 
that's the case, but hey you don't know, and I think for me that's the 
worst part is the never knowing because you don't have anything 
feasible, not feasible, nothing tangible.  
 (Margaret, re: Mitch)  
 
The frustration was evident in her body, voice and tears.  Perhaps this 
frustration is born of the need, the imperative even, to have a defined, and 
satisfactory, cause. The frustrated need to know is powerful, leaving a profound 
sense of intangibility, the world becomes less solid, more ethereal to Margaret.  
As if the sudden loss, with its fracturing randomness, cannot be assuaged.  
Could it be that the importance of the cause, is to knit together in some fashion, 
the edges of expectations of everyday life and experience, the underpinning 
framework of life, that is stretched and torn by the random inexplicableness of 
death?  In short, if death must have a random element, then at least let it be 
explicable.  Perhaps under these conditions the sense making task (Owens et 
al., 2008), becomes all the more urgent. It becomes more important to make 
sense in the face of non-(or no)-sense; and possibly the departure narratives, 
like the “tales of biographical disintegration” that Owens et al. (2008:237) heard 
from parents whose children were lost to suicide, become not just tellings, nor 
even only sense making task, but begin to become “survival tools” (Owens et 
al., 2008:251).  
 
The frustration and disorientation of the owner, when a lack of information 
makes forging a plausible cause of death impossible, speaks to the significance 
of this particular practice of meaning making.  Yet whilst having too little 
potential for defining a cause is a problem, having lots of information and 
experience from which to forge one is not without issues also.  Whilst a lack of 
sufficient information to build a coherent cause may be problematic, and 
threaten the sense making task on the one hand, an offered cause may be 
contested if there are other voices and possibilities. This process of contestation 
was more difficult to see, perhaps because it tended to become evident when 
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more than one human family member was addressed.  If a single view was 
taken at a time, or other human family members were more passive, I was less 
likely to encounter the divergent voices within the family, whose principal 
speaker tended to define the consensus.  Sometimes it was evident, and the 
negotiation around defining a cause could be seen in action.   The process of 
negotiation, and the contestation of meaning are visible in the case of Rowan 
and Gregor as, together, they forge an explanation for Shelby’s death.   
     
MD What happened with Shelby?   
Rowan Well. 
Gregor Her insides started coming out.   
Rowan I thought she had an abscess in her bottom. 
MD Goodness me.   
Rowan And I thought she'd an abscess in her bottom and I was 
bathing it and trying to keep it clean and she was 
crying, she wasn't happy and I thought 'oh I'll not do 
anymore.'   
Gregor But she had cancer.     
Rowan  Yeah but we didn’t, and then it kind of went in again.  
And then I was at my work and Bridget and her 
husband and Ethan was just a baby, they were home 
from Cyprus on holiday at Christmas, and Bridget 
phoned me at work ‘mum, you better get Shelby to the 
vet tonight, she’s got a big growth coming out of her 
back passage’.  And so obviously it was cancer of the 
bowel and that was it coming out and I was bathing it, 
because Jake had had an abscess in his bottom and 
that’s what I thought it was.  It was an abscess, and 
then his abscess burst and he was okay I thought that’s 
what it was with her, and we just had to have her put 
down straight away that night.  
   (Gregor and Rowan, re: Shelby)   
As the home was very clean, and scrupulously well presented, I find myself 
wondering if Rowan’s discomfort with the explanation of Shelby’s insides 
coming out is in part motivated by a wish not to give an explanation that is too 
‘dirty’.  Where boundaries leak from the inside to the out, it is problematic and 
can be disturbing (Haraway, 2008).  Perhaps Rowan is seeking to avoid this 
implication of a dirty death, because all explanations are not equal, and 
explanation for the cause of death also needed to serve the interested of 
impression management, to present to others that the dog died in an 
acceptable, humane, clean, and morally defensible way. These aspects are 
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explored more fully in the interpretation Chapter 9 on everyday practices and 
welfare.  
 
In terms of frequency, the first three given causes of companion canine death in 
this study, in order of prevalence: are cancer, old age and stoke.  These 
principal three causes are then followed by a varied selection of other causes, 
occurring with lesser frequency (see Table 3).   
 
Table 3 - Causes of death (alphabetical) 
* There is a co-morbidity of cancer with other illnesses, but it is identified    
Cause of Canine Death  Instance 
Cancer *   10 
Disappeared  4 
Excitement  1 
Grief  1 
Haemorrhage  1 
Heart disease / failure  4 
Mental illness / aggression  4 
No data  4 
Old age  7 
Parasite  1 
Stroke  5 
Unknown cause (falling over)  1 
Victim of violence  2 
  as the killer in these cases  
 
 
These declared causes of canine death have similarities with the contemporary 
causes of death in Scotland, which are ascribed to the human population, that 
is according to the General Register of Scotland (2010), specifically the vital 
events reference tables, ‘Death by Frequency of Cause by Sex, Numbers and 
Percentages 1986 to 2010.  The first three human causes of death, having the 
lion’s share of the cases, are cancer, heart disease and stroke, with a varied 
selection of other causes then occurring at a lesser frequency.  The main 
human causes of death, are also major causes for the companion canines, with 
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cancer being the principal cause of death for both human and canine. However, 
there is some variation in the pattern between human and canine.  Though the 
companion canines share cancer, heart disease and stroke as significant 
causes of death, there is also disappearance, mental illness and old age, which 
are not represented in the same order or manner in the human data.  But what 
is telling, is perhaps less the difference in the more infrequent causes of death, 
than the similarity in the main causes.   
 
Why the given causes of death in this study should in part pattern the ascribed 
causes of death of the general human population can only be guessed at.  Are 
we subject to, and also affected, by the same environmental pollutants, or 
physiological vulnerabilities?  Perhaps it is not without significance that 
following the completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003 (US 
Department of Energy, 2011), the National Human Genome Research Institute 
(2013, page unlisted) are now running the Canine Genome Project and “are 
working to develop resources necessary to map and clone canine genes in an 
effort to utilize dogs as a model system for genetics and cancer research”.  Or 
perhaps this patterning of causes of death is less to do with a physiological 
similarity, than with a subtle weaving of human and canine society, in which the 
agents of our mortality is assumed to be theirs?   
 
Summary 
Companion canine dying emerged as a negotiated process, shaped by a divide 
between gradual and sudden death.  Gradual death was the more prevalent, 
and was characterised by a compound effect of increasing disruptions to 
normative wellness.  In Parson’s sense of illness as deviance (1951), it was a 
gradual descent into, what is ultimately regarded as untenable, dysfunction.  In 
sudden death the process of negotiation is truncated, but not absent, and some 
particular challenges to the everyday creation of meaning are encountered.  
These challenges take the form a threatening randomness that risks exposing 
the fragile foundation of the everyday processes of living and coping. 
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 This work has encountered developed narratives of departure, that seem to 
structure the experience of losing a companion, and provide a way of sharing 
this experience with the wider society beyond the family.  These narratives of 
departure, also served as part of what it was to ‘do’ family (Finch, 2007), to 
maintain a moral identity in an emphasis on ‘putting the dog first’.  It is 
suggested that the negotiated process of companion canine dying constitutes a 
“negotiated order” (Strauss, 1978), a structure within the social field that both 
shapes, and is shaped by, the interactions between various actors.   
 
In particular the role of the expert, the veterinarian, is a privileged voice in the 
negotiations, and the biomedical view is treated as being definitive.  The role of 
the expert is not simply submitted to, but a range of stances to expert medical 
authority are displayed: acquiescence, resistance and invalidation to the 
veterinary voice.  There is a pronounced preference in the data for a ‘natural 
death’, and deep ambiguities in relation to choosing euthanasia.  In particular 
the ambiguities reflect a conflict between the requirements of being a ‘good 
owner’ and the maintenance of moral integrity, and choosing to have the 
creature in your care put down.  The privileging of a biomedical view is also 
reflected in the given causes of death, which echo the human declared causes 
of death in contemporary Scotland, which may reflect an interweaving of the 
understanding of human and canine life.  This interweaving is explored more 
deeply in the chapter to come, where how humans and companion canines live, 
and create everyday meaning together, is addressed directly.   
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Chapter 9  ~  Interpretations of Everyday Practices 
and Disruptions to Wellbeing   
 
Wellbeing is a fluid notion, which incorporates “material wellbeing, subjective 
wellbeing and relational wellbeing” to produce an overall sense of wellness 
(Punch, 2014:16). The data suggests that the extra-individual disruption caused 
by companion canine illness or loss impacts human owner wellbeing.  This is a 
factor that can be overlooked in veterinary and psychological studies that 
privilege the internal, individual, psychological and physiological states. In this 
work the external disruption to routines and taken-for-granted patterns of the 
lifeworld appear to be the nexus between human and companion canine 
wellbeing, rather than a physiological response to an event.  The locus of 
suffering is external, related to the embedding of human and canine in a 
common lifescape, as Goffman emphasised (1968a), society is first.  The 
disruption is initially between the agent and their immediate social structure, and 
this disruption then ripples within the being, to cause intra-psychic, or 
physiological, disturbance.  As Mead (1934) found, the inner state and self, is 
born of, and reflected from, the external relations to the world and others. This 
is a direct reversal of the trajectory of disturbances to wellbeing assumed in a 
biomedical frame, which understands disruptions to wellbeing as predominately 
to do with inner biochemical or psychological reactions to the loss.  Rather this 
study finds that it is the disrupted pattern of life, and impoverishment of the 
lifescape, that is the genesis of pain.   
 
9.1. Routine and the Ritualisation of Living Together  
As in Scott’s (2009) analysis of the daily lives of humans, the everyday life of 
human and canine together was habitual and domestic.  Moreover, the canines 
seem to be embedded in the family in large part by way of being embraced in 
the routines and activities of their family.  As Morgan suggests, routine activities 
such as eating may “define who belongs or does not belong to particular 
families or map out areas of social and interactional significance” (Morgan, 
1996:158). There was an established order of routine, a cycle of everyday 
activities, involving: waking, toileting, walking, eating, possibly going to day 
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care, walking, eating again, relaxing together and sleeping. In this aspect all the 
families were concurrent, and extensive and detailed, though varied, practices 
were present in each case.   
 
 
Figure 21 – eating patterns were part of everyday practices, Rusty, 28 January 2012  
 
  
Having set times and places for meals was part of the everyday routine of 
human and canine coexistence.  The canines were aware of the practices, and 
they were sensitive to changes in the established order of everyday events.   
 
Yeah, so I’ve moved Kari’s food, her dish, to actually right next to 
the water dish which is where Ted used to eat, and she’s a bit 
funny.  She’ll have her breakfast there, she’s quite happy to have 
her breakfast there, but teatime she’s not too sure.  She’ll sit on her 
bed and look over at her food and you’ve really got to encourage 
her to come over and eat her dinner there.  Its very unusual for Kari, 
because Kari would steal food at a drop of a hat.  But she still has 
that in her head, that that’s Ted’s place to be eating, and her place 
is beside her bed.   (Susan, re: Kari, after the death of Ted) 
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It is worth noting in this example that the canine both has her experience 
shaped by the family’s routine, and yet also exerts a shaping influence upon it, 
in this case by Kari’s reluctance to eat her food in the place that was Ted’s.  
Indeed the companion canines were not only the recipients of the daily family 
routines, they would also seek to enforce the normal order, particularly if an 
owner was late in feeding them, or became absorbed in other activities and did 
not keep to the usual routine.  In short, the companions were seen as active 
participants in the everyday practices of life and living together.   
 But she was told what day of the week it is and so she would chew 
that and think it was a great treat and, eh, I would then leave.  
Always bid her farewell, I’ll be back and, you know, just be good 
and when I would come back and sometimes organise someone to 
come in at lunchtime to just take her a little walk.   You know, just a 
little walk to get her out, and then when I got home, say, five o'clock 
she was ready, she would greet me and then we’d go for our walk 
which would be a good hour’s walk at least.  
 Oh yes, and then back and she would have her meal, I’ve got my 
meal, I would then. We’re talking about oh, half past six/quarter to 
seven. And then I would work for two hours until nine o'clock doing 
admin work for school or whatever.  I would sit at this here, and she 
would be there or walking about and, you know, or sitting beside 
me.  And then at nine o'clock. Oh yes, always, her basket would be 
here.  And I would talk to her and I would turn the music on of 
course and I’d be writing and I’d say ‘are you fine Rose?’ she 
always was happy.   
And then at nine o'clock she would get restless and she would.  It 
was as if she knew the time, cause at nine o'clock I had to stop 
work.  She dictated that I had, she would nudge me and walk round 
the table and nudge me.  Not wanting out but wanting me to go next 
door, right, where we could relax and where she had another.  She 
had one in here it was one of those big plastic burgundy coloured 
bed things with the soft stuff inside it.  Next door there was always 
just a loose thing that was thrown down, and she would sit at my 
feet or she would come up and coorie in and she was fine, and we 
would watch some television. She wasn’t all that interested in 
television to be honest, she preferred music and a discussion or 
something.  And then at half past ten I’d put on my jacket or my 
coat and we’d go out and we’d walk through the village and up the 
XXX Road till we were out of lights.   (Winston, re: Rose) 
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The routines of human and companion canine coexistence were so developed, 
that some of those I witnessed, or had described to me, seemed to assume an 
almost ritualistic nature.   
 
 
Figure 22 – some practices, such as where and when canines slept, had a ritualistic 
quality, Mitch and Sally, 29 March 2011 
 
Seale considered that “human social life is fundamentally ritualistic at every 
level” (1998:32).  In this light it appears that the companion canines also form 
part of the ritualistic enactment of human social life, as both those who have the 
rituals enacted upon them, and as social agents who actively participate in the 
rituals.  The canines seemed to be emeshed in what Morgan calls “the ritual life 
of families” (1996:158).  It would be intriguing to explore to what extent the 
sharing of ritualised routine is implicated in the construction of mutuality and the 
experience of a shared world.  Also intertwined with the routines were aspects 
of power and dependence. This was not unilateral, with only the canine 
companion being dependent on the human owner, but flowed in many 
directions (Foucault, 1991). Power in this study was manifest relationally, rather 
than being a thing (Foucault, 1991).  
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When a canine is absorbed into a family they are expected, as are the human 
members, to adhere to the norms concerning behaviour, with restraint and 
physical control of both emotions and bodily functions, such as excreting and 
sexual activities. The data supports that failure to adhere to these norms on the 
part of the canine can disrupt the anticipated ordering of everyday events.  
Though he was specifically referring to human conduct, I would suggest that 
these fractures in the framework of everyday experience are akin to the frame 
breakers that Goffman identified, in his words, “now it is apparent that the 
human [sic] body is one of those things that can disrupt the organisation of 
activity and break the frame” (Goffman, 1974:347).  In this case the canine 
body is the disruptor, as in Rusty attempts to mate with my legs, or in the case 
of incontinence:   
So he’s, you know, obviously I think the age thing definitely is 
kicking in with him, he’s just getting to that point. But this last month 
or so we've had difficulties with overnight – although I’d take him out 
for a tinkle before he goes to his bed.  Often I’ll get up and I’ll find 
that, you know, he’s had an accident and everything else, but you 
know, to me that’s a minor detail.  Yes, he doesn’t do anything in 
his bed, from that point of view he’s very good, not that it would 
matter, it’s just a case of chucking it in, but that’s just happened 
lately.   (Margaret, re: Mitch) 
 
Such frame breakers disrupt the normal flow of events and justifications, such 
as Mitch being elderly, are brought into play to bring the deviant event back into 
line and smooth the normal flow of interaction or narrative.  The “companion 
animals are closely intertwined with the lives of their human caretakers” 
(Jackson, 2012:254), and are enmeshed in the every practices of life and living.   
 
Right, in the winter, oh we still went out the same number of walks 
but we dressed differently.  Because it was dark I had to wear my 
long coat and then wear one of those yellow sort of.  And she had 
her little coat thing, it wasn’t to keep her dry but it was to keep her 
bright cause she always walked to my left, I was always told that 
was how you walked a dog, on the left.  So if I was on the road and 
she was on the outside, she had her fluorescent thing round her 
neck, which I made for her, it’s what cyclists would wear on their 
arms.  She had a sort of extended one that she wore round her 
neck, very fetching!  And off we would go.  I would need to take a 
brolly with me sometimes but that was fine because she needs to 
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go, but I would make the walks slightly shorter in the morning.  
Maybe half an hour instead of 40 minutes, but if it was fine.  She 
always got the full walk at five o'clock till about half past six, that 
would always, didn’t matter what the time of year was, and even the 
last walk at night, well if I was tired I wouldn’t go all the way up the 
XXX Road.   (Winston, re: Rose) 
 
The human owners seemed to “invest their egos primarily in certain routines” 
(Goffman, 1959:43). The mutual routines served to link the canine and human, 
and this had implications for the human identity and wellbeing, in that; “the 
extent that the human-animal interactions proceeded more or less smoothly and 
rewardingly, the person incorporates certain positive elements (responsible, 
knowledgeable, etc.) into his or her self-definition” (Sanders, 2003:413).  This 
interweaving of life together and sharing of the daily cycle of routines and 
practices, presents a picture of a stable and ordered co-existence, which 
contributes positively to human welfare, not only in the sense that walking is 
beneficial for human health from a physiological point of view, but also that 
"value and meaning and the vision of order are basically necessary for human 
wellbeing" (Grainger, 1998:92), and the everyday practices of living with a 
companion canine support this vision of order.  The everyday practices of 
human and canine coexistence found in this research were stable and firmly 
rooted, a finding which challenges the assumption that the position of the 
companion canine is liminal.   
 
9.2. Everyday Practices as Challenging Liminality  
Charles Davies (2008) emphasises the ambivalence in human and companion 
animal relations, and the liminal state the companions occupy, yet it may not be 
quite as liminal as is being emphasised.  The day-to-day routines and ordering 
of life of the companions is firmly rooted, and practices reflecting the canines 
place, and significance, within the family, are established.   
 
But she became part of the family and people said, ‘Its only a dog’.  
I said, ‘no it’s not only a dog’.  Yeah ‘it’s only a dog’, I says ‘no, she 
was part of my family, I loved her, she loved me, she loved Stacie 
and the kids and we loved her, she wasn’t just a dog, she was part 
of my family.’   (Matthew, re: Brandy) 
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The companion canines do not appear to receive the occasional care of a 
creature occupying a liminal state at the periphery of the group, such as the 
village dog, with its limited rights and expectations of fair treatment and care.  
Rather they receive high level care, indeed it is considered morally deficient for 
them to be treated without due consideration to their privileged position (Arluke 
and Sanders, 1996).  In a sense it could be argued that the reverse dynamic is 
functioning, that companion canines are not liminal creatures receiving 
ambivalent and sporadic care.  Rather they are established members of the 
group, receiving high level care, and that it is the justification for this favour, 
rather than the favour itself, that is problematized and limited.  As Margaret 
found when her boss was unsympathetic at her losing her companion:  
 
I find the concept of other humans who are not animal lovers to that 
very, I actually find it quite abhorrent actually.  ‘It’s only an animal’, 
you see, that phrase ‘its only’.  I don’t like that.   (Margaret).   
 
It is not that the position of the companion canines that is weak and liminal; it is 
that the established, indeed elevated, position being given to the canine 
companion, has a weak justification and is problematic in a society that has a 
strong inter species divide, and that privileges human over nonhuman.  The 
position of the animal is not liminal, in day-to-day functional terms the 
companions are fully embraced in what it is to be family, rather it is the moral 
and ideological justification for the companion’s inclusion that is weak.   
 
Whilst Wilkie (2005) also emphasises the ambiguous nature of human-animal 
relations there is a critical difference between the cattle in her study and the 
canines in this work, and that is the role expectations of the nonhuman in each 
case.  The livestock heifer is not generally expected to have a self, therefore 
there is tension and significant levels of ambiguity, when the animal deviates 
from the routine process of production and begins to emerge from the herd as 
an individual.  In contrast to this, the companion canine is expected by the 
owners to possess at least a rudimentary personhood, therefore the emergence 
of individuality does not necessarily create the contradictions and tensions that 
it does for the stockperson of the animal that is a “sentient commodity” (Wilkie, 
2005:213).  
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This assumption that animal-human relations are profoundly ambiguous is 
echoed in the recent work by Charles and Davies (2008), who are looking at 
human and companion animal relations, rather than the human-to-livestock 
relationships Wilkie (2005) addresses.  Whilst at the macro level of human and 
multispecies interactions, across the globe, and across the range of species 
and specific context, animal-human relations could be said to be ambiguous.  
At least animal-human relations could be called ambiguous in the sense that 
some animals are regarded as persons and cared for as companions, whilst 
others are commodities or objects of scientific research. Just because animal-
human relations can be ambiguous on a large scale, does not necessarily 
mean that they are within a specific field.   
 
Charles and Davies are explicit that “the ambivalence which characterises 
humans’ relationships with other animals, however, also characterises our 
relationships with pets (Charles and Davies, 2008:2.4). I would question this 
assumption, and even if ambiguity does exist at the micro level of companion 
animal and human relations, it is not necessarily driven by the same dynamics 
as the ambiguities that exist on a large scale across multiple species and 
situations.  There are aspects to the human and companion canine relationship 
that do not apply to the relationship between humans and wildlife, or the 
relations between humans and livestock, or humans and experimental animals.  
Part of this difference is the role to which the nonhuman is assigned, there is a 
vast difference in the expectations and assumptions that surround a wild adder, 
or laboratory mouse, compared to those that shape the life of a pet Pekinese.    
 
9.3. Everyday Practices and Quality of Life  
The routines that shape everyday life were also implicated in issues regarding 
loss of wellbeing and suffering, suffering was not only a matter of physical pain.  
When these everyday routines were disrupted it was considered that the quality 
of life of the companion may be compromised. This concern with an ability to 
maintain normal routines formed part of the background, part of the negotiated 
process explored in Chapter 8, that may lead to euthanasia. Issues regarding 
routines and quality of life could deter an owner from having their companion 
put down, even if the canine was of advanced age and had serious illness.  As 
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in the case of Mitch, the 20 year old cocker spaniel, who had a large anal 
tumour, part of which was external and visible to me, at about the size of a lime 
(Fieldnotes, 10 May 2011).   
 
So I was quite happy to let him have a nice quality of life and if that 
was for two weeks or, you know, well its now been five months and 
he hasn’t got any worse.   (Margaret, re: Mitch). 
 
Or, more usually, changes in quality of life could be the spur that prompted the 
owner to choose euthanasia.   
 
So his quality of life in his last few years was going to be very 
compromised.  Even at that they didn’t know if it was survivable, 
they were fairly confident that it might be, so the decision was 
made that it was probably best to just let him go.    
 (Amanda, re: Lloyd)  
 
Quality of life is also implicated in arguments in support of human euthanasia 
(Pitcher; 2010, Warnock and MacDonald, 2008; Peck, 1997). The particular 
aspects of quality of life identified as significant for the canine companions, 
seemed to be closely related to the companion and owner being able to 
maintain the usual standards home cleanliness and personal hygiene. Being 
able to continue, unaided, with the everyday practices of eating, drinking, going 
outside for walks and toileting, emerged as the four instrumental concerns, 
when owners were considering the euthanasia of their companion.   
 
So he’s getting more of these little things over him but she {the vet} 
said that’s quite normal, because he doesn’t have anything like that, 
you know, so, but you, know, the fact is as long as he continues to, 
you know, be the way he is then I don’t have any concerns, but I 
mean, I do check him a lot more regularly now just to see, but you 
know, a lot of it is you can see what he’s like by his demeanour, you 
know, he always wants to come out, he’s drinking plenty and he still 
eats and, he does all the things that are important.  The day he 
doesn’t want to go out for a walk will be the day I’ll really have to sit 
down and think ‘ well, you know, it’s maybe come to a point now 
where he’s not, he’s just not got it in him anymore’.   
 (Margaret, re: Mitch). 
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As long as Mitch is eating, drinking, going for walks (however slow and brief) 
and toileting unassisted, Margaret will not have him euthanized.  In this sense 
the everyday routines of life are not only part of the fabric of the everyday world 
in which Mitch lives, but they become the value system against which it is 
determined whether or not his life is worth living at all.   
 
It is not only the quality of life of the companion that is the concern, “what 
applies to self applies to body” (Giddens, 1993:31).  The companion canine 
body, like the civilised human body, is expected to be a disciplined body, which 
adheres in its everyday practices to the physical, and the moral standards, 
expected for the relationship between an individual and society (Foucault, 
1963). An inability for the canine to conform to the normative standards of 
hygiene and cleanliness, of both the self and the home, can be a precipitating 
factor in the decision to have the companion euthanized.  This was the case 
with Ted, an elderly male collie living in an upper working class residential 
estate in central Scotland.  Ted had had a series of health issues, however, it 
seemed to be the day he lost bowel control and rendered the livingroom 
unhygienic, that was the deciding factor in his being put to sleep.   
 
The watching and negotiation that are the hallmarks of the process of dying for 
the companion canines was ongoing, but the critical moment of decision 
appeared to focus on the loss of bodily control and, what is presented as an 
untenable, breach by Ted of the normative standards of hygiene of the home.   
 
We came in on the Tuesday afternoon after work and oh my 
goodness.  You opened that door and I have never smelt a smell 
like this in my life before. He had thrown up and had diarrhoea.  But 
it didn't smell like normal diarrhoea, I couldn't imagine even 
describing what it smelt like, it was just putrid, absolutely putrid. To 
the point that we actually, we had two rugs through in the dining 
room.  We just literally folded them up and threw them straight into 
the bin. It was everywhere and it was, put it this way, we were going 
to have a chicken korma that night, no it was a stew we were 
having that night, and we'd looked at the stew and we looked at the 
diarrhoea and 'well we'll not be eating that!' [laugh]. He was so 
miserable, we just went down to the vets and it was like, you know, 
this just isn't funny.  (Susan, re: Ted)    
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When the companion canine is unable to maintain the bodily control necessary 
for the normative level of cleanliness in the home, the presentation of the family 
as a respectable one is also potentially compromised. It is to this issue of 
presentation of a positive social identity that this chapter now turns.   
 
9.4. The Good Owner  
A concern with wellbeing is not necessarily limited to a concern for the self.  
Convery et al. (2008) point out, that while it may appear paradoxical, farmers 
may experience concern for the wellbeing of their herds, even if they are 
destined for the slaughterhouse. This concern and interest in the wellbeing of 
the other is also present in human and companion canine relations (Sanders, 
1999).   
 
Rebekah  So I was quite concerned when I saw him like that, I 
thought ‘Something’s not right here at all, there’s 
something not right.   
Ross He was just like an old dog, he’d suddenly become old 
and infirm, well not infirm but still, couldn’t’ walk, 
geriatric.   
Rebekah And my Mum’s saying ‘Ocht, don’t waste your money, 
if that happens again just give him some Calpol.  But I 
thought, ‘I don’t know what’s going on in his wee 
body, I’m not going to take that risk’ … 
Ross So if we can afford it we’d rather see him alright 
because he’s a life.   
Rebekah He’s a life. 
Ross And that’s more important than the cost at the end of 
the day.   (Rebekah and Ross, re: Rusty) 
 
Ross and Rebekah provided a home for Rusty, he was well fed, had canine 
playmates and activities. Rusty was cared for at Rebekah’s mothers house five 
days a week whilst the couple were away at work (Transcript 11 June 2011).  
Caretaking was arranged for Rusty if they went away on holiday and there was 
extensive attention to both his physical and emotional wellbeing.  As Tronto 
observes, interest in the wellbeing of another, caring, particularly in its ethical 
aspect, relates to attention and “is a quality of the morally good person” (Tronto, 
1993:126).  The owner who cares for their dogs is the responsible, socially 
approved and morally upstanding owner, in short they are the ‘good owner’.  
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The ‘good owner’ can be understood as a role, with associated assumptions 
and expectations. Features of the role of the ‘good owner’ include: a concern 
for wellbeing of the canine, an ethical and compassionate consciousness, to be 
a responsible owner, mindful of the expectations of the wider society that a 
canine be well behaved, non-aggressive and not creating noise or disturbance, 
presenting the image of an upstanding and respectable person, with a particular 
emphasis on compassion and kindly care for another living being.   
 
The ‘good owner’ is expected to be considerate of the needs of others in the 
wider society, to keep their canine disciplined and restrained, either with 
training or on the lead.  They are to be the “pack leader” (Milan, 2008:223) who 
is in command and responsible for the behaviour of the companion.   
 
You’ve always got to be one ahead of them and you’ve always got 
to be the pack leader, otherwise they just run riot.  As my nephew 
found out to his cost.   (Susan) 
 
The ‘good owner’ keeps their canines disciplined and their behaviour in 
accordance with norms of acceptable conduct for canines in public, that is 
quiet, friendly, clean, and obedient.   The behaviour of the canine reflects on the 
identity of the owner and the family they both represent, the ‘good owner’ is not 
only a role, it is also a display, signalling the moral standing of a family.  As 
Finch argued, “my central argument is that families need to be ‘displayed’ as 
well as ‘done’’” (Finch, 2007:66, emphasis in the original).  Canine behaviour, 
and their care, is implicated in the display of family.   
 
The ‘good owner’ is assumed to love and care for their companions, and to 
notice and attend to their needs, making canine wellbeing a priority.  Care is 
both a concept and an activity, “which connotes some kind of engagement” 
(Tronto, 1993:102) and the giving of time and resources. To be loved is to be 
given time, attention and embraced in the activities of the lover (Fromm, 1995).  
Winston and Rose shared long walks together, he spoke with Rose as he 
studied in the kitchen whilst she lay beside him, and at the end of the day they 
sat in front of the fire in the livingroom together (Transcripts and Fieldnotes, 23 
June 2011). Love moves us to interact, as Jackson emphasises “love cannot be 
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treated as if it has an existence independent of the social” (1993:202). The 
discourse of love includes themes of sacrifice, which are echoed in the 
sacrifices of time and money, which owners report giving to their companion 
animals.  The discourse of love also contains a belief in the power of love to 
transform a being from badness to goodness. The position of the lover is a 
morally superior stance, understood as being indicative of a good person, even 
as owners may present the impression of the ‘good owner’ when they rush 
home from work to care for an ill canine (Transcripts, Rebekah and Ross, 11 
June 2011), or take the decision to choose euthanasia to alleviate suffering 
(Transcripts, Susan and Frank, 17 September 2011).  
 
 
Figure 23 – the companions are considered to show their love by their desire to be 
near their owner and each other, Rusty and Glen, 18 November 2011 
 
The companion canines, who are understood as displaying their love by their 
desire for proximity and expression of pleasure in the company of their owner, 
are also the good pet, that is the loving pet; the greater the desire for proximity, 
the greater the rapport and perhaps also the greater the assumption of the 
companion’s love.   
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Since she [Sierra] has hurt her back she has been very attached to 
me.  I cannot get off the couch without her going where ever I am 
going … Kari is a wee bit of a slut.  It doesn’t matter who she will go 
from one person to another, it doesn’t matter.  Whoever is going to 
give attention she will [laughs].   (Susan, re: Sierra and Kari)  
 
In a Durkheimian sense, the identity of the good owner can also be emphasised 
by drawing attention to ‘bad owners’, who are uncaring, or actively cruel 
towards their canines.  In this sense the goodness and kindness of the owner is 
stated in opposition to the deviant practices of animal cruelty.  The deviance in 
this case is serving to reinforce the positive values, and emphasise the moral 
integrity and standing, of the ‘good owner’. This can be particularly vividly seen 
in the acquisition narratives where the companion canine has been taken from 
a situation of abuse, and acquired by their new owner.   
 
She had been a rescue dog who was found in a flat in XXX in a 
cupboard. I think I have told you already. I had a friend who worked 
for the RSPCA and they found 2 dogs in a cupboard in an 
abandoned flat in XXX. Someone has reported that they had heard 
strange noises. And they had gone in and there was 2 dogs. A 
German Shepherd and Doberman Pincher… So she was picking 
up.   She still looked like she was a sick old puppy, we do not know 
how old she was.  Oh She was dreadfully emanciated.  She had no 
muscle, she had actually got to the stage that she was so starved 
that her body had started to eat the muscle.   (Amanda, re: Yara) 
 
In this acquisition narrative Amanda and her family rescue Yara from isolation, 
torture and starvation. This act of rescue emphasises the moral goodness of 
the owner, indeed such is the moral goodness of rescuing a suffering animal, 
that it can override a normative expectation not to steal.  Two of the canines in 
this study were taken by their new owners, without the previous owners 
knowledge or consent.  The narratives here are being deployed to construct 
and maintain the family members’ identity as morally upright persons (Owens et 
al., 2008; Pietilä, 2002 cited in Owens et al., 2008).  
 
The ‘good owner’ has the status of a person who is beneficent, it is a positive 
social identity which may serve to enhance the standing of the human, in their 
own eyes and in the eyes of others, and may thus contribute to the human 
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owners wellbeing. This presentation of the ‘good owner’ was achieved by a 
variety of means, involving both the presentation of the self as caring and 
conscientious and involving the other of the animal, as loving and disciplined, 
that is the ‘good pet’.   
 
But she was very good because if she was off the lead and a car 
was coming, I would say ‘Rose, car’ and she would sit, stop rigid 
and I would just walk up and put the lead on her, but by that time 
the car was probably past her, I then let her off again. But she was 
very knowledgeable about road safety, self-preservation. She was 
good at that and if I wanted her to walk beside me I’d say ‘beside 
me Rose, walk beside me’. She would come to my left side and 
walk and she would always look up at me ‘when are you going to let 
me away?’  (Winston, re: Rose) 
 
Rose is obedient to her owner and disciplined, also by implication, the needs of 
the wider society, in terms of road users, are being considered, and Rose is not 
causing any inconvenience or danger to other people.  This presentation of self 
of the owner, reflected in the behaviour of the animal, and also the appearance, 
and cleanliness, of the home, could be understood in terms of impression 
management (Goffman, 1959), particularly those forms of impression 
management concerned with the avoidance of stigma (Goffman, 1968b). Of the 
three forms of potential stigmatisation that Goffman discusses, this would be 
related to those potential “blemishes of individual character”, rather than those 
of the body or tribe (1968b:14). I would consider that what was encountered 
was not the management of full blow stigma, but was rather dealing with 
aspects that may be “discreditable” (Goffman, 1968b:14). The management of 
the persona of the animal as the ‘good pet’, all the human participants identified 
their current canines are predominately good (with the exception of Fritz), 
seems to be a form of identity management.  Further, the owner’s effort to 
manage the identity of the companion canine is suggestive of the animal’s 
identity being linked to that of the owner.  The physical being of the canine also 
reflects on the owner, in the case of an overweight dog: 
 
Either owners are presumed to be deficient in their knowledge about diet, 
physical activity, and what constitutes a health body condition for a dog; 
or they are presumed to be deficient in the type of relationship that they 
have allowed to form with their dog.  In both instances, the problem is 
construed as a moral failing.   (Degeling and Rock, 2012:41).   
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That is a moral failing in the human owner, as well as it possibly being seen as 
greediness on the part of the companion canine. Being a ‘good pet’, as explored 
in Chapter 6, also encompassed not being unwell, wellness was regarded as 
normative, and the ‘good pet’ is also the healthy, slim and active pet.   
 
9.5. Interplays of Wellbeing  
Humans are a social species (Haraway, 2003), this is not a mere adjunct or 
potential of humanity, but rather a primary and profound aspect of our being 
(Goffman, 1968a).  To be with a canine companion is to be with another, also 
social, being.  The canines would seek out the company of the humans, and the 
humans the company of the canines. This mutual sociability itself can be 
beneficial for humans.   
 
 
Figure 24 – mutual sociability and eye contact was a feature of the human and 
companion canine relations, Diesel and Mason, 8 March 2011 
 
As Rosenhan observed, “eye contact and verbal contact reflect concern and 
individuation; their absence, avoidance and depersonalisation” (1973:250), for a 
social species to be regarded with concern, as in the face gazing of the canines, 
can be a beneficial experience.   
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He's changed us, you know, very much he is our family, we feel 
like a family unit.  And people say 'oh shouldn't be a substitute 
child, you know, this that and the next thing'.  And I don't care 
about that, all that matters to us is he is a wee creature, he's a 
living being, we love him, he loves us and we just.  We give and 
take so much from each other. He's just, he's a wonderful wee 
thing.  He's just brought so much joy and fun into our lives and 
he's so easy to love and, you know, he gives us so much love 
back. He's affectionate, I always say 'mummy Rusty cuddles' and 
it's usually at bedtime he likes his cuddles, but I've got to stand 
up, I've done it since he was a puppy, and I hold him in my arms 
and straight away over my arm the head goes down and within 
seconds [snore sound] he's snoring away, but if you sit down it's 
like 'you've changed your position' and that's not the same… He 
loves to get his cuddles with mummy. And yet he goes to Ross 
sometimes, it's like he wants dad, we'll be sitting watching TV and 
he's not a lap dog, he never sort of comes up and sits on your lap, 
but he'll come up and he'll sit at the side of Ross and sort of 
nuzzle in and that's him, you know, quite happy, sit there for 
hours, you know, 'I want to be with my dad' and other times he 
comes up beside me, you know, and he'll sit on the arm of the 
chair and sort of cuddle in and it's like 'I want to be with my mum'.  
 (Rebekah, re: Rusty and Ross) 
 
The mutual desire to be with each other is a joy to Rebekah and Ross, though 
they struggle to find a form in which their deep love and care for Rusty can be 
understood by those around them. Charles and Davies found that the owners 
they spoke with “tended to ‘test the water’ to see how the interviewer would 
react to any revelations about animals as family members” (2008:unlisted 
pages).   
 
Whilst I did not encounter much testing of the water on this issue, possibly due 
to the much smaller sample size and greater time spent building rapport in my 
study, the owners did express a conflict between how they experienced their 
companion canines as family, and how they were expected to relate to their 
companions as “just a dog” (Arluke, 2006;1).   
 
 Although it can be regarded by wider society as transgressing the social 
boundaries between human and nonhuman to view a pet as your child (Charles 
and Davies 2008), some of the owners, including Susan and Irma, explicitly 
referred to their canine companions as being their children. Regardless of 
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whether or not the companions were viewed as children, they were all 
considered family members.  As Charles and Davies found in their exploration 
of pets as kin; 
 
What is abundantly clear from our finding is that the animals are 
regarded as important members of kinship networks and that they 
operate as social actors within these networks. 
 (Charles and Davies, 2008:unlisted pages)  
 
Moreover it is at the level of the everyday interactions, the cycle of the daily 
routine of waking, walking, eating and relaxing together that family seems to be 
both enacted and experienced.  In Morrow’s study of British children’s 
relationship with their companion animals she found that the animals were also 
understood as family members by the children, and that “their pets were 
mentioned as part of their daily routine” (1998:222).   It is by way of this 
enmeshing of human and companion canine in everyday family life that 
interplays of wellbeing come into force. The canines contribute to the stability 
and coherence of everyday life, and therefore to wellbeing, by being an active 
part of the structures of routine and ritualised social interactions; the morning 
walks, meals together, evenings in front of the TV, and settling down for bed, 
that form the foundation of the lives of the human owners.  As Jamieson, though 
she was referring to humans, observes “a sense of a solid unchanging world, a 
stable society and a stable self can only be achieved through intense, face-to-
face, sustained interaction” (1988:3).   
 
Interplays of human and canine wellbeing can also be seen in the detrimental 
effect on wellbeing of disruption to the everyday practices of being and living 
together.  As Giddens noticed, “the individual is morally and psychologically 
vulnerable whenever established routines are broken” (1993:175).  When Stuart 
was hospitalised, having been overcome with acute physical pain at home, and 
then diagnosed with Crohn's Disease, he experienced not only a dislocation 
from his home, but also a dislocation from the normal routine of everyday life 
with the companion canines:  
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It’s nothing that I can say, ‘yeah this is what they do/this is what I 
miss’ eh.  It’s just all the little things, you know.  Just having a cup of 
tea and a biscuit at three o'clock, when they came round with the 
cup of tea and a biscuit.  Now normally if you have a cup of tea and 
a biscuit in this house – as you’ll know very shortly when we let 
them out – you will have two dogs stuck to your leg.  Yeah, well it’s 
just little things like that, you know.  Things like ‘oh I didn’t want the 
crust off that, I’ll give it to the [pause] no I can't give it to the dog 
because he’s not here’ you know.  It’s little things that you think 
‘aw’.  It’s just wee things like that that you would miss.  You know, 
even just feeding them in the morning, you think ‘I’ll be feeding the 
dog now’ but there was, there’s nothing specific.  It’s all just a small 
bits and pieces of detail that you would miss, things that you 
wouldn’t think about that you’ve even done, but that’s the biggest 
thing.  (Stuart)  
 
Mead stressed that “all living organisms are bound up in a general social 
environment or situation” (1934:228).  This general social environment, with its 
everyday routines of living together, is part of the foundation of human being in 
the world, and human wellbeing.  When this foundation of the everyday taken-
for-granted routines of living is disrupted, wellbeing and the sense of a secure 
self and society is disrupted along with it; because the sense of a stable self 
and society, the framework of meaning upon which humans live their lives, is 
born in the social matrix (Jamieson, 1988).  In Becker’s words, whilst "men [sic] 
are congenitally compelled to impose a meaningful order upon reality” 
(1973:31), and we rely upon this meaningful order for existence, "all our 
meanings are built into us from the outside, from our dealings with others" 
(Becker, 1973:48), and as Goffman (1973) would add, particularly by our 
predictable and taken-for-granted interactions with others.    
 
The serious illness or death of a companion canine can rip a hole in this fabric 
of taken-for-granted routines, leaving the human animal exposed to the 
awareness of their fragility in the world (Becker, 1973), and the fragility of the 
social world itself, which the multifarious practices of everyday life conceal 
(Goffman, 1973). There is a sense of shock, and a sudden violation of the 
taken-for-granted meaning of objects and places:  
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So I went and dug a grave for her and I put her favourite blanket 
down with all her toys, put her in with her toys, covered her up and 
that was it.  But Stacie had came out and said to me.  ‘Matthew are 
you alright’, I said, ‘I’m sad’.  She says ‘Your hair’s turned chalk 
white, you’ve took a wee bit of a stroke I think’. (Matthew, re: Brandy) 
 
The holes in the everyday fabric of their routine of being with the canine 
companions are a source of suffering for the human owner.  It was as if they 
were travelling through their days on tracks that guided them around the 
landscape of everyday life, only to find, when the canine died, that the patterns 
of daily interactions through which they normally travelled were gone, 
irrevocably changed, and the world that was left, was a more lonely and hostile 
place.   
Every time I thought of her I would look [pause].  And just see in the 
morning I would eat my toast, I always kept the [pause] it doesn't 
matter, she’s not there. But that memory kept on coming flooding 
back because if you were eating a biscuit you gave her a bit of your 
biscuit. Yeah.  It was if Brandy’s here, I’ll give her that.  It was habit 
forming and the same thing when she died, we were still doing the 
same thing, we were putting down expecting Brandy to take it off of 
my finger.  And I went like that ‘geez, this is [pause]’.  It took me a 
long time, maybe a year to get over that.  A full year because you 
see every time I seen a Golden Labrador, Brandy, Brandy.  I don't 
know, it hurt so much [pause] I think I became a wee bit withdrawn 
for a while, I didn’t want to bother with people, just leave me alone, 
let me be myself.  (Matthew, re: Brandy)  
 
When the connection point to life, others and the world, that the companion 
represented was lost, Matthew found himself withdrawing, and colleagues at his 
work became concerned for his wellbeing (Transcript, 23 June 2012).   
 
Companion canine relations can contribute towards human wellbeing because, 
“there is no living organism of any kind whose nature or constitution is such that 
it could exist or maintain itself in complete isolation from all other living 
organisms” (Mead, 1934:228).  Human and companion canine bonds may, at 
least in part, satisfy the profound human desire for society and mutual 
sociability. The maintenance of the social bond “keeps us alive” (Seale, 
1998:30), though Seale was referring to human-human bonds, human-canine 
bonds may also meet this human need for other living creatures to relate to.   
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In the extreme, Villalta-Gil et al. (2009) found that humans experiencing 
pronounced social withdrawal, having been institutionalised for chronic 
schizophrenia, benefited from engagement with a therapy canine, and 
recommend that “introducing dogs into some psychosocial interventions may 
facilitate the patients’ social abilities, thus improving their ability to function in 
the community” (Villalta-Gil, et al., 2009:157), a dog may ease social isolation.  
However, Villalta-Gil et al., (2009) are looking at transient involvement with a 
therapy canine, not the long term intertwining of lives that accompanies 
permanent canine companionship.  Involvement with canines may be beneficial 
for human health, by providing interest and engagement to the life of someone 
institutionalised with schizophrenia, but my research finds that the relation of 
canine companionship to human wellbeing is more complex. Interplays of 
wellbeing in the relationship between human and companion canine can 
manifest in three different ways: first they may be in a form in which wellbeing is 
promoted, second a disturbance in welfare can be mutually experienced, even 
reinforced, by the interplays between human and canine, finally the relationship 
with the companion canine may be deleterious for human wellbeing.   
 
To take the first of these scenarios, as companions the canines were able to 
support human wellbeing, providing the humans a sense of not being alone, and 
that there was someone who cared about them and would comfort them in times 
of trial.   
And as I say, whenever you, you know, being upset, it is quite nice 
to know that there is something, as you say, a living being there… 
she is solid, she is a peaceful dog.  I mean, she has her moments 
obviously, but you know what I mean, there is something peaceful 
about her... You know there’s something, I think then you know 
there’s somebody there…she likes a cuddle, you just sort of cuddle 
her cause she’s a very nice dog to cuddle.   (Olga, re: Pandora)   
 
Olga found Pandora’s companionship beneficial, finding her to be “a comfort, a 
confidant” (Adkins and Rajecki, 1999:33), during her grief at the death of her 
mother.  But it was not only human wellbeing that could be supported by canine 
companionship.  As in Lauder Lindsay’s early work (1880), in which he 
proposed that animals were capable to experiencing forms of mental illness 
similar to those found in humans, the canines were understood as being 
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subjects themselves and therefore also capable of experiencing suffering in its 
non-physical aspects.  When the elderly collie Ted seemed to succumb to 
melancholia at losing his sight, it was the youngest collie Kari, who responded 
to him:  
 
Yes, I mean he would just walk around the house not doing very 
much. Whereas before he would pick up a toy or whatever. But Kari 
seemed to notice that you know, that he wasn’t quite the same.  So 
she ended up taking the toys to him, because the two of them used 
to play with the rag or what we called the raggy, its like the pull toy 
and you know, and she would find that he was not going for it, he 
would walk past it he wouldn’t pick-u-up and whatever.  And he had 
became quite depressed you know, he was just lying there and 
obviously not a happy bunny …  But Kari used to actually bring the 
toys up … maybe because he was not running for the toys and 
playing with them so she was actually taking the toys to him.   
  (Susan, re: Kari and Ted)  
 
By encouraging Ted  to play, come out of his bed and be part of the family, Kari 
supported his wellbeing.   
 
 
Figure 25 – the canines also comforted each other, Ted and Sierra, 17 September 
2011  
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In the second scenario, a disturbance in welfare can be mutually experienced 
by the human owner and their companion(s).  Interplays of wellbeing could be 
found in a context where both human and canine were subject to the same 
adverse conditions; living in the atmosphere of violence engendered by Irma’s 
abusive husband, both Irma and her two canine companions experienced 
distress. 
 
Braxton was clingy and stayed very close to Irma, and Zayne became 
aggressive and violent (Fieldnotes, 12 November 2011), but when her husband 
left, Irma’s sense of wellbeing, and also her relationship with her companions, 
and Zayne’s way of relating to others, was transformed;  
 I was really proud of him, really, really proud, I've explained to you 
how proud I was, it’s like, you know, a kid winning a gold medal or 
something like that, I was so proud of him, cause my family always 
think, you know, he’s a wee yelp and my brother in law is scared of 
him because, you know, and my brother even thinks ‘oh my God 
he’s a little toe rag’, but they all said how well behaved he was and 
aw he was just and even my sister in law says ‘oh I just can't 
believe that, just’.  Cause we were both watching being a bit wary, 
but then he just, aw it was just, he cuddled into her and she’s you 
know, and the paw’s up like that and she’s just petting his stomach 
and I looked at my sister in law and I says ‘you wouldn’t have seen 
that a year ago!’ she says ‘I would never have thought that a year 
ago’, just different dog … I've been a lot calmer, yeah.  I've been a 
lot more relaxed yeah, not on edge, so yeah, and I definitely think 
that the two are connected, definitely think and I think because Jack 
Russells do tend to have one master, and when he was here I think 
he was his master, he would only take a telling from him.  But I think 
because the more he was scared of him [dog groaning] rather than.  
But, you know, just big difference in him, it is a different dog, he is a 
different dog, cause at one point I thought I was going to have to 
part with him because he kept going for me, and I thought ‘I can't, I 
can't’ and actually my ex turned round and says to me ‘he’s going, 
I'm not having him biting anybody, he’s going’ and I thought, I 
mean, he was adamant and I thought ‘no, persevere with him’ and 
you know, I'm glad I did.                                           (Irma, re: Zayne) 
 
As the home became a safer place to be, the wellbeing, and positive forms of 
interaction increased, for both the human owner and her companions 
(Fieldnotes, 11 February, 2012).  They had together been subject to a 
detrimental influence upon their wellbeing, and when it was removed, they all 
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began to flourish. (As discussed in Chapter 7 perhaps the previous negative 
pattern of interacting between Irma and Zayne may in some way have served to 
reinforce the oppressiveness within the home, even as the new positive patterns 
of interacting seemed to reinforce the wellbeing of human and canine, but this is 
only conjecture).   
 
Whilst canine companionship may be beneficial for human wellbeing, or human 
and canine may suffer under threats to their welfare together, the relationship 
with the canine could, at times, be deleterious to human wellbeing. It is 
problematic for an owner, who is under the obligation to be the ‘good owner’ 
who copes well with, and cares for their companion canine, to admit to hostile 
feelings towards them.  Rowan had profound difficulties in her relationship with 
Fritz, particularly during their early years, and she considers that her strained 
relationship with him, contributed to her poor mental health;  
 
Rowan  So we took Fritz home and we kept him for a year and 
I couldn’t stand it, absolutely I was.  I was on the edge 
of depression.  
Gregor He was ripping everything up, skirting board and. 
Rowan Ripped the house to sheds, he was. 
Gregor Ripping up the flooring. 
Rowan  Biting us, he was us a psycho.  He was very highly 
strung but he was like, he had so many psychological 
problems.  You couldn’t put your hand out to put a 
lead or anything on him.  He would just start to bite 
me.  And I wasn’t very well, obviously my nerves were 
really bad at the time.  I had a short fuse, the dog had 
an even shorter fuse and I could just have seen him 
far enough.  I’d never felt like that before. 
    (Gregor and Rowan, re: Fritz) 
 
At one point Fritz, forced Rowan to the ground with his teeth around her head, 
Gregor and Rowan eventually returned Fritz to the woman who had sold him to 
them, yet after three days, during which time Rowan was inconsolable, they felt 
such commitment to him that they brought him back (Fieldnotes, 31 January 
2012).  In the words of Himsworth and Rock, from their study of pet ownership 
and life satisfaction among senior Canadians, “whether pet ownership correlates 
with satisfaction with life appears to depend on the presence and nature of other 
domestic relationships” (2013:295). The nature of the domestic relationship 
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matters, in this case, where the relationship is harmonious, the interplays of 
wellbeing between human and canine are beneficial, where the relationship is 
disharmonious it can be disruptive to human wellbeing.   
 
Summary  
Detailed everyday practices were found at each of the research sites, and these 
routines not only served to create a sense of family, but also enabled a linking of 
human and canine subjectivity. Profound interweaving of human and canine 
everyday life was apparent, and this itself seemed to be the point of connection 
between the interplays of human and canine wellbeing. The meshing of human 
and canine everyday practices challenges the assumption that companion 
canines occupation a liminal state, rather it is the justification for their 
established position within the families that seems to be weak.  Disruptions to 
the everyday practices of life were involved in concerns regarding the quality of 
life of the companion, and this was a critical issue in owners’ negotiated process 
of deciding whether or not to have a companion euthanized.   
 
The canine companion body was expected to be a disciplined body, and the 
canine was required to be able to maintain normative levels of bodily and 
behavioural control.  If normative standards of hygiene, of both self and home, 
could not be maintained, such a normative failure may prompt the owners to 
have their companion euthanized.   A high level of care for the canines was 
apparent and this care for the companion was linked to identity of the owner as 
a ‘good owner’.  The ‘good owner’ appeared to be a role with expectations of 
behaviour and attitude, and whilst the owner is expected to be a good owner, 
the companion is also expected to be a good pet.  The interweaving of everyday 
life seems to be a nexus for interplays of human and canine wellbeing.  The 
human owners experienced being with their companions as beneficial and 
enriching, whilst being separated from them, through death or illness, dislocated 
the owners from the normal routines of being together, and was a cause of 
suffering and distress.  The relationship between companion canine ownership 
and human wellbeing is a complex phenomenon. The companions’ presence in 
the home may be beneficial, mutually reinforcing, or undermine human 
wellbeing, dependent upon the nature of the interaction and the context.    
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Chapter 10  ~  Conclusion  
 
This thesis represents an in depth study of human and animal relations, and 
makes an original contribution to the discipline of Sociology, by shedding light 
on the little understood dynamics of human and companion canine relations.  
The research explores the understanding of death and dying in the relationships 
between companion canines and their human owners in ten families living in 
Scotland.  Taking established sociological concepts, this work has extended the 
wisdom of sociological thought outward, and connected theories born of 
studying human-to-human interaction, across the human/animal divide at three 
key areas.  This has been done with particular attention to the thought of Mead, 
Goffman, Irvine and Sanders. The three key areas in which this thesis has 
extended understanding are: serious illness, the self and suffering; dying and 
meaning; and everyday practices and wellbeing.   
 
Overall, it has been found that sociological insight from human-human relations 
can be applied to human-animal relations, and that they enables us to see 
social functions, and dynamics of social interaction, buried in the social web.  
This research has found that the tools of Sociology have much to offer the wider 
body of science in the endeavour to understand human and nonhuman life. In 
particular, this research indicates that sociological insight can enrich and 
deepen an understanding of human and canine relations born of the veterinary 
and biomedical fields, by highlighting forces shaping human and canine 
relations beyond the biophysical and instinctual behavioural models.   I consider 
that the fledgling field of human and animal relations within Sociology has an 
enormous amount to offer the more established fields of veterinary, medical and 
psychological science, in advancing our understanding of humans and 
nonhumans.   
 
To conclude this thesis will now revisit the three research questions informing 
this work, and highlight the major findings in each area of study.   
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10.1 Major Findings  
The first research question explored the experience of serious illness in 
companion canines, for the owners and those in the animal’s immediate society.  
This was investigated in the light of sociological concepts that sensitise to subtle 
forms of suffering, such as the ideas of Charmaz (1983) on the impact of illness 
on selfhood, and Mort et al.’s (2007) work on emotional landscapes and 
disruptions to the social fabric.  Particular attention was given to Michael Bury’s 
(1982; 2001) work on biographical disruption. The first research question asks 
whether sociological insight based on the study of humans, could be applied to 
nonhuman illness and suffering, and related to this whether there were 
possibilities for a nonhuman selfhood; the experience of a self being implicated 
in the understanding of suffering. 
 
Nonhuman illness narratives were found in abundance in the data, and it does 
seem possible to apply Bury’s (1982;2001) concept of biographical disruption to 
the companion canines, which, to my knowledge, is the first time this concept 
has been applied to a nonhuman.  The application of biographical disruption to 
the companion canines is made possible by the imputation of an anticipated 
lifecourse to the canine, by their human family members; in combination with 
the canine’s own cycle of being; both sociological, in how they related to others 
and changes in their expression of agency, as well as their biological cycle.  
This is conceptualised as biographical disruption-by-proxy, where there is a 
disturbance in the established modes of being, and anticipated lifecourse of the 
companion.  
 
The discovery of nonhuman illness narratives and disrupted companion canine 
biographies, also raises questions about the nature of the self. Whilst Mead 
(1934) claimed that nonhumans could not be actors in the social web, due to 
their lack of mindfulness, Mead for this research, also provides part of the 
theoretical foundation that makes a nonhuman personhood possible.  Mead 
makes it possible by insisting that the self and consciousness is an emergent 
phenomenon with its genesis within the social web (Mead, 1934). Looked at in 
this light, I developed an original four-fold model of canine selfhood, as forged 
within a family, this is to thought to be the first model of a nonhuman 
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consciousness found in the discipline.  This model comprises the Enacted Self, 
the realm of character, the Latent Self, a private inner world, hidden and 
personal, only hinted at through dreams, the Enacted Kin, which is 
consciousness as forged by the identity of the family dog, and finally Latent Kin, 
where canine consciousness is moulded by intra-family dynamics. Being 
understood by those in their immediate society as having a self, also made 
possible forms of suffering that went beyond the physical for the canines.   
 
Based on my data, in terms of physical pain, the canines were understood as 
experiencing pain in a manner equivalent to that of the humans.  For the owners 
there existed an imperative to minimise canine suffering, in the role of the ‘good 
owner’.  This role served to shape human and canine relations with regard to 
pain, though the imperative to minimise canine pain was problematised by the 
voicelessness of the companions, who could not express their feelings and 
thoughts in human language.  Whilst unable to use human language the 
canines could express pain through their bodily actions and vocalisations, and 
they were regarded as being able to do this in a meaningful and minded way.  
Being minded and having a sense of self, the companions were understood to 
also be subject to the pain of loneliness and fear, even as the humans were.  
This commonality emerged as a point of connection between the canines and 
the humans, and there was a strong emphasis on the power, and practice, of 
being together.  Being together emerged as both something that was done and 
as an ideal, and the ending of togetherness brought with it grief.   
 
The second question this thesis addressed was to reveal the meanings 
surrounding the death and dying of a companion canine for their owner, and 
those in the animal’s immediate society. This was done to further the 
understanding of death and dying coming from human focused studies, such as 
Timmerman’s (2005;2010) work on constructing death, Becker’s (1973) insights 
into the denial of death, and Seale’s analysis of dying alone (1995a; 1995b; 
1998). It was found possible in my research to both work with, and to extend, an 
existing sociological understanding of death, to include dynamics shaping 
nonhuman dying in the case of companion canines.  Companion canine dying 
was found to be a negotiated process, shaped by a divide between gradual and 
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sudden death; and there was a privileging of the voice of the veterinarian in this 
process. Developed narratives of departure were encountered, that seem to 
structure the experience of losing a companion, and provide a way of sharing 
this experience with the wider society beyond the family. There was a 
pronounced preference by the participants for a ‘natural death’, and deep 
ambiguities in relation to choosing euthanasia. In particular the ambiguities 
reflect a conflict between the requirements of being a ‘good owner’, and 
choosing to have the creature in your care put down. There was a privileging of 
a biomedical view, which is also reflected in the given causes of death.  The 
given causes of death have similarities with the human declared causes of 
death in contemporary Scotland, and may reflect an interweaving of the 
understanding of human and canine life.  
 
The third, and final, objective of this thesis was to consider the everyday 
experience of living with a companion canine, and to examine any interplays of 
wellbeing between human and nonhuman that may be present.  During my 
fieldwork detailed everyday practices were found at each of the research sites, 
and a profound interweaving of human and canine everyday life was apparent.  
There was extensive routinisation of life with the canines, and disruptions to the 
everyday practices of living were involved in concerns regarding the quality of 
life of the companion, which emerged as a critical issue in the owners’ 
negotiated process of deciding whether or not to have a companion euthanized.   
 
Moreover, the canine companion body was expected to be a disciplined body, 
and failure of the canine to adhere to normative standards of bodily control may 
prompt the owners to have their companion euthanized.  A high level of care for 
the canines was apparent, and these acts of care were linked to identity of the 
owner as a ‘good owner’. Mort et al. (2007) suggested that interplays of 
human/animal wellbeing are embedded deep in the social web, beyond the 
access of the bio-medical frame alone.  My research supports this, and further 
suggests that the interweaving of human and canine in everyday life is a nexus 
for interplays of human and canine wellbeing.  Overall, the human owners 
experienced being with their companions as beneficial, whilst being separated 
from them, through death or illness, dislocated the owners from the normal 
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routines of being together, and was a cause of suffering. Nonetheless, the 
relationship between companion canine ownership and human wellbeing is a 
complex phenomenon; and the companions’ presence in the home may be 
beneficial, or it could mutually reinforce a disturbed pattern, or even actively 
undermine human wellbeing, dependent upon the nature of the interaction and 
the context.    
 
10.2 Future Possibilities  
In an under researched area the possibilities for future research are wide.  This 
study represents one of, if not the first, attempts to apply sociological 
understanding to the phenomenon of canine companion dying in contemporary 
Scotland.  As such it needs to be understood as limited, in that being an 
exploratory work it is not possible to be very definitive, and any connection 
made out with the study can only be tentative. I do consider that it would have 
benefited the work had I been able to observe the families for a longer period of 
time.  Perhaps by beginning contact during puppyhood and revisiting across the 
years, rather than focusing on one aspect of the lifecourse. It would also have 
been beneficial to revisit the families after my experience of losing Zak, as the 
loss of my own companion during the final write up phase gave me particular 
insight, which I would have applied by exploring different avenues of 
questioning during data gathering.  
 
Yet, despite these limitations, conducting this work has been an extraordinary 
experience, and it has been especially rewarding to stand at one of the 
expanding frontiers of our discipline and see our science in action. The human 
in companionship with their canine is such a taken-for-granted sight, yet it hides 
such mystery, and so many questions remain unanswered. How does this 
relationship begin, to what extent is the relationship moulded by wider social 
forces and what dynamics forge and sustain the patterns of interaction?   
 
It was unanticipated that a model for companion canine consciousness would 
emerge from the data, and it is a strength of this thesis that it offers Sociology 
its first model of a nonhuman consciousness.  It is my intention to take the 
opportunity to explore this discovery further.  For future research I would like to 
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investigate whether this model can be applied in other settings, and what are 
the implications of this discovery for the potential modelling of other forms of 
nonhuman consciousness?  Taking inspiration from Lauder Lindsay’s work 
Mind In the Lower Animals In Health and Disease (1880), and his contention 
that nonhuman consciousness could be subject to pathology, it could also be 
valuable to explore, from a more modern view than his, deviant dimensions of 
nonhuman consciousness. Do canines exhibit psychic pathology, and if so of 
what kind, and what remedial measures may be possible?    
 
This research has found that established sociological wisdom can be applied to 
a human-nonhuman interactional context. Moreover, in seeking to apply 
existent sociological concepts to human-canine relationship new applications 
and dimensions of experience have come to light.  It is testament to the power 
of Sociology to illuminate the hidden aspects of life and living, that it is able to 
reach across the human and animal divide and show us some of the treasures 
buried there.  It is my fervent hope that future work will take Sociology deeper 
into the animal-human nexus, and continue to explore the extraordinary that lies 
hidden in the everyday.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
~ 220 ~ 
 
References 
 
Alger, J. M. and Alger, S. F. (1999) ‘Cat Culture, Human Culture: An 
Ethnographic Study of a Cat Shelter’, Society and Animals, Journal of Human-
Animal Studies, 7, (3), pages not listed. 
 
Alger, J. M. and Alger, S. F. (1997) ‘Beyond Mead: Symbolic Interaction 
between Humans and Felines’, Society and Animals, 5, (1), 65-81. 
 
Allen, K. and Mendick, H. (2014) ‘Keeping it Real? Social Class, Young People 
and ‘Authenticity’ in Reality TV’, Sociology, 47, (3), 460-476. 
 
Allen-Collinson, J. (2009) ‘Intimate Intrusions Revisited: A Case of Intimate 
Partner Abuse and Violations of the Territories of the Self’, Qualitative 
Sociology Review, 5, (1), 50-69.  
 
Anderson, W. P., Reid, C. M., and Jennings, G. L. (1992). Pet ownership and 
risk factors for cardiovascular disease. Medical Journal of Australia, 157, 298–
301. 
 
Animal-Human Studies Group. Current Projects and Current PhDs.  Available 
from http://www.ahsg.co.uk/index.html [accessed 12 August 2012]. 
  
Arluke, A. (2006) Just a Dog: understanding animal cruelty and ourselves. 
Philapelphia: Temple University Press.  
 
Arluke, A. and Sanders, C. R. (1996) Regarding Animals. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 
 
Arluke, A. and Solot, D. (1997) ‘Learning The Scientist’s Role: Animal 
Dissection in Middle School’, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 26, (1), 
28-54.  
 
Associated Global Transport Services (no date) Solo Sailing and Psychological 
Failure.  Available at; http://www.associatedglobaltransportservices.com/solo-
sailing-psychological-failure/ [Accessed 15.7.2013]. 
 
Bauman, Z. and May, T. (1990) Thinking Sociologically. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing Limited.  
 
Bauman, Z. (1992) Mortality, Immortality & Other Life Strategies. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.  
 
Bauman, Z. (2001) The Individuated Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bauman, Z. (2005) Liquid Life. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Baun, M. M., Bergstrom, N., Langston, N. F., & Thoma, L. (1984). 
Physiological effects of human/companion animal bonding. Nursing Research, 
33, 126–129. 
~ 221 ~ 
 
 
BBC Ethics Guide (2013) Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide. 
Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/euthanasia/  [accessed 21 June  
2012] 
 
BBC News Science and Environment, 23/7/2013, Dolphins ‘call each other by 
name’ by Rebecca Morelle, Science reporter, BBC World Service.  Available 
from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-23410137 
 
BBC News, 21 November 2011, Chinese Dog Refuses to Leave Dead Owner’s 
Graveside. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-
15825892. [accessed 22/11/2011].  
 
BBC News, 6 August 2013, Killer Dogs’ Owners in England and Wales Could 
Face Life in Prison.  Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23578561 
[accessed 8/8/2013].  
 
Beauvoir, S. (1949) The Second Sex, London: Vintage. 
 
Becker, E. (1973) The Denial of Death. New York: Free Press Paperbacks.  
 
Becker, H. S. (1928) Tricks of the Trade: how to think about your research 
while you’re doing it.  London: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Becker, H. S., Geer, B., Hughes, E. C. and Strauss, A. L. (1961)  Boys in 
White: Student Culture in Medical School. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Beetz, A., Juliu, H., Turner, D. and Kotrschal, K. (2012) Effects of social 
support by a dog on stress modulation in male children with insecure 
attachment.  Frontiers in Psychology. 3, 352.  
 
Bekoff, M. (2006) ‘Animal Emotions and Animal Sentience and Why They 
Matter: Blending ‘Science Sense’ with Common Sense, Compassion and 
Heart’. In Turner, J., D’Silva, J. (eds.) Animals, Ethics and Trade: the challenge 
of animal sentience. London: Earthscan. 
 
Bekoff, M. (2006) Animal Passions and Beastly Virtues: Reflections on 
Redecorating Nature. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  
 
Bendelow, G. (1993) ‘Pain Perceptions, Emotions and Gender’, Sociology of 
Health and Illness, 15, (3), 273-294. 
 
Bendelow, G. A. and Williams, S. J. (1993) ‘Transcending the Dualisms: 
Towards a Sociology of Pain’, Sociology of Health and Illness, 17, (2), 139-
165.  
 
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1967) The Social Construction of Reality: a 
treatise in the sociology of knowledge. New York: Anchor Books.  
 
~ 222 ~ 
 
Bhatnagar, S. and Joshi, S. (2012) ‘”A Good Death”, Sequence (Not Stigma), 
to an Enigma Called Life: Case Report on End-of-Life Decision Making and 
Care’, American Journal of Hospice and Palliative Medicine, 30, (7), 626-627. 
 
Blaikie, A. (1999) Ageing and Popular Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Borgstrom, E., Barclay, S. and Cohn, S. (2013) ‘Constructing Denial as a 
Disease Object: Accounts by Medical Students Meeting Dying Patients’, 
Sociology of Health and Illness, 35, (3), 391-404.  
 
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. 
London, Routledge. 
 
Brown, N. O. (1968) Life Against Death: the psychoanalytical meaning of 
history. London: Sphere Books. 
 
Brownlie, J. and Howson, A. (2005)‘Leaps of Faith and MMR: an Empirical 
Study of Trust’, Sociology, 39, (4) 221-239. 
 
Brown-Saracino, J. (2014) ‘From Methodological Stumbles to Substantive 
Insights: Gaining Ethnographic Access in Queer Communities’, Qualitative 
Sociology, published online 21 January 2014. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com.ezproxy.stir.ac.uk/article/10.1007/s11133-013-9271-7  
 
Bryant, C. (1979) 'The Zoological Connection. Animal-related Human 
Behaviour', Social Forces, 58(2) p. 399–421. 
 
Burkitt, I. (2002) ‘Complex Emotions: Relations, Feelings and Images in 
Emotional Experience’, In: Barbalet, J. (ed) Emotions and Sociology. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 151-167.  
 
Bury, M. (1982) ‘Chronic Illness as Biographical Disruption’, Sociology of 
Health and Illness, 4, (2), 167-182. 
 
Bytheway, B. (1995) Ageism. Buckingham: Open University Press.  
 
Chandler, A. (2013) ‘Inviting Pain? Pain, dualism and Embodiment in 
Narratives of Self-injury’, Sociology of Health and Illness, 35, (5), 716-730.  
 
Chapela, M. C. (2013) ‘Is It Possible for Critical Social Sciences to Trespass 
the Biomedical Sciences Bunker in a Neoliberal Era?’, Cultural Studies-Critical 
Methodologies, 13, (6), 504-509.  
 
Charles, N. and Davies, C. A. (2008) ‘My Family and Other Animals: Pets as 
Kin’, Sociological Research Online, 13, (5), pages not listed. Available at: 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/5/4.html  
 
Charmaz, K. (1983) ‘Loss of Self: a Fundamental Form of Suffering in the 
Chronically Ill’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 5, (2), 168-195. 
~ 223 ~ 
 
Chen, K. K. (2012) ‘Charismatizing the Routine: Storytelling for Meaning and 
Agency in the Burning Man Organization’, Qualitative Sociology, 35, 311-334.  
 
Christiansen, S. B., Kristensen, A.T., Sandøe P. and Lassen, J. (2013) 
‘Looking After Chronically Ill Dogs: Impacts on the Caregiver’s Life’, 
Anthrozoös, 26, (4), 519-533.  
  
Coffey, A., Holbrook, B. and Atkinson, P. (1996) ‘Qualitative data analysis: 
technologies and representations’, Sociological Research Online, 1 (1), 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/1/1/4.html#top 
 
Cohen, J. and Richardson, J. (2003) ‘Pit Bull Panic’, Journal of Popular 
Culture, 36, (2), 285-317.  
   
Cohen-Almagor, R. (2003 Spring) ‘Non-voluntary and Involuntary Euthanasia 
in the Netherlands: Dutch Perspectives’, Issues in Law & Medicine, 18 (3), 
239-57. 
 
Coia, R. I. and Rusu, A. S. (2010) ‘Attitudes of Romanian Pet Caretakers 
towards Sterilization of their Animals: Gender Conflict over Male, but not 
Female, Companion Animals’, Anthrozoös, 23, (2), 185-191.  
 
Collins, R. (1992) Sociological Insight; an introduction to non-obvious 
Sociology. 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Convery, I., Mort, M., Baxter, J. and Bailey, C. (2008) Animal Disease and 
Human Trauma: Emotional Geographies of Disaster.  Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillian.  
 
Czarniawska, B. (2004) Narratives in Social Science Research. London: Sage. 
 
Dasgupta, P. (1993) An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Davies, H., Irwin, P., Richardson, M. and O’Brien-Malone, A. (2003) ‘When a 
Pet Dies: Religious Issues, Euthanasia and Strategies for Coping with 
Bereavement’, Anthrozoös, 16, (1), 57-74.  
 
Davis, H., Irwin, P., Richardson, M. and Obrian-Malone, A. (2003) ‘When a Pet 
Dies: Religious Issues, Euthanasia and Strategies for Coping with 
Bereavement’, Anthrozoös, 16, (1), 57-74.  
 
Davis, S. J. M. (1987) The Archaeology of Animals. Oxon: Routledge.   
 
Degling C., and Rock M. (2012) ‘Owning the Problem: Media Portrayals of 
Overweight Dogs and the Shared Determinants of the Health of Human and 
Companion Animal Populations’, Anthrozoös, 25, (1), 35-48.   
 
~ 224 ~ 
 
 
Delanty, G. and Strydom, P. (2003) Philosophies of Social Science, the classic 
and contemporary readings. Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) (2000) Handbook of Qualitative Research,  2nd 
edn, Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage. 
  
Denzin, N. K. (1984) ‘Toward a Phenomenology of Domestic, Family Violence’, 
American Journal of Sociology, 90, (3), 483-513.  
 
Derrida, J. (2008) The Animal That Therefore I Am. Fordham University Press: 
New York.   
 
Desougi, M. (2008) On Meaning and Companion Animals: interplays of well-
being. BA(hons), Edinburgh Napier University.   
 
Desougi, M. (2009) Ageing in Canine Companion Animal Ownership.  MSc, 
University of Stirling.   
 
Dinzelbacher, P. (2002) ‘Animal Trials: a Multidisciplinary Approach’, Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History,  32, 405-421.  
 
Elias, N. (1985) The Loneliness of the Dying. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
 
Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1956) Nuer Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Eysenk, M.W. (2000) Psychology: a student’s handbook. Hove: Psychology 
Press Limited. 
 
Field, N. P., Orsini, L., Gavish, R. and Packman W. (2009) ‘role of Attachment 
in Response to Pet Loss’, Death Studies, 33, 334-355.  
 
Finch, J. (2007) Displaying Families. Sociology, 41 (1), 65-81. 
 
Finnegan, D. A. (2008) ‘”An Aid to Mental Health”: Natural History, Alienists 
and Therapeutics in Victorian Scotland’, Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 39, 326-337.  
 
Flynn, C. P. (2000) ‘Battered Woman and Their Animal Companions: Symbolic 
Interaction Between Human and Nonhuman Animals’, Society and Animals, 8, 
(2), 99-127. 
 
Foucault, M. (1973) [1963] The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical 
Perception. New York: Pantheon. 
 
Foucault, M. (1991) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Middlesex: 
Penguin.  
 
Franklin, A. (1999) Animals and Modern Cultures. A Sociology of Human–
Animal Relations in Modernity. London: Sage. 
 
~ 225 ~ 
 
Fraser, J., Clayton, S., Sickler, J. and Taylor, A. (2009) ‘Belonging at the Zoo: 
Retired Volunteers, Conservation Activism and Collective Identity’, Ageing and 
Society, 29, 351-368.  
 
Freidson, E. (1970) Profession of Medicine: a study of the sociology of applied 
knowledge. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Freud, S. (1930) Civilisation and Its Discontents. London: Penguin Books.  
 
Friedmann, E., and Thomas, S. A. (1995). Pet ownership, social support, and 
one year survival after acute myocardial infarction in the cardiac arrhythmia 
suppression trial (CAST). American Journal of Cardiology, 76, 1213–1217. 
 
Friedmann, E., Locker, B. and Lockwood, R. (1993) ‘Perception of Animals 
and Cardiovascular Responses During Verbalization with an Animal Present. 
Anthrozoös, 7, (3), 115-134.  
 
Fromm, E. (1964) The Heart of Man. New York: American Mental Health 
Foundation Books.  
 
Fromm, E. (1995) The Art of Loving. London: Thorsons.  
 
Fulton, R. and Gottesman, D. J. (1980) ‘Anticipatory Grief: A Psychosocial 
Concept Reconsidered’, British Journal of Psychiatry, 137, 45-54.  
 
Furedi, F. (2002) Culture of Fear: risk-taking and the culture of low 
expectation. London: Continuum. 
 
Furedi, F. (2004) Therapy Culture: cultivating vulnerability in an uncertain age. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Garrity, T. F., Stallones, L., Marx, M. B. and Johnson, T. P. (1989) ‘Pet 
Ownership and Attachment as Supportive Factors in the Health of the Elderly’, 
Anthrozoös, 3, (1), 35-44.   
 
General Registrar of Scotland (2010), Vital Events Reference Tables, ‘Death 
by Frequency of Cause by Sex, Numbers and Percentages 1986 to 2010’ 
(Table 6.5).  Available at: http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/statistics/theme/vital-
events/general/ref-tables/archive/2010/deaths-causes.html 
 
Gergen, K. J. (1999) An Invitation to Social Construction. London: Sage.  
 
Giddens, A. (1993) The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and 
Eroticism in Modern Socieites. Oxford: Polity Press.  
 
Goffman, E. (1955, August) ‘On Face-work: an Analysis of Ritual Elements in 
Social Interaction’, Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes,18, (3), 
213-231.  
 
~ 226 ~ 
 
 
Goffman, E. (1964) ‘The Ethnography of Communication’, American 
Anthropologist, 66, (6), Part 2, 133-136.  
 
Goffman, E. (1968a) Asylums: essays on the social situation of mental patients 
and other inmates. London: Penguin Books. 
Goffman, E. (1968b) Stigma: notes on the management of spoiled identity. 
Middlesex: Penguin Books. 
 
Goffman, E. (1969) Where the Action is; three essays.  London: Allen Lane 
The Penguin Press  
 
Goffman, E. (1974) Frame Analysis; an essay on the organisation of 
experience. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Goffman, E. (1989) ‘On Fieldwork’, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 18, 
(2), 123-132.  
 
Gopher, A., Abbo, S. and Lev-Yadun, S. (2001) ‘The ‘when’, the ‘where’ and 
the ‘why’ of the Neolithic Revolution in the Levant’, Documenta Praehistorica, 
XXVIII, Neolithic Studies 8, pp. 49 – 62.  
 
Gorman, J. (2013) ‘Rights Group is Seeking Status of ‘Legal Person’, for 
Captive Chimpanzee’. New York Times. 2 December 2013. 
 
Grainger, R. (1998) The Social Symbolism of Grief and Mourning. London: 
Jessica Kingsley Publishers.   
 
Guenther, L. (2011) ‘Subjects Without a World? An Husserlian Analysis of 
Solitary Confinement’, Human Studies, 34, 257-276.  
 
Guisepi, R. A. ed. The Origins of Civilisations: the agrarian revolution and the 
birth of civilisation. Available from http://history-world.org/neolithic.htm 
[accessed 7 July 2009]. 
 
Gunnarsson, E. (2009) ‘I think I have had a Good Life’: the Everyday Lives of 
Older Women and Men from a Lifecourse Perspective’, Ageing and Society, 
29, 33-48.  
 
Guttmann G, Predovic M, Zemanek M. (1985) The influence of pet ownership 
on non-verbal communication and social competence in children. In: 
Kukacka P, ed. Proceedings of International Symposium on Human-Pet 
Relationships. Vienna: IEMT, 1985:58-63 
 
Guy, P. and Holoway, M. (2009) ‘Drug-related Deaths and the ‘Special Deaths’ 
of Late Modernity’, Sociology, 41, (1), 83-96.  
 
Haddow, G. (2005) ‘The Phenomenology of Death, Embodiment and Organ 
Transplantation’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 27, (1), 92-113.  
 
~ 227 ~ 
 
Handlin, L., Nilsson, A., Ejdebäck, M., Hydbring-Sandberg, E. and Uvnäs-
Mberg, K. (2012) ‘Associations between the Psychological Characteristics of 
the Human-Dog Relationship and Oxytocin and Cortisol Levels’, 
Anthrozoös,25, (2), 215-228.  
 
Haraway, D. (1991) Simians, Cyborgs and Women: the reinvention of nature. 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Haraway, D. (2003) The Companion Species manifesto; dogs, people, and 
significant otherness. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.  
 
Haraway, D. J. (2008) When Species Meet. London: University of Minnesota 
Press.  
 
Harden, J. (2005) ‘Parenting a Young Person with Mental Health Problems: 
Temporal Disruptions and Reconstruction’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 27, 3, 
351-371. 
 
Harrington, A. (2005) Modern Social Theory; an introduction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Hepworth, M. (2000) Stories of Ageing. Buckingham: Open University Press.  
 
Higgins, J. W., Temple, V., Murray, H., Kumm, E. and Rhodes, R. (2013) 
‘Walking Sole Mates: Dogs Motivating, Enabling and Supporting Guardians’ 
Physical Activity’,  Anthrozoös, 26, (2), 237-252.   
 
Himsworth, C. G. and Rock, M. (2013) ‘Pet Ownership, Other Domestic 
Relationships, and Satisfaction with Life among Seniors: Results from a 
Canadian National Survey’, Anthrozoös, 26, (2), 295-305. 
 
Hirst, K. K. Dog History: how were dogs domesticated? Available from 
http://archaeology.about.com/od/domestications/qt/dogs.htm [accessed 1 July 
2009].  
 
Hochschild, A. R. (1983) The Managed Heart: commercialisation of human 
feeling. London: University of California Press.  
 
Huang, C., Hu, Y., Liu, W., Zou, Z. J. and Sundell, J. (2013) ‘Pet-keeping and 
its Impact on Asthma and Allergies Among Preschool Children in Shanghai, 
China’, Chinese Science Bulletin, 58, (34), 4203-4210.  
 
Hubbard, G., Backett-Milburn K. and Kemmer, D. (2000) ‘Working with 
Emotion: Issues for the Researcher in Fieldwork and Teamwork’, International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology, 4, (2) 119-137.  
 
Humphrey, N. K. (1978) ‘Nature’s Psychologists’, New Scientist, 78, 900-903. 
 
~ 228 ~ 
 
 
Hydén L. and Peolsson, M. (2002) ‘Pain Gestures: the Orchestration of 
Speech and Body Gestures’, Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social 
Study of Health, Illness and Medicine, 6, (3), 325-345.  
 
Hyden, L. (1997)’Illness and Narrative’,  Sociology of Health & Illness, 19, (1), 
48-69.  
 
Inside the Animal Mind (2014) BBC Two Television, 4 February.   
 
Irvine, E. (Autumn, 2009) Personal email correspondence with the author.  
 
Irvine, L. (2003) ‘The Problem of Unwanted Pets: A Case Study in How 
Institutions “Think” about Client’s Needs, Social Problems, 50, (4), 550-566.  
 
Irvine, L. (2004a) ‘A Model of Animal Selfhood: Expanding Interactionist 
Possibilities’, Symbolic Interaction, 27, (1), 3-21.  
 
Irvine, L. (2004b) If You Tame Me: understanding our connection with animals.  
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  
 
Irvine, L. (2012) ‘Sociology and Anthrozoology: Symbolic Interactionist 
Contributions’, Anthrozoös, 25, (supplement), s123-s137.  
 
Irvine, L. (Autumn, 2003) ‘George’s Bulldog: What Mead’s Canine 
Companion Could have told him about the Self’, Sociological Originals, 3, 
(1), 46. 
 
Its Me or The Dog. Channel 4. Original run beginning 31 August 2005.   
 
Jackson, P. (2012) ‘Situated Activities in a Dog Park: Identity and Conflict in 
Human-Animal Space’, Society and Animals, 20, (3), 254-272.   
 
Jamieson, L. (1988) Intimacy: Personal Relationships in Modern Societies. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Janis Claxton (2011) Humanimalia.  Available at: 
http://www.janisclaxton.com/works/humanimalia. [accessed 10/2/2014].  
 
Jasper, J. M. & Nelkin, D. (1992) The Animal Rights Crusade: the growth of a 
moral protest. New York: Free Press. Cited by Alger, J.M. & Alger, S. F. (1997) 
Beyond Mead: Symbolic Interaction between Humans and Felines, Society 
and Animals, 5, (1), pp. 65-81. 
 
Jennings, G. L. R., Reid, C. M., Christy, I.,, Jennings, J., Anderson, W. P. and 
Dart, A. (1998) ‘Animals and Cardiovascular Health. In Companion Animals in 
Human Health, 161-171, ed., C. C. Wilson and D. C. Turner.  Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage.  
 
~ 229 ~ 
 
 
Jotkowitz, A., Glick, S., and Gesundheit, B. (2008) ‘A Case Against Justified 
Non-voluntary Active Euthanasia (The Groningen Protocol)’, American Journal 
of Bioethics, 8, (11), 23-26.  
 
Jutel, A. (2008) ‘Sociology of Diagnosis: a Preliminary Review’, Sociology of 
Health & Illness, 31, (2), 278-299.  
 
Kalof, L. (2007) Looking at Animals in Human History. London: Reaktion 
Books Ltd.  
 
Keele, U. (1997) Computer-assisted Analyses of Qualitative Data (papers in 
Social Research Methods, Qualitative Serios No.4) London: London School of 
Economics Methodology Institute in Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (2003) Qualitative 
Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers. 
London: Sage. 
 
Kellert, S. R. and Wilson, E. O. (1993) The Biophilia Hypothesis. Island Press: 
Washington DC.  
 
King, B (2013) ‘When Animals Mourn’, Scientific American, 309, (1), pages 
unlisted.  
 
Klocker, N. (2007) ‘An Example of Thin Agency: Child Domestic Workers in 
Tanzania’. In Panelli, R., Punch, S. and Robson, E. (eds.) Global Perspectives 
on Rural Childhood and Youth: Young Rural Lives. London: Routledge. 
 
Kristeva, J. (1989) Black Sun. Chichester: Columbia University Press.  
 
Kϋbler-Ross, E. (1970) On Death and Dying. London: Tavistock Publications 
Limited.   
 
Kϋbler-Ross, E. (1991) On Life after Death. New York: Celestial Arts.  
 
Lacan, J. (1973) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis. 
London: Karnac.  
 
Larsson, A. T. and Grassman, E. J. (2012) ‘Bodily Changes Among People 
Living with Physical Impairments and Chronic Illness: Biographical Disruptions 
or Normal Illness?’,  Sociology of Health and Illness, 34, (8) 1156-1169.  
 
Lauder Lindsay, W. (1880) Mind In The Lower Animals In Health and Disease: 
Mind in Disease. Vol 2. New York: D. Appleton and Company.  
 
Lawton, J. (2003) ‘Lay Experiences of Health and Illness: Past Research and 
Future Agendas’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 25, 23-40. 
 
~ 230 ~ 
 
 
Lee, S. A. and Surething, N. A. (2013) ‘Neuroticism and Religious Coping 
Uniquely Predict Distress Severity Among Bereaved  Pet Owners’, 
Anthrozoös, 26, (1), 61-76.  
 
Letherby, G. (2009) ‘Researching Reproductive Loss’, In: Earle, S., 
Komaromy, C. and Bartholomew, C. (eds) (2009) ‘Death and Dying: a Reader’, 
London: Sage.  
  
Lewis, C. S. (1940) The Problem of Pain. London: The Centenary Press.  
 
Liamputtong, P. and Ezzy, D.(2005) Qualitative Research Methods. 2nd edn, 
Melbourne: Oxford University Press.  
 
Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, G. E. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry, Beverley Hills, CA: 
Sage.  
 
Lobell, J. A. and Powell, E. (2010) ‘More Than Man’s Best Friend’, 
Archaeology, 63, (5), pages unlisted.  
 
Luske, B. (1990) Mirrors of Madness: Patrolling the Psychic Border. New York: 
Aldine de Gruyter.  
  
Mamo, L. (1999) ‘Death and Dying: Confluences of Emotion and Awareness’, 
Sociology of Health and Illness, 21, (1), 13-36.  
 
Manning, P. (1992) Erving Goffman and Modern Sociology.  Cambridge: Polity 
Press.  
 
Marcus, P. (2007) “I’m Just Wild About Harry!” A Psychoanalyst Reflects on 
His Relationship with His Dog’,  Psychoanalytic Review, 94, (4), 639-656.  
 
Mason, J. (2002) Qualitative Researching. 2nd edn, London: Sage. 
 
Mason, P. (1988) ‘The Excommunication of Caterpillars: Ethno-anthropological 
Remarks on the Trial and Punishment of Animals’, Social Science Information, 
27, 265-273. 
 
Masterton, J. F. (1990) Search For The Real Self: Unmasking The Personality 
Disorders Of Our Age. New York: The Free Press.  
 
McCreight, B. S. (2004) ‘A Grief Ignored: Narratives of Pregnancy Loss from a 
Male Perspective’, Sociology of Health and Illness, 26, (3), 326-350. 
 
McNicholas, J., Gilbey, A., Rennie, A., Ahmedzai, S., Dono, J. & Ormerod, E. 
(2005), Pet Ownership and Human Health: a brief review of evidence and 
issues, British Medical Journal, 331, 1252-1254. 
 
Mead, G. H. (1934) Mind, Self, and Society: from the Standpoint of a Social 
Behaviourist, London: University of Chicago Press.  
~ 231 ~ 
 
Mead, G. H. (1938) The Philosophy of the Act. London: University of Chicago 
Press.   
 
Menache, S. (1997) ‘Dogs: God’s Worst Enemies?’, Society and Animals, 5, 
(1), 23-44.  
 
Mennie, A. T. (1974) ‘The Child in Pain’ In: Burton, L. (ed.) Care of the Child 
Facing Death. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 49-59.  
 
Midgley, M. (1998) Animals and Why They Matter.  Georgia: University of 
Georgia Press.  
 
Millan, C. (2008) Be The Pack Leader. London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd.  
 
Morgan, D. H. J. (1996) Family Connections: an introduction to family studies. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.   
 
Mort, M., Convery, I., Baxter, J. and Bailey, C. (2007) ‘Psychosocial Effects of 
the 2001 UK Foot and Mouth Disease Epidemic in a Rural Population: 
Qualitative Diary Based Study’, British Medical Journal, 331, 1234-1238. 
 
Nettleton, E. (1995) The Sociology of Health and Illness. Cambridge: Polity 
Press.  
 
Nimmo, R. (2012) ‘Animal Cultures, Subjectivity, and Knowledge: Symmetrical 
Reflections beyond the Great Divide’, 20, (2), 173-192.  
 
Nonhuman Rights Project (2014) Home Page.  Available at: 
http://www.nonhumanrights.org/ [Date accessed: 6/4/2014]. 
 
O’Donnell, M. (2001) Classical and Contemporary Sociology: Theory and 
Issues. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
 
Owens, C., Lambert, H., Lloyd, K. and Donovan, J. (2088) ‘Tales of 
Biographical Disintegration: How Parents Make Sense of their Sons’ Suicides’, 
Sociology of Health and Illness, 30, (2), 237-254.  
 
Parslow, R. A., and Jorm, A. F. (2003) ‘Pet Ownership and Risk Factors for 
Cardiovascular Disease: Another Look’, The Medical Journal of Australia, 179, 
(9), 466-474.   
 
Parsons, T. (Summer, 1975) ‘The Sick Role and the Role of the Physician 
Reconsidered’, Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly Health and Society, 53, (3), 
257-78. 
 
Patterson, F. G. (1981) ‘Ape Language’, Science 211, (4477), 86–88. 
 
Peck, M. S. (1997) The Road Less Travelled and Beyond: spiritual growth an 
age of anxiety. London: Rider Books.  
 
~ 232 ~ 
 
Peggs, K. (2009) ‘A hostile world for nonhuman animals: human identification 
and the oppression of nonhuman animals for human good’, Sociology, 43, (1), 
85-102. 
 
Peggs, K. (2012) Animals and Sociology. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.  
 
Pepperberg, I. M. (1998). Talking with Alex: Logic and Speech in Grey Parrots. 
Scientific American. 
 
Pietilä , A. (2001) ‘Support Groups: a Psychological or Social Device for 
Suicide Bereavement?’, British Journal of Guidance and Counselling, 30, (4), 
401-414, cited in Owens, C., Lambert, H., Lloyd, K. and Donovan, J. (2088) 
‘Tales of Biographical Disintegration: How Parents Make Sense of their Sons’ 
Suicides’, Sociology of Health and Illness, 30, (2), 237-254.  
 
Pitcher, G. (2010) A Time to Live: the Case Against Euthanasia and Assisted 
Suicide. Oxford: Monarch Books.  
 
Pritchard, E. (1940) The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and 
Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Provet (2009) Provet Healthcare Information - Chronic Degenerative 
Radiculomyelopathy CDRM. Available from: 
 http://www.provet.co.uk/health/diseases/cdrm.htm  [accessed 14 July 2009].  
 
Punch, S. (2012) Hidden Struggles of Fieldwork: Exploring the Role and Use 
of Field Diaries, Emotion, Space and Society, 5, (2), 86-93. 
 
Punch, S. (2014) ‘Resilience and Wellbeing’ In: Open University Changing 
Childhoods: Local and Global. Education and Language Series, Level 2 Book 
4: The Open University.  
 
Ramsden, E. and Wilson, D. (2010) ‘The Nature of Suicide: Science and the 
Self-destructive Animal’, Science Direct, 34, (1), 21-24.  
 
Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (2003) Qualitative Research Practice: a guide for 
social science students and researchers. London: Sage. 
 
Rollin, B. E. (1989) The Unheeded Cry: animal consciousness, animal pain as 
and science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
 
Rosenhan, D. L. (1973) ‘On Being Sane in Insane Places’, Science, (179), 
250-258. 
 
Ruiz-Izaguirra, E. and Eilers, C., H., A., M. (2012) ‘Perceptions of Village Dogs 
by Villagers and Tourists in the Coastal Region of Rural Oaxaca, Mexico’, 
Anthrozoös, 25, (1), 75-91.  
 
Sanders, C. R. (1999) Understanding Dogs: Living and Working with Canine 
Companions. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
~ 233 ~ 
 
Sanders, C. R. (2003) ‘Actions Speak Louder than Words: Close Relations 
between Humans and Nonhuman Animals’, Symbolic Interaction, 26, (3), 405-
426.  
 
Schaefer, D. O. (2012) ‘Do Animals Have Religion? Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on Religion and Embodiment’, 25, (Supplement), S173-SS189. 
 
Scott, S. (2009) Making Sense of Everyday Life. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Seale, C. (1995a) ‘Dying Alone’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 17, (3), 376-392. 
 
Seale, C. (1995b) ‘Heroic Death’, Sociology, 29, (4), 597- 612. 
 
Seale, C. (1998) Constructing Death: the sociology of dying and bereavement. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Shapiro, K. (2008) Human–Animal Studies: Growing the Field, Applying the 
Field. Ann Arbor: Animals and Society Institute. 
 
Shilling, C. (2012) The Body and Social Theory, 3rd Edn, London: Sage.  
 
Siegel, J., P. (2006) ‘Dyadic Splitting in Partner Relational Disorders’, Journal 
of Family Psychology, 20, (3), Special Section: Relational Disorders and 
Relational Processes in Mental Health. 418-422. 
 
Silverman, D. (2005) Doing Qualitative Research. 2nd edn, London: Sage.  
  
Sorokin, P., A. (1942) Man and Society in Calamity. New York: Dutton and Co. 
 
Stoker, G. (1998), ‘Governance as Theory: Five Propositions’, International 
Social Science Journal, 50, (155), 17-28. 
 
Strauss, A. (1978) Negotiations: varieties, context, processes, and social 
order. London: Jossey-Bass Publishers.  
 
Sweeting, H. and Gilhooly, M. (1997) ‘Dementia and the Phenomenon of 
Social Death’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 19, (1), 93-117.  
 
Taylor, B. (2010) ‘Hospice Nurses Tell Their Stories About a Good Death: the 
Value of Storytelling as a Qualitative Health Research Method’, Annual Review 
of Health and Social Science, 3, 97-108.  
 
The Dog Whisperer with Caesar Milan. The National Geographic Channel. 
Original run 13 September 2004.  
 
The Wolf in Your Living Room. BBC. 4 April 2988. Presented by Desmond 
Morris, Produced by Mike Beynon.   
 
Timmermans, S. (2005) ‘Death Brokering: Constructing Culturally Appropriate 
Deaths’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 27, (7), 992-1013.   
~ 234 ~ 
 
Timmermans, S. (2010) ‘There’s More to Dying than Death: Qualitatieve 
Research on the End-of-Life’ In: Bourgeault, I., Dingwall, R., and de Vries, R. 
(2010) The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Methods in Health Research. 
London: Sage. 19-33. 
 
Tipper, B. (2011) ‘A Dog Who I Know Quite Well’: Everyday Relationships 
Between Children and Animals’, Children’s Geographies, 9, (2), 145-165.  
 
Tronto, J. (1993) Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. 
New York: Routledge.  
 
U.S. Department of Energy, Genome Programs. (19 September 2011). Human 
Genome Project Information. Available from:  
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/about.shtml 
[accessed 24 January 2013]. 
 
U.S. Department of Energy, Genome Programs. National Human Genome 
Research Institute Dog Genome Project. Available from: 
http://research.nhgri.nih.gov/dog_genome/  [accessed 24 January 2013].  
 
Villalta-Gil, V., Roca, M., Gonzalez, N., Doménec, E., Cuca, Escanilla, A., 
Asensio, M., R., Esteban, M., E., Ochoa, S., Haro, J., M., and Schi-Can Group, 
(2009) ‘Dog-Assisted Therapy in the Treatment of Chronic Schizophrenia 
Inpatients’, Anthrozoös, 22, (2), 149-159.  
 
Walker, E. R. (September 1999) Common Canine Behavioural Crises, talk 
given at the British Veterinary Association Congress.  
 
Warnock, M and Macdonald, E. (2008) Easeful Death: is there a Case for 
Assisted Dying? Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Wells, D. L. (2004) ‘The Facilitation of Social Interactions by Domestic Dogs’, 
Anthrozoös, 17, (4), 340-352.  
 
Wesley M. C., Minatrea N. B. and Watson, J. C. (2009) ‘Animal-Assisted 
Therapy in the Treatment of Substance Dependence’, Anthrozoös, 22, (2), 
137-148.  
 
Wilkie, R. (2005) ‘Sentient Commodities and Productive Paradoxes: the 
Ambiguous Nature of Human-livestock Relations in Northeast Scotland’, 
Journal of Rural Studies, 21, 213-230. 
 
Wilkie, R. and McKinnon, A. (2013) ‘George Herbert Mead on Humans and 
Other Animals: Social Relations After Human-Animal Studies’, Sociological 
Research Online. 18, (4), pages unlisted.  Available at: 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/18/4/19.html  
 
Wolpert, L. (1999) Malignant Sadness: the Anatomy of Depression.  London: 
Faber and Faber.  
 
~ 235 ~ 
 
Appendix 1 – Full Demographic Details of Participants 
Principal Canine 
Participant 
name  gender age 
Principal Human 
Participant 
name  gender age 
Others Living in Household* 
name species/role  gender age 
Bashan**  M  nk*** Nathaniel M  nk None 
 
Brandy  F  - 
Turner  M  -  
Matthew M  nk Stacie partner  F  nk 
 
Braxton M  12 
Zayne M  4 
Irma F  40 None  
Fritz M  8 
Glen M  5 
Rowan F  67 Gregor partner  M  70 
Mason M  3 
Diesel M  2 
Amanda F  51 Fred  cat  M   15 
Omar parrot  M   5 
Kaitlin daughter  F   24 
Cormac son  M   26 
Samir partner   M   40 
 
Mitch M  20 
Sally F  16 
Margaret  F  48 Ochre  springer spaniel (Ned’s son) M   10 
Damson springer spaniel (Ned’s  F   7 
 daughter) 
Buttons  Shetland pony F   16 
Summer Sun Thoroughbred horse F   9 
Autumn Rain Corona cross  F   2 
 (Bella’s foal) 
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Pandora  F  8 
 
Olga F  65 Fleece Visiting canine companion   F  13  
 of Olga’s former partner  
Rose F  - Winston M nk None and Holly is deceased.   
 
Rusty  M 5 mth Rebekah 42 F  
 
Ross partner  M  56 
Sierra F  13½ 
Ted M  14 
Kari F  7 
Susan F  46 Flip budgie   M 5+ 
Frank partner    M 50 
Connor son   M 19 
 
*    this includes those who stay overnight regularly, but not family living away from home, deceased pets/people, or visiting  
     dog walkers/groomers 
**  the names of non-humans are italicised  
***not known  
N.B. Names of both humans and nonhumans have been anonymised  
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Appendix 2 
 
Interview Details  
 
Participants Names 
and Visit No.  
Date and Time 
 
Duration Audio Recorded 
Component 
 
Mason & Diesel 
Initial Meeting/Visit 1 
Tuesday 25 January 2011  
10.30 am to 1.51 pm  
3 hours 21 mins  - 
Mason & Diesel 
Visit 2 
Tuesday 1 February 2011 
11.25 am to 3.00 pm  
3 hours 35 mins  20 mins  
Mason & Diesel 
Visit 3  
Wednesday 9 February 2011 
11.10 am  to 1.54 pm  
2 hours 44 mins 25 mins 
Mason & Diesel 
Visit 4 
Tuesday 8 March 2011  
10.44 am to 2.54 pm  
4 hours 10 mins  - 
Mason & Diesel 
Visit 5 
Thursday 24 March 2011  
10.20 am to 1.25 pm  
3 hours 5 mins 19 mins  
Mason & Diesel 
Visit 6 
Tuesday 13 September 2011  
11.06 to 3.50 pm   
4 hours 44 mins 28 mins  
Mason & Diesel 
Visit 7 
Wednesday 16 November 2011  
10.50 am to 3.15 pm   
4 hours 25 mins  13 mins   
    
Sierra, Ted & Kari 
Initial Meeting/Visit 1 
Wednesday 26 January 2011 
1.40 pm to 3.20 pm  
1 hour 40 mins  - 
Sierra, Ted & Kari 
Visit 2  
Saturday 12 February 2011  
9.30 am to 12.17 pm  
2 hours 47 mins 27 mins  
Sierra, Ted & Kari 
Visit 3  
Saturday 2 April 2011  
10.17 am to 1.00 pm  
2 hours 43 mins 30 mins 
Sierra, Ted & Kari 
Visit 4  
Saturday 17 September 2011  
10.54 am to 1.50 pm  
2 hours 56 mins  46 mins  
Sierra, Ted & Kari 
Visit 5 
Saturday 3 December 2011 
11.07 am to 1.28 pm  
2 hours 11 mins 37 mins  
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Participants Names 
and Visit No. 
Date and Time 
 
Duration Audio Recorded 
Component 
 
Mitch & Sally 
Initial Meeting/Visit 1 
Wednesday 9 March 2011  
12.00 noon to 1.45 pm  
2 hours 45 mins  - 
Mitch & Sally 
Visit 2 
Tuesday 29 March 2011  
10.26 am to 3.38  
5 hours 12 mins 23 mins  
Mitch & Sally 
Visit 3  
Tuesday 10 May 2011  
11.00 am 1.55 pm 
2 hours 55 mins 43 mins 
Mitch & Sally 
Visit 4 
Thursday 30 June 2011  
11.00 am to early afternoon 
4 hours approx.  25 mins  
Mitch & Sally 
Visit 5 
Thursday 6 October 2011  
9.57 am to 3.06 pm  
5 hours 9 mins 28 mins  
Mitch & Sally 
Visit 6 
Monday 19 March 2012  
9.45 am to 2.40 pm  
4 hours 55 mins  25 mins  
Mitch & Sally 
Visit 7 
Friday 24 August 2012 
9.44 am to 2.43 pm  
4 hours 59 mins  30 mins  
    
Rose 
Initial Visit/Visit 1 
Saturday 19 March 2011 
12.50 pm to 3.25 pm  
2 hours 35 mins  - 
Rose 
 Visit 2 
Thursday 5 May 2011  
11.50 am to 6.30 pm  
6 hours 40 mins 47 mins  
Rose 
 Visit 3 
Thursday 23 June 2011  
10.25 am to mid afternoon 
5 hours 30 mins 
approx. 
43 mins  
    
Pandora 
Initial Meeting/Visit 1 
Thursday 31 March 2011  
11.00 am to late morning  
1 hour approx..   - 
Pandora  
Visit 2 
Wednesday 15 June 2011  
9.42 am to early afternoon 
4 hours 30 mins 
approx.. 
32 mins  
Pandora  
Visit 3  
Friday 9 March 2012  
11.20 am to mid afternoon 
5 hours approx..   11 mins (Part 1) 
41 mins (Part 2) 
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Participants Names 
and Visit No.  
Date and Time 
 
Duration Audio Recorded 
Component 
 
Rusty 
Initial Meeting/Visit 1  
(+ Irma) 
Thursday 19 May 2011  
12.17 am to 1.16 pm 
59 mins  - 
Rusty 
Visit 2  
Saturday 4 June 2011  
9.48 am to 2.23 pm 
4 hour 35 mins   - 
Rusty 
Visit 3  
Saturday 11 June 2011  
9.39 am to 2.16 pm  
4 hours 37 mins 39 mins  
Rusty 
Visit 4 
Saturday 15 October 2011  
9.52 am to 2.23 pm   
4 hours 31 mins  56 mins  
Rusty 
Visit 5  
Saturday 28 January 2012  
9.40 am to 2.25 pm  
4 hours 45 mins   - 
    
Braxton & Zayne  
Initial Meeting/Visit 1 
(+ Rekekah)  
Thursday 19 May 2011  
12.17 am to 1.16 pm  
(joint with Marion’s initial visit) 
59 mins   - 
Braxton & Zayne  
Visit 2 
Saturday 12 November 2011 
11.15 am to 2.25 pm  
3 hours 10 mins 10 mins (Part 1) 
49 mins (Part 2) 
Braxton & Zayne  
Visit 3 
Saturday 11 February 2012  
10.00 am to 3.32 pm  
5 hours 32 mins  40 mins (Part 1) 
15 mins (Part 2) 
    
Fritz & Glen 
Initial Meeting/Visit 1 
Friday 18 November 2011 
11.13 am to 2.14 pm  
3 hours 1 min  - 
Fritz & Glen  
Visit 2 
Tuesday 31 January 2012 
9.42 am to 3.30 pm  
5 hours 48 mins  44 mins 
Fritz & Glen  
Visit 3 
Tuesday 21 February 2012  
9.44 am to 3.39 pm  
5 hours 55 mins 37 mins  
    
Bashan 
Initial Meeting/Visit 1 
Wednesday 23 November 2011  
10.20 am to 3.30 pm  
5 hours 10 mins  - 
Bashan  
Visit 2  
Wednesday 7 December 2011 
10.15 am to 3.25 pm  
5 hours 10 mins 51 mins  
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Participants Names 
and Visit No.  
Date and Time 
 
Duration Audio Recorded 
Component 
 
Brandy 
Initial Meeting/Visit 1 
Thursday 14 June 2012  
Afternoon  
30 mins   - 
Brandy  
Initial Meeting/Visit 2 
Friday 22 June 2012  
11.00 am to 1.10 pm  
2 hours 10 mins  29 mins  
N.B. The interview duration time is accurate to within 5 minutes, though may include some 
travelling time, and the recorded component time is accurate to within 1 minute, unless 
otherwise indicated.   
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Appendix 3 - Information Sheet  
 
Dear ? 
 
Thank you for your interest in participating in my project.  Further to our discussions I am 
writing this information sheet for you to give you a clear indication of the nature of the project 
that you and your companion animals will be involved in, and what to expect. 
 
Contact Details  
You can contact me by email on maria.desougi@blueyonder.co.uk or by telephone on 07804 
292 033 with any questions that you may have about the project.   
 
If you have a concern regarding the project, but for any reason do not wish to address it to me,  
you may contact the School of Applied Social Science on telephone 01786 467695, or email  
appliedsocialscience@stir.ac.uk.   
Or you may contact the Head of School, Professor Bowes, on a.m.bowes@stir.ac.uk. 
 
Area: Sociology  
This project is in the discipline of Sociology, specifically the area of human and animal 
interaction, and is concerned with what it means to their owners when companion canines 
become unwell and how illness and loss may affect the animals and their owners  
 
Purpose & Funding  
This study is a PhD level project funded by the Economic & Social Research Council of Britain.     
 
Supervision: Stirling University 
This project will be run under the guidance of Stirling University, Department of Sociology.  
The specific supervisors are Dr S Punch and Dr I McIntosh of Stirling University.     
 
What to Expect 
I will come to your home at our pre-arranged times on multiple occasions.  During these visits 
we will talk about your relationship with your companion animals and one or more of these 
conversation will be recorded by digital recorder.  I would also appreciate the opportunity to 
meet your companion animals and to see you with them, and take part in some everyday 
activities with you, such as walking the dog/s.  It would also be beneficial to see photographs 
or videos of any of your companion animals that you may wish to share with me.  The 
information gathered will be analysed and written into my thesis, which will then be submitted 
to Stirling University and may lead to a publication.   
 
Sensitivity 
This project will be conducted sensitively to the best of my ability.  Your contribution will be 
confidential and your anonymity protected.  A different name will be substituted for your name, and 
those of your companion animals in the project.  I will ask for your consent before sharing anything 
that may be identifiable (such as having a photograph of your dog as part of a presentation).  The 
inclusion of any visual materials in the thesis will be at your discretion.  You may withdraw from the 
project without explanation or penalty at any time.  When we are recording you can of course ask 
for the tape to be stopped for a break at any time.  You may also see a summary of the final results 
of the project if you want.   
 
When Confidentiality Will Not Apply 
In the unlikely event of the research uncovering issues of serious risk or harm to respondents or 
others, it may be appropriate for the researcher to pass this information on to the relevant 
authorities.  
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In the Event of After Effects 
Though I do not anticipate it, should you experience any discomforting after effects which you 
consider may result from your involvement in this study you may contact me.  If you consider 
that your participation has awoken any personal difficulties you may wish to speak with some 
one close whom you trust.  If you have become aware of any issues concerning your health 
during the course of your participation, you may wish to consider contacting your general 
practitioner.  If you have become aware of any issues concerning the health of your 
companion animals during the course of participation, you may wish to consult a veterinary 
service.   
 
If you are experiencing distress on the illness or passing of a companion animal, you may wish 
to contact The Blue Cross, a national animal welfare organisation, who provide support both 
by telephone on 0800 096 6606 or by email on pbssmail@bluecross.org.uk, their website can 
be found at http://www.bluecross.org.uk/web/site/home/home.asp . 
 
Thank you again for your interest and involvement in this study.  
 
 
 
 
Maria Desougi  
March 2010  
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Appendix 3 - Consent Form  
for participation in PhD Project regarding 
Human and Canine Companion Animal Relationships 
 
I …………………………………..…hereby give my consent, and that of the companion animals 
in my care, to voluntary participation in the above named project being run by Maria Desougi 
under the guidance of Stirling University Department of Applied Social Science.   
 
I have read the information sheet provided and am aware of what to expect during 
participation and that I and my companion animals will be observed and recorded and that this 
should not cause any harm to myself or my companion animals.     
 
I am aware that I may choose not to answer any question and that I may withdraw from the 
project at any time without explanation or penalty.   
 
I am aware that the written and audio recorded data gathered will form part of a PhD and that 
the inclusion of any visual materials concerning myself and my companion animals will be at 
my discretion. 
 
I am aware of my confidentiality and that a different name will be substituted for my name and 
the names of my companion animals.  So that I am not identifiable in written or oral records, 
presentations, publications or reports, based on the data gathered.   
  
I am aware of the purpose of the study and of who to contact regarding any questions or 
difficulties that I may have regarding the project.   
 
In light of these conditions  
and ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
(any additional conditions you require) 
 
I give my consent to my participation and that of my companion animals in the above named 
project.   
 
Signed …………………………………………………… 
Date  …………………………………………………… 
Witnessed …………………………………………………… (Maria Desougi) 
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Appendix 3 - Debriefing Information   
for participation in PhD study regarding  
Human and Canine Companion Animal Relationships 
 
 
 
 
Dear  ? 
 
My thanks to you and your companion animals for participating in this study.   
 
The information you have shared with me will be treated with confidentiality and respect.  
The data gathered will be analysed and written into my PhD thesis, which will then be 
submitted to Stirling University and may lead to a publication.   
 
Should you so wish you may see a summary of the finished work.   
 
 
Contact Details  
You can contact me by email on maria.desougi@blueyonder.co.uk or by telephone on 
07804 292 033 with any questions that you may have about the project.   
 
If you have a concern regarding the project, but for any reason do not wish to address it to me,  
you may contact the School of Applied Social Science on telephone 01786 467695, or email  
appliedsocialscience@stir.ac.uk.   
Or you may contact the Head of School, Professor Bowes, on a.m.bowes@stir.ac.uk. 
 
In the Event of After Effects 
Should you experience any discomforting after effects which you consider may result from 
your involvement in this study you may contact me.  If you consider that your participation 
has awoken any personal difficulties you may wish to speak with some one close whom 
you trust.  If you have become aware of any issues concerning your health during the 
course of your participation, you may wish to consider contacting your general practitioner.  
If you have become aware of any issues concerning the health of your companion animals 
during the course of participation, you may wish to consult a veterinary service.   
 
If you are experiencing distress on the illness or passing of a companion animal, you may 
wish to contact The Blue Cross, a national animal welfare organisation, who provide 
support both by telephone on 0800 096 6606 or by email on pbssmail@bluecross.org.uk, 
their website can be found at http://www.bluecross.org.uk/web/site/home/home.asp . 
 
Thank you again for your interest and involvement in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maria Desougi  
May 2010     
Appendix 4 - Interview Schedule 
 
1) Intro - Thank participant, explain purpose of interview and confirm 
consent.  Check that they are comfortable with setting and aware of 
confidentiality and that they can withdraw at any time.  Ask for 
demographic details such as age, location, who living in home, level of 
prosperity, lifestyle, to give them time to relax.   
 
2) History – ask about early life and interaction with animals.  Any 
animals in the family, grew up in rural/urban setting etc.? 
 
3) Current – why current companions and questions regarding the 
specific companions (where from, how long)? 
 
4) Have they experienced illness of a companion canine, if/how did this 
affect their relationship? 
 
5) Have they experienced the loss of a canine companion, if/how did this 
affect them and other companion animals?   
 
6) Routines – are there routines?  Are there special times and how are 
these marked?   
 
7) Context – how are the companions situated (family, security etc.).  
Who does which aspects of the care taking?  Do they have special 
places/items?   
 
8) Thank participant and end on a note of encouragement.   
 
 
 
 
Remember your themes: meaning and interaction   
 
KEEP QUESTIONS LIGHT AND NOT LEADING 
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